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

THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF HUGH FIRST VISCOUNT GOUGH FIELD-MARSHAL

BY

ROBERT S. RAIT

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD

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WITH MAPS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS

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

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Acknowledgements are due to General Sir Charles Gough for permission to reproduce several maps from his work, *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*; and to Mr. R. P. Dunn-Pattison, Lecturer of Magdalen College, who was good enough to draw three of the Indian maps.

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IV

MOODKEE AND FEROZESHAH

THE Sikhs, on their part, had done nothing so interesting as to make an attempt to capture the Head of the Indian Government. On crossing the Sutlej, they threatened Ferozepore, but declined to try conclusions with Sir John Littler, who showed them that he was prepared to resist any attack, and even to offer battle if they desired it. They contented themselves with investing Ferozepore from one side, and, marching southwards, took up an entrenched position at Ferozeshah, about halfway between Ferozepore and Moodkee, which, as we have seen, the relieving force was approaching on the evening of the 18th of December. The Sikhs were probably unaware of the combination of the Ludhiana and Umballa forces, and, under-estimating the British numbers, they decided not to await Sir Hugh's attack, but to detach a portion of their army from Ferozeshah, with the view ofoverwhelming his small army. The numbers detached to make the attack at Moodkee have been estimated at about 10,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry with 22 guns[1]. The force under Sir Hugh Gough num-

[1] Colonel Malleson, in his *Decisive Battles of India*, says: 'The numbers given in the official despatches are absurdly unreliable.' The fact that Sir Hugh Gough expressly gives

bered almost 10,000 men. 'The country,' says the Commander-in-Chief in his dispatch, 'is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low, but in some places, thick, jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks.' Almost from the start they were in touch with the enemy, feeling-parties of whom retired before Sir Hugh's cavalry patrols. The van reached Moodkee soon after midday (18th December), and the army began to encamp, when, about three o'clock in the afternoon, it was announced that the Sikhs were advancing. It has frequently been stated that the army was surprised at Moodkee, and it is an interesting illustration of the danger of trusting to a single personal impression that Major Broadfoot believed that it was he who had given the alarm. It was certainly Major Broadfoot who carried the information to the tent of the Governor-General, but the news was not a surprise to the Commander-in-Chief. Unlike the Governor-General, who, naturally enough, had never seen the Sutlej before the war broke out, the Commander-in-Chief had, as we have seen, in the preceding year, made a most careful survey of the situation, and had been over this very ground on the 9th of December, 1844. When the Chief and his staff reached Moodkee, Sir Hugh sent out his acting Military Secretary, Captain (now Field-Marshal Sir Frederick) Haines, to the right front to see and hear any movement of troops. Captain Haines found a cavalry piquet

these numbers as hearsay would never be suspected by Colonel Malleson's readers.

under Captain Quin (it is frequently said that Sir Hugh did not take the obvious precaution of protecting his camp with piquets)[1], and obtained from Quin the information that he had, for some little time, been watching clouds of dust in the distance, indicating the movement of a large body of troops. When he reported this to the Chief, he found that Sir Hugh was already aware of it, and had taken measures accordingly. This was some time before the action began; the dust-clouds could be seen for a great distance. It was now about three o'clock in the afternoon.

Sir Hugh Gough's plan of attack was to silence the enemy's guns, outflank them by his cavalry, and after cavalry, artillery, and musketry had been given full scope to do their work, to complete their demoralization by an infantry charge. For this purpose he sent the cavalry immediately to the front. The Brigades of Michael White and J. B. Gough moving forward to our right, and that of Brigadier Mactier to our left, threatened the enemy's flanks. The horse artillery joined the field batteries, which were all massed in our immediate centre. While Sir Hugh Gough was engaged in superintending these arrangements, the infantry was forming up in second line—Sir Harry Smith's Division on the right; Major-General Gilbert's Division (lacking its European troops, which had not come

[1] The late Field-Marshal Sir Patrick Grant, as well as Sir Frederick Haines, gave an absolute contradiction to this assertion.

up) in the centre, and Sir John McCaskill's Division on the left[1]. While the infantry was forming into line, the Sikh artillery commenced the battle with a fierce cannonade. The British artillery replied, and (although the enemy's guns were protected by the jungle) with such effect that the enemy's artillery soon appeared (in Sir Hugh's words) to be paralysed. This had continued for some little time when the enemy's cavalry began to advance, and their line, extending beyond ours, became a source of danger to our flanks. A further difficulty arose—the necessity of making room for the formation of the second line without pushing the artillery forward, for it was not yet possible to risk too near an approach of our guns to the jungle. At this juncture, Brigadiers Gough and White, obeying orders from the Commander-in-Chief, swept out on the right with the cavalry and charged the enemy[2], as

[1] The forces were composed as follows:—Brigadier Mactier commanded the 9th Irregular Cavalry and a portion of the 4th Lancers; Brigadier Gough the 5th Light Cavalry and the Bodyguard; Brigadier White the 3rd Light Dragoons and the remainder of the 4th Lancers. Sir Harry Smith's Division consisted of H.M.'s 50th Foot, the 42nd and 48th Native Infantry, under Brigadier Wheeler, on the right; with H.M.'s 31st Foot and the 24th and 47th Native Infantry on the left, under Brigadier Bolton. The 2nd and 16th Grenadiers and the 45th Native Infantry composed Gilbert's Division; and Sir John McCaskill's included H.M.'s 9th Foot, the 26th Native Infantry, the 73rd Native Infantry, and H.M.'s 80th Foot under Brigadier Wallace. The Artillery was under the charge of Brigadier Brooke.

[2] The 2nd Lord Hardinge (p. 85) says of this: 'Sir Hugh

opportunity offered. Similar orders had been given to Brigadier Mactier, with the view of turning the enemy's right. Both movements were carried out with complete success. The Sikh horse could not stand against the brilliant charge which won for the 3rd Light Dragoons the name of the *Moodkeewallahs*. Left and right they fell back, and the British cavalry moved rapidly along the Sikh infantry and artillery, silencing for the time the enemy's guns. Brigadier Brooke now pushed up his horse artillery to the jungle. Night was falling as the infantry advanced, Sir Harry Smith's Division in front. They were met by what their commander describes as 'an overwhelming force of Sikh infantry.' The Sikhs fought well, and their gunners made a noble defence. Sir John McCaskill fell dead at the head of his division; Brigadier Bolton was mortally wounded while leading his brigade, and, on his right, Wheeler fell, severely wounded. But the infantry pressed on, and the resistance slackened. 'Their whole force,' says the dispatch, 'was driven from position after position, with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using that

Gough with the Cavalry Division had moved to the right, and soon engaged the enemy's horse. Then ensued a sort of Balaclava *mêlée*.' Sir Frederick Haines states that the Commander-in-Chief rode a couple of hundred yards or so with the Cavalry when giving his orders to General White, but he took no further part in their movement, returning at once to superintend the disposition of the troops for the frontal attack.

never-failing weapon, the bayonet[1], whenever they stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during one hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object.' The victory was complete; the invincible Khalsa had been routed in its assault upon the British, and the Commander-in-Chief might well congratulate himself on the result. But, complete as it was, the triumph was dearly bought. In addition to Sir John McCaskill and Brigadier Bolton, the army had lost the distinguished Quartermaster-General of Her Majesty's troops, Sir Robert Sale. The total loss was 215 of all ranks killed and 657 wounded[1]. Among the killed were thirteen European officers and two native officers. The Deputy-Adjutant-General, Major Patrick Grant, the son-in-law of the Commander-in-Chief, was among the wounded. Part of the loss must be ascribed, not to the courage, but to the fanaticism of the Sikh

[1] The weapon employed, it must be remembered, was still the 'Brown Bess,' which had done such good service under the Duke of Wellington. Its range was 300 yards, and that of the artillery only 800 yards.

[2] The figures are—

Personal Staff: Two officers killed and two wounded.
General Staff: One officer killed and one wounded.
Artillery: 27 killed, 47 wounded.
Cavalry: 81 killed, 87 wounded.
1st Infantry Division (Smith's): 78 killed, 339 wounded.
2nd Infantry Division (Gilbert's): 18 killed, 100 wounded.
3rd Infantry Division (McCaskill's): 8 killed, 79 wounded.

army. Brave as they were, they expected no mercy and they gave none. They killed and mutilated the wounded, and there were instances in which (like the Soudanese dervishes in more recent years) Sikhs who had been spared, murdered in cold blood those to whom they owed their lives. Part of the loss must also be referred to the confusion of the attack. Sir Hugh, writing to his son on the 19th, regrets the necessity of a night attack, which was forced on the army by the Sikh advance. To encamp was out of the question. Some of the loss, he says, 'was caused, I am quite convinced, by corps firing into one another.' Sir Henry Hardinge made the same remark in a letter to Lord Ripon, printed in his son's *Life* (p. 86). 'There can be no doubt,' wrote Sir Henry, 'that the following reason may have operated prejudicially upon the native Corps. The troops having been collected from various points, and constantly engaged in marching, had only been brigaded on paper. . . . The troops therefore were not in that state of organization and formation so essential to discipline and field movements. The brigadiers and their staff were unknown to the men, and the men to the brigadiers, while at Múdkí the confusion of the attack, combined with the facts above noticed, had created a feeling that the army was not well in hand.' These statements, made by the Governor-General to the President of the Board of Control, seem to suggest some censure upon the Commander-in-Chief. But it must be remembered that the political considera-

tions, which had guided the Governor-General, had deprived the Commander-in-Chief of any opportunity of assembling his troops near the frontier and brigading them elsewhere than on paper, or of bringing together the frontier troops and the brigadiers and staff. This lack of acquaintance between brigadiers and men was merely one of the consequences of the policy of inactivity, which circumstances forced upon the Governor-General, and for which he had the sole authority and the sole responsibility. 'You are aware,' wrote Sir Hugh to his son, in the same connexion, 'that, however expedient in a political point of view, I had it not in my power to arrest this evil[1].'

The fall of night and the tired condition of the army prevented the troops from following up their advantage. The Commander-in-Chief did not leave the field till two o'clock on the morning of the 19th, and, four hours later, he was again on the scene. But the army required a rest; reinforcements were hurrying up, and Sir Hugh was within reach of Littler should he require his aid. The day was, therefore, devoted to the care of the wounded and the burial of the dead. In the evening, two regiments joined—H.M.'s 29th Foot from Kassauli, and the 1st European Light Infantry from Subathu, along with two 8-inch howitzers, and two regiments of Native Infantry. The march from Kassauli and Subathu was performed with admirable

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, December 19, 1845. Gough MSS.

BATTLE OF MOODKEE, DECEMBER 18, 1845.



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promptness, and tells its own story not only of the state of preparation of these regiments for moving, but also of the vigour and resource of the commissariat, &c., on which they depended. 'There was,' says Sir Charles Gough, 'no "mobilization scheme" in those days, yet nothing could have been more prompt and effective than the rapid and highly disciplined manner in which all these troops moved off for the war[1].' They were received with rejoicings at Moodkee. The Governor-General's own elephants and a string of camels with fresh water were sent out to meet them and to convoy them in. They were the last reinforcements which could come up for some time.

Before the army left Moodkee, the Governor-General took a step which was severely criticized at the time. 'On this evening' (December 19), says Sir Hugh Gough's dispatch, 'in addition to the valuable counsel with which you had in every emergency before favoured me, you were pleased yet further to strengthen my hands by kindly offering your services as second in command of my army. I need hardly say with how much pleasure the offer was accepted.' It was an act of chivalry which has frequently been described as quixotic, and, two days later, it added greatly to the difficulties of a delicate situation. But while the measure was one of doubtful wisdom, involving, as it did, the risk of straining to an open rupture,

[1] *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, p. 81.

at a critical moment, the always difficult relations between a Commander-in-Chief and a Governor-General, it is impossible not to admire the spirit in which it was made, or the freedom from 'red tape' notions of official dignity which enabled Lord Hardinge to serve his country under the directions of his own subordinate. He had been (as Sir Hugh told his son) 'in the thick of it' at Moodkee, and had placed his personal staff at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.

The situation of the enemy was quite well known. One portion of their forces, under Tej Singh, was watching Ferozepore; the other, under Lal Singh, was entrenched at Ferozeshah. Throughout the 19th there had been rumours of another attack, and due preparations were made; but the enemy wisely decided to remain within their lines and to await the British assault. The aim of the Commander-in-Chief was threefold—to maintain his communications, to deal separately with Lal Singh and with Tej Singh, and to obtain the assistance of a portion of Littler's Division. He had, therefore, no option but to attack the strong Sikh position at Ferozeshah. Any attempt to march round to Ferozepore would have resulted in the loss of his communications, and the junction of the two Sikh forces. Orders were therefore sent to Sir John Littler to elude the vigilance of the Sikhs, and, leaving a small guard at Ferozepore, to effect a junction with the main body. It was by no means an easy task, but both the Commander-

in-Chief and the Governor-General trusted to the abilities of Sir John Littler. It was not possible to rely with absolute confidence on the success of so difficult a manœuvre, and Sir Hugh Gough decided that, whether with Littler or without him, he must attack Lal Singh on the following day; the junction of Lal Singh with Tej Singh must, at all hazards, be prevented.

These orders reached Littler on the evening of the 20th of December. On the same evening, the Commander-in-Chief summoned his officers who commanded divisions and brigades, and he was able to show them the nature of the position to be attacked. This information he had obtained from the Quartermaster-General and the Political Department, and he was himself familiar with the country. Sir Hugh, therefore, at this meeting, communicated to those concerned the main part of his plan (as far as related to the movements of troops) and gave the necessary instructions. His orders were to start very early in order to arrive in front of the Sikh position in time to commence the battle at eleven o'clock. Sir Henry Hardinge was not present at the meeting, but he was represented by his Military Secretary, Colonel Blucher Wood.

At four a.m. on the 21st, the army started from Moodkee, leaving two regiments of Native Infantry to protect the wounded and take charge of the baggage. Some changes in the arrangement of the army were necessitated by the losses at Moodkee.

Cavalry and artillery remained as before. In Sir Harry Smith's Division, Brigadier Ryan had replaced Wheeler, and Brigadier Hicks had succeeded Bolton. Gilbert's Division had been completed and divided into brigades; H.M.'s 29th Foot, the 80th Foot, and the 41st Native Infantry formed one brigade under Brigadier Taylor, and another was composed of the 1st European Light Infantry, the 16th Native Grenadiers (the Governor-General's infantry escort), and the 45th Native Infantry, under Brigadier McLaren. The 2nd Native Grenadiers had been added to the 3rd Division, and Brigadier Wallace had succeeded Sir John McCaskill in command of it. While Sir Hugh Gough's army was marching from Moodkee to Ferozeshah, important events were passing at Ferozepore. When Tej Singh had refused to attack, on the 13th, Littler had taken up a position covering the cantonment and the town, and opposite the Sikh camp. Seven days passed and the enemy showed no signs of activity. On the evening of the 20th came the message from the Governor-General, and Littler proceeded to make his dispositions accordingly. He entrusted the charge of the cantonment and the town respectively to the 63rd Regiment of Native Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson and the 27th Native Infantry. The artillery he took with him, except half a field battery which remained in the town, and a battery of heavy guns in the cantonments. The cavalry brigade accompanied him and two infantry brigades, under Brigadiers

Reid and Ashburnham[1]. About eight a.m. he succeeded in leaving Ferozepore, without attracting the attention of Tej Singh's force, and marched out towards the south-east. It was a difficult manœuvre, and the skill with which it was accomplished is characteristic of the ability displayed by Sir John Littler throughout the whole of that troubled week.

Sir Hugh Gough's force, after covering over four miles, found themselves face to face with the right of the large horseshoe entrenchment occupied by the force of Lal Singh. They had marched (after the locality of the enemy was definitely known) in column of route, and their extended line had but slowly covered the rough road in the darkness of a December morning. About half-past ten o'clock the army halted to breakfast, and the Commander-in-Chief reconnoitred the situation. The troops had time for only a very scrambled meal from their haversacks, and Sir Hugh, within view of the Sikh position, applied his army to the task before them. He had decided, the night before, that whether

[1] The Brigades were thus composed :—

Cavalry (under Brigadier Harriott): 8th Native Light Cavalry and 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

Reid's Brigade: H.M.'s 62nd Foot, 12th and 14th Regiments Native Infantry.

Ashburnham's Brigade: 33rd, 44th, and 54th Native Infantry.

Artillery (under Lt.-Col. Huthwaite): one European and one Native Troop Horse Artillery, one European Field Battery and one Native.

Littler joined him or not, he must fight Lal Singh that day; otherwise a combination of the two Sikh forces was assured. On the morning of the 21st, the situation remained unchanged except for one important modification. Sir Hugh was now tactically in connexion with Sir John Littler, for staff officers had passed between the forces. Littler was still some miles away, but his arrival was certain, and arrangements could be made for employing his force as a reserve.

At eleven o'clock, the army occupied such a position that the words, 'Right wheel into line,' would have brought on an action. Before giving the order, Sir Hugh rode up to the Governor-General and said: 'I promise you a splendid victory.' Sir Henry Hardinge had either misunderstood or was entirely ignorant of the meeting of the night before, for his son writes that 'it was with no small surprise that the Governor-General found himself confronted with such extraordinary proposals.' It was certainly with no less surprise that the Commander-in-Chief discovered that the Governor-General desired him to spend the precious hours of daylight in waiting for General Littler's arrival. The Commander-in-Chief, with his second in command, attended by a few of their staffs (among them the second Viscount Hardinge and Sir Frederick Haines), retired a short distance to discuss the situation. Sir Hugh Gough took the view that it was, above all else, necessary to attack by daylight, and pointed out that they were talking on the morning of the shortest day in the year. He

Fred. P. Stevens Jr. Col.

argued that it was essential, even if Littler's movement had failed, for them to vanquish Lal Singh's army without delay. Littler's manœuvre had not failed, and it was so much the more advisable to attack at once. Several hours must elapse before the Ferozepore division could reach the position the main body now occupied; by that time, the daylight would almost have gone, and they would be in the same plight as at Moodkee. Sir Henry Hardinge was a brave man; but he had seen no fighting from the Waterloo campaign to the date of the battle of Moodkee. He had been Secretary of State for War, but he had never known the responsibility of high command in the sight of an enemy. The courage and discipline of the Sikhs had deeply impressed him, and as he looked on their entrenchments, and on the forces at Sir Hugh's disposal, his faith failed him. The task before the army seemed greater than they could accomplish, and the confidence of the gallant old soldier who urged him on to high endeavour seemed to be only the recklessness of him whom the gods have doomed. More strongly than before, he advocated delay, and suggested that the army should march on to meet Littler. The Commander-in-Chief imagined that the Governor-General could not realize all that this proposition meant. 'What!' he exclaimed, 'abandon my communications with India, and my wounded at Moodkee!' Sir Henry Hardinge was unmoved by this appeal, and, confident that he was saving India from the rashness of his high-spirited Commander-

in-Chief, he determined to exercise his powers as Governor-General, in spite of the position he held as second in command. For the only time in Indian history, the definite plans of a Commander-in-Chief were, in the face of the enemy, over-ruled by his official superior. It was a delicate situation, and Sir Henry's generosity of two days before had rendered it doubly difficult. But the second in command could not divest himself of his supreme powers, or of his supreme responsibility. Sir Hugh Gough at once recognized that the decision was final, and he gave orders to resume the march.

The camp at Moodkee was left defenceless, and the wounded were at the mercy of a merciless enemy. In the event of failure, the communications with India would be cut and the defeated army driven upon Ferozepore. Even if there should be no failure, the position was far from easy. Sir Hugh's first duty was to make a difficult march which Sir Harry Smith describes as 'almost crossing the front of the enemy's position.' Counter-marching and the formation of the army to suit the new front must follow. Some time after midday Sir John Littler rode into the camp of the Commander-in-Chief. He was in advance of his men, but, in course of time, the junction was effected near the village of Misreewalla. Counter-marching and the new formation were not the work of a moment. About 18,000 men had to be marshalled in the face of the enemy along a line over two miles in length; the majority of them had already been

eighteen hours on the march. Declining several suggestions of an immediate attack, Sir Hugh refused to commence the battle until assured that every man was in his place, in reserve as well as in the van. The final disposition of the troops found them fronting the southern and western faces of the Ferozeshah entrenchments tired and hungry, just as they had fronted the eastern face at eleven o'clock, fresh and vigorous. The Commander-in-Chief personally conducted the right wing, which consisted of Gilbert's Division; the left was entrusted to Sir Henry Hardinge and was composed of Wallace's Division. Further to the left was Sir John Littler with the Ferozepore force, and Sir Harry Smith was placed so as to form a reserve for the centre of the whole army. The main body of the artillery was stationed between the divisions of Gilbert and Wallace; batteries of Horse Artillery were placed on the flanks, and Littler retained his own artillery which he had brought with him. The cavalry which had come from Ferozepore also remained attached to Littler's Division; the right of the main army was supported by White's Cavalry Brigade (3rd Light Dragoons and 4th Bengal Lancers) and the left by Gough's Brigade (the Governor-General's Bodyguard and the 5th Cavalry).

On receiving the report that Sir Harry Smith's Division had reached its destination, the Commander-in-Chief commenced the action. It was now between 3.30 and 4 o'clock. The battle began, as usual, with an artillery duel. It was not so

successful as at Moodkee. The enemy's guns were more numerous and of much heavier metal than our own, and they were dispersed over their position in skilful fashion. Except in the centre, where two howitzers made an excellent impression on the enemy, our artillery was everywhere getting the worst of it. The Sikh cannonade grew fiercer, and their shot and shell, lopping off the branches of the trees as they reached the British position, fell with increasing sound and fury, and began to render precarious the situation of our gunners. Finally Brigadier Brooke, who commanded the artillery, approached the Commander-in-Chief. 'Your Excellency,' he said, 'I must either advance or be blown out of the field.' Just about this time, a somewhat premature advance of Littler's Division led to a general attack along the whole line. While the cannonading was still going on, Sir Hugh heard the sound of Littler's musketry. 'Littler will be in the trenches unsupported,' he exclaimed, and he now considered it necessary to give the order for the attack by his own forces. The advance was not in time to save Littler from the disaster into which undue precipitancy led his division. The artillery was moved forward, but the right Brigade of Littler's Division, under Brigadier Reid, was already approaching the entrenchments. Not only was the attack premature; it was unfortunate in another respect, for the 2nd Brigade, composed of three regiments of Native Infantry, seem to have made no effort to support their comrades.

The Sepoys had been exhausted by the long march, and they had not the powers of endurance of the British soldier; they suffered especially from lack of food and from the difficulty of cooking it in accordance with ceremonial requirements. Reid's Brigade did all that men could do, and they were most gallantly led by Sir John Littler in person. Resolutely and steadily they faced the fire of the enemy's artillery, but misfortune dogged their footsteps, and they found themselves face to face with the heaviest guns that the Sikhs possessed. The Sepoys began to waver, but H.M.'s 62nd Foot, encouraged by Sir John Littler, kept its ground, and made its way closer to the entrenchments. Seven officers and 97 men fell dead before that frightful shower of grape; in a few minutes the killed and wounded numbered 200. The position was clearly impossible, and at length the order was given to retire[1]. The retreat was made calmly and in excel-

[1] An unfortunate mistake arose with regard to the 62nd, which Sir Hugh thus describes in a letter of February 2, 1846: 'I was quite horrified to see Sir J. Littler's report to me published. It was all a mistake and a most mischievous one. He foolishly sent to the Governor-General a copy of his report to me (censuring the 62nd). In the hurry Sir Henry put it amongst the other papers relating to the action, and the head of the Foreign Office, a civilian, not looking whether it was countersigned by my Military Secretary (which alone could make it as a document coming from me) sent it down for publication.' In a General Order the Commander-in-Chief in India did justice to the 62nd, as did also the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords (cf. pp. 96–7, 105).

lent order. The whole incident was a combination of unlucky conditions; at the very outset of the battle the troops for which they had waited so long, and to join with which the careful plan of the Commander-in-Chief had been suddenly abandoned, were completely repulsed.

The main body now attacked, the right wing (Gilbert's Division) led by Sir Hugh in person, the left by Sir Henry Hardinge. We shall, in the first place, follow the fortunes of the right. Taylor's Brigade, with H.M.'s 29th and 80th Regiments in front, made a gallant charge and, taking the entrenchments, passed straight on, beyond the guns, to the Sikh infantry which protected the camp. The bayonets flashed in the evening light; the Sikhs wavered; and the brigade was in the camp of the enemy. McLaran's Brigade followed, the 1st European Light Infantry in front. They passed through a fearful fire of shot and shell, and thinned in numbers, but unswerving, they reached the entrenchments, charged over some entanglements, and found themselves in possession of the Sikh guns. Here, as always, the devoted gunners stood by their guns, and only the bayonet could end their resistance. Here, too, the assailants found the infantry behind the guns, and volley on volley greeted their arrival. Another charge, and the brave Sikh infantry began to give way. Here and there the line was broken; here and there resolute bands tried to retrieve the disaster. But, in the end, they had to retreat, and soon the British

infantry were reinforced by the brigade of cavalry which had been stationed on their right. Through shot and shell, the 'Moodkeewallahs,' the 3rd Light Dragoons, had charged over these stern entrenchments, capturing guns and breaking up lines of infantry. McLaran's Brigade now wheeled to the left, and dashed down the Sikh lines, capturing more guns. An order was at this point conveyed to them to take the village of Ferozeshah, which was about the centre of the Sikh position. The order was being obeyed when there occurred one of those accidents which frequently turn victory into defeat. In the darkling light of the short Indian twilight there rose, above the sound and fury of the battle, the noise of a fearful explosion; and, in the ghastly gleam, those behind could see the charred remains of their comrades. Right and left the light spread, making the darkness more terrible, as another and another pile of ammunition was reached by the fire. The soldiers recognized that they had chanced on a Sikh powder magazine, and the 1st Europeans, who had suffered most, began to scatter. But there was nothing resembling flight. The brigade pulled themselves together and undauntedly pressed on to their goal.

Meanwhile Sir Henry Hardinge, with Wallace's Division, had experienced no less difficult a task. The division had been temporarily brigaded; the 9th Foot and 26th Native Infantry forming a brigade under Colonel Taylor, and the 2nd Native Grenadiers and the 73rd Regiment of Native Infantry forming

another brigade on Taylor's right. Taylor charged in front, and his attack was directed almost where Littler's had been. Amid the smoke and the dust, they mistook the precise locality of the enemy's guns, and they suffered heavily for their error, reaching a point where they were directly in front of the muzzles. Taylor fell dead and his brigade began to show signs of panic, when Captain Borton, taking Taylor's place, again brought them into action, and with success, for they captured the guns. A portion of this division, consisting mainly of some of the 9th Foot, became separated, and, meeting a party of McLaran's Brigade advancing towards the village of Ferozeshah, joined them and remained with them till next day.

We left McLaran's Brigade on its way towards the village. When they reached it, they found it already in possession of the British reserve, under Sir Harry Smith. His division had been stationed in two brigades; Hicks on the right, and Ryan on the left. When Littler was hard pressed, Smith, under Hardinge's orders, had moved up into the front line. Major Broadfoot now galloped up and warned Smith that four Sikh battalions were about to attack his flank, attempting to pierce between him and Littler. He had just time to change the direction of his troops when they met with a furious onslaught in which Broadfoot himself was killed. Having repulsed these, they charged through the entrenchments, the 50th Regiment bearing the brunt of the charge. 'I continued,' wrote Sir Harry

Smith, in his report[1], 'to advance in Line in perfect order, until impeded by the enemy's tents, when

[1] This report (printed in App. A) was not included in the public dispatches, and has never before seen the light. Some disagreement arose on the subject between the Commander-in-Chief and Sir Harry Smith. In his Autobiography Sir Harry severely criticizes Sir Hugh's strategy, and expresses the opinion that Sir Henry Hardinge's interference was right. 'There was plenty of daylight,' he says; 'the imputation of attacking too late in the day is unfounded, as I will plainly show.' This he does by complaining that after taking Ferozeshah 'it was very dark,' and then mentioning that 'the moon arose and the night was as bright as day.' All other accounts are agreed upon the deplorable effects of the fall of darkness, and Sir Harry twice alludes to it in the portions of his report quoted in the text. The moon does not appear in the report, and it is not clear from the Autobiography at what time Sir Harry's recollection placed its appearance. I am indebted to the Savilian Professor of Astronomy in the University of Oxford for the information that on December 21, 1845, the moon was just changing to her last quarter. 'She rose [over the Sutlej] at midnight and changed to her last quarter four and a half hours after rising.' So extraordinary a statement as that there was plenty of daylight seems to suggest that the writer was suffering from indignation at the suppression of his dispatches. The editor of his Biography publishes a letter from Sir James Kempt, in which the writer insinuates that Sir Hugh Gough withheld the dispatch in order to hide the fact that, if Smith had been properly supported, he would not have had to retire from the village of Ferozeshah. If this was Sir Hugh Gough's object, he was extremely maladroit in his method, for Sir James Kempt derived this very inference from what Sir Hugh did publish. It is not necessary to make any such wild conjecture; the explanation of the non-publication of the dispatch is evident at once. There are references in the dispatch which

the whole broke and, in a mass of undaunted British soldiers, pall mall, rushed forward, bore everything before them, until we reached the mud-walled village of Ferozshah, where the enemy attempted to rally, and compelled me to collect my troops. I speedily seized this village, filled with Infantry, Cavalry and Horses, richly caparisoned. . . . By this time, many Detachments belonging to the Regiments composing the left of the Main Attack had joined me. . . . It was now dark. . . .' Sir Harry, after some delay, collected his troops, and formed a semi-circular line of defence round the village. Scarcely had this been done when the enemy attacked his right, 'and that part of my position [was] shamefully abandoned. The enemy most fortunately was prevented in the

the Commander-in-Chief might reasonably prefer to treat as private, and he had to consider what was fair to others. Sir Harry, in his report, criticizes adversely, not only his own troops, but others as well; condemning, for example, the attack of the right wing as not pushed far enough, and he barely mentions the 1st Brigade of his own division, which, rightly or wrongly, he left to its own devices after receiving the order from Hardinge. All that Sir Harry says of Sir Hugh Gough in his Autobiography must be read in the light of this dispute. It is interesting and significant that, while in the Autobiography he speaks of the whole attack at Ferozeshah as badly conceived and badly carried out, in his Report to the Commander-in-Chief he refers to it as 'the most glorious battle ever fought in the East, adding additional lustre to H.M. and the Honble. Company's arms, and to the already acquired glory of the Commander-in-Chief.' Possibly Sir Hugh Gough's modesty forbade his publishing a dispatch which placed his own achievements on a higher scale than those of Clive and Wellington.

darkness from pushing the advantage gained, or all was lost.' He describes his troops as 'much excited and unsteady,' but he succeeded in making a brave defence, until between two and three in the morning.

While Sir Harry Smith was defending his position at the village of Ferozeshah, the Commander-in-Chief was passing an anxious night. When night came, the Sikhs had been driven from most, though not all of their entrenched positions, and various portions of the British forces were occupying different parts of the Sikh camp. Had there been another hour of daylight, success would have been complete. Except for Littler's initial repulse, the attack had nowhere failed, though everywhere it had met a vigorous and courageous resistance. But swiftly and relentlessly fell the night; fires broke out in the camp as package after package of ammunition exploded. The troops, scattered in the darkness, might mistake each other for detachments of the foe. The Commander-in-Chief decided to recall the army from the Sikh camp and to withdraw some 300 yards beyond the entrenchments. In this position they spent the night; the burning camp in front, the jungle behind. The Sikhs, from their entrenchments, harassed the troops with artillery, as, from time to time, the moonlight disclosed their position. One gun was nobly silenced by a charge of the 80th Foot and the 1st European Light Infantry, under orders from Sir Henry Hardinge. Most of the men had been under arms for twenty-four hours;

they were tired, hungry, and cold. To light a fire or take any other step which might attract the attention of the enemy was out of the question. What morning might reveal, they could not tell. It was not wonderful that some brave men lost nerve and urged a retreat upon Ferozepore. 'Were I to have taken,' wrote Sir Hugh Gough to his son on the 16th of January, 1846, 'the strenuous representations of officers, some of rank and in important situations, my honour and my Army would have been lost. . . . Two said they came from the Governor-General. I spurned the supposition as I knew it could not be well founded.' My answer was, 'Well, I shall go to the Governor-General, but my determination is taken rather to leave my bones to bleach honourably at Ferozeshah than that they should rot dishonourably at Ferozepore.' The Commander-in-Chief's generous repudiation of these orders[1] as impossible for the Governor-General to have given was well founded. The two met and both were agreed that retreat was not to be considered for a moment. Yet so critical was the position that Sir Henry Hardinge sent away his surgeon with Napoleon's sword (which he had received from the Duke of Wellington in 1816) that so precious a relic might be taken to a place of safety[2], and dispatched orders to his Secretary,

[1] A somewhat bitter correspondence took place over this incident at a later date. Sir Henry Hardinge denied having sent any such message.

[2] Hardinge, p. 28.

Mr. Frederick Currie, to destroy all State Papers left at Moodkee, should the British army be cut to pieces at Ferozeshah [1].

At length morning dawned, and daylight found the Commander-in-Chief calm and unperturbed. 'I saw nothing,' he says, 'to make me despond. We were well collected, and our Europeans all in good heart and in hand. I had not a doubt in my mind as to our success in the morning, when daylight showed me friend from foe.' The Sikhs had partially reoccupied their entrenchments, and the attack on these was at once resumed. After an artillery fire, under cover of which the front line advanced, a general onslaught was made on the entrenchments; and the position was carried. Entrenchments, camp, and even the village which had been the 'Castle Dangerous' of the night before, were all in possession of the British forces. Wheeling to the left, the line swept down the camp and cleared out the last traces of the enemy. The army was completely reunited. Sir Harry Smith had led his troops from the village of Ferozeshah to Misreewalla, whither they were attracted by the fires marking the spot where Littler had bivouacked, and he had rejoined in time to take part in the final attack. Morning had, indeed, brought gladness. 'The line halted,' says Sir Hugh Gough's dispatch, 'as if on a day of manœuvre, receiving its two

[1] Trotter's *Life of John Nicholson*, 8th ed., p. 55. Prince Waldemar of Prussia, who accompanied the army (*incognito*), was also sent to a position of safety.

leaders as they rode along its front, with a gratifying cheer, and displaying the captured standards of the Khalsa army. We had taken upwards of seventy-three pieces of cannon, and were masters of the whole field.'

The rejoicings of Sir Hugh's exhausted force were interrupted by the news that Tej Singh's army was marching from Ferozepore and was close upon them. Even the undaunted old Lion Heart felt his confidence for a moment wavering. 'The only time I felt a doubt,' he says[1], 'was towards the evening of the 22nd when the fresh enemy advanced, with heavy columns of Cavalry, Infantry and guns, when we had not a shot[2] with our guns, and our Cavalry Horses were thoroughly done up. For a moment then I felt a regret (and I deeply deplore my want of confidence in Him who never failed me nor forsook me) as each passing shot left me on horseback. But it was only for a moment, and Hugh Gough was himself again.' There was little time for thought. Tej Singh was soon upon them, and once again the little force was subjected to a fierce cannonade. A vigorous attack was made on the left flank; it failed, and an equally vigorous demonstration forced Sir Hugh to change his whole front to the right. After he had given his instructions, the Chief's emotions became overpowering, as he watched that dreadful shower of shot and shell.

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, January 16th, 1846.

[2] The failure of ammunition was owing to accidental explosions. Lawrence's *Essays*, p. 329.

The Native Troops were shaken, and when the Europeans reeled, he could bear it no more. 'I rushed forward, with my gallant A.D.C. [1], to draw a portion of the Artillery fire on us from our hard-pressed Infantry. We, thank God, succeeded, and saved many unhurt, my gallant horse being a conspicuous mark—unheeding the thunder of shot (both round and grape)—ploughing up the earth around him [2].' At such a crisis, the Commander-in-Chief could not be out of range, and the sight of the brave old man, as he sat in his white 'fighting-coat' was of no little value to his wearied troops. He has been blamed for recklessness in exposing himself beyond what the actual necessities of the situation demanded. 'Those about me may have thought me reckless,' he said, 'My feelings were utterly different from that.'

Right and left, the Sikh attack had failed, and, never strong in attack, they began to hesitate. Hesitation passed into alarm, but not alone by the strength of man was the army saved. By some strange chance, an order was given which would have carried despair into the heart of the Chief. An officer of the Head-quarters Staff had been smitten with sunstroke; in his deranged condition [3],

[1] This was the Hon. C. R. Sackville West, afterwards Lord Delawarr. Captain Haines had been dangerously wounded at the close of the first day's fighting, and Sackville West had taken his place as acting Military Secretary.

[2] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, Christmas Day, 1845.

[3] It is recorded that the unfortunate officer appeared in pyjamas, stating that his overalls had been so riddled with

he gave the artillery and cavalry an order on his own responsibility, and the main body of these divisions was soon on its way to Ferozepore. Tej Singh was wavering, and this extraordinary accident seemed to him part of some tactical combination with a view of cutting off his retreat. At this moment Sir Hugh ordered Brigadier White, with the never-failing 3rd Light Dragoons, to charge the Sikh forces. Tej Singh could not tell the real condition of the enemy; he knew only that they were in possession of Lal Singh's carefully entrenched position. He made no further resistance, but withdrew his force, and left the victorious army to a sorely needed rest on that well-fought field. It is not easy to realize what the sight of the retreating Sikhs must have meant to the British troops. More than forty hours had elapsed since they left Moodkee; heat and cold, the weariness of marching and the stress of fighting, hunger and thirst, constant anxiety, hope alternating with despair, had thrust into these few hours experiences which it is vain to strive to picture. At last, as by a miracle, there ceased the pitiless rain of bullet and grape and shell, food was provided by the stores of grain which the Sikhs had abandoned, and peace settled down on the field of carnage. The long day's task was done.

There still remained the care of the wounded and the burial of the dead. Nearly 700 were buried beside the Church at Ferozepore—among them

bullets that they had dropped off (Hardinge, *Life of Viscount Hardinge*, p. 88).

BATTLE OF FEROZESHAH, DEC. 21 AND 22, 1845.


FEROZESHAH
Sikh Camp
To Ferozepoor
To Moodkee
From Sultan Khanwallah
From Ferozpoor
Misreewallah
Shukoor
Maj. Gen. Littler
Brig. Wallace
Maj. Gen. Gilbert
Brig. Stanton
Brig. Bridgeford
Brig. White
Maj. Gen. Sir H. Smith
Point of Junction of Umballa & Ferozpoor Forces
Line of Advance of Sir J. Littler's force
Line of Advance of Umballa force
BRITISH.
AA British Army formed for Attack, Dec. 21st.
BB Bivouac of 2nd Division with Details on morning of 22nd.
C Sir H. Smith with 1st Brigade of Reserve, up to 3 a.m. on morning of 22nd.
DD British position after capture of enemy's camp on 22nd.
EE Final Position of British troops on 22nd.
FF Cavalry movement against enemy's final movement.
SIKHS.
XX Enemy's position on Dec. 21st.
YY First attack of enemy, Mid-day 22nd.
ZZ Final movement of enemy on 22nd.
Scale of Distances
1000 500 0 1000 2000 YARDS
Scale of Area of Enemy's Camp
1000 500 0 1000 YARDS

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the wise and brave Broadfoot, and the gallant Arthur Somerset. The enemy had directed their fire mainly upon the European regiments, and the European regiments had been foremost in the attack. Of the total killed (694), no fewer than 499 were British—37 officers, and 462 men; in the total wounded (1,721) there were 78 British officers and 1,054 men. The Sikhs had lost 100 guns; their losses in killed and wounded were probably about 5,000. Our death-roll was certainly heavy, but we had to face a brave enemy, and the accidents of warfare had been, on the whole, against us. The newspapers, knowing nothing of the circumstances, raised the usual outcry when the dispatches arrived in England. 'Long experience has taught me, wrote one who knew more and could judge dispassionately, 'that such achievements cannot be performed, and such objects attained as in these operations without much loss, and that in point of fact the honour acquired by all is proportionate to the difficulties and dangers met and overcome[1].' The writer had himself lost a third of his army at Assaye; the Ferozeshah casualties did not exceed one eighth.

It is impossible to leave here the story of the battle of Ferozeshah. Space forbids the telling of the courage of regiment after regiment, of the valour of individuals, of the endurance of the whole army[2].

[1] The Duke of Wellington to Lord Gough, March 7, 1846.

[2] For further details on these topics the reader is referred to *The Sikhs and the Sikh War.*

The present work is concerned with the life of the Commander-in-Chief, and interest in the battles must not be allowed to divert attention from their connexion with him. Some reference must be made to the question of the delay, on which the Governor-General insisted. It seems probable that if Sir Hugh's plan had not been overruled, the misfortunes of the day would have been avoided. The success of the first attack was gained by the Moodkee troops alone; complete success was prevented by nightfall, and had daylight lasted, there can be little doubt that the positions would have been carried, as they were carried next morning. The army would have been spared the exhaustion of that terrible night, and if Tej Singh came up next day, he would have found a refreshed force in the Sikh entrenchments. Sir Henry Hardinge wrote to Lord Ripon that 'the want of daylight, while it rendered our decided success less secure, caused the enemy to abandon that portion of the position which had not been attacked, and was as detrimental to him as it was hazardous to us[1]'; but the temporary abandonment of a portion of his entrenchments by the enemy can scarcely be regarded as atoning for the interruption of our attack. It is difficult to see what we actually gained by the delay, which has been described as saving India. Littler's force, for which the army waited, came up; but its main body was immediately repulsed, and its reserve never came into action. Had the attack been made

[1] Hardinge's *Life*, p. 103.

while Gough's troops were fresh, and with several hours of daylight before them, Littler's force would have been a most valuable reinforcement; Sir Charles Gough aptly compares the situation to that of Königgrätz, when Moltke, 'instead of waiting for a junction to be completed, attacked the Austrians; the second army coming up and attacking the enemy in flank during the engagement—thus achieving a decisive victory.'

The disagreement between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief was known to few. In his dispatch, Sir Hugh Gough said merely: 'Instead of advancing to the direct attack of their formidable works, our force manœuvred to their right.' He has accordingly been frequently blamed for the very movement he strove to avert. 'It was not till nearly four in the afternoon of the shortest day of the year,' says Mr. Bosworth Smith, in his *Life of Lord Lawrence*, 'that Sir Hugh Gough, with characteristic recklessness, gave the order to storm their entrenchments.' The delay in the publication of the Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith deferred the first definite account of the incident till the late Lord Hardinge wrote the Life of his Father. He was able, from personal recollection, to describe that memorable conversation at Ferozeshah, and his statement is confirmed by the recollection of Sir Frederick Haines. Though Sir Hugh never made any public reference to the controversy, he never ceased to believe that he was right and the Governor-General wrong. Sir Henry Hardinge, on

his part, also kept the secret; but, on the 30th of December, 1845, he wrote a strongly worded letter[1] to Sir Robert Peel, demanding the recall of the Commander-in-Chief. There can be no question about the propriety of this letter; as he himself says, 'If I am afraid of making this avowal of my opinion to you, I am unfit for my present office.' Sir Hugh Gough could not know that such a letter had been written, and he was never made aware of its existence. He had, thus, no opportunity of stating his own case to Sir Robert Peel. We must therefore take Sir Henry Hardinge's letter upon its own merits. He gave Sir Robert Peel a vivid account of his experiences through the trying night of the 21st of December, but without any hint of the intervention which had delayed the attack. He attributed the great success, political and military, which had been achieved, to the Governor-General alone. Fortune, he said, had favoured them. But Sir Hugh Gough 'is not the officer who ought to be entrusted with the conduct of the war in the Punjab,' nor (this is in a later letter) were his political colleagues of any real use. 'The Council are excellent men, but there is not one who is equal to any emergency.' He admits that Sir Hugh is also an excellent man in point of personal courage. But he 'has no capacity for administration. He is at the outposts wonderfully active; but the more important points, which he dislikes, of framing proper orders and looking to their execution, are

[1] Printed infra, pp. 88–94.

very much neglected.' This charge of incapacity for administration has been already answered in the letters quoted in vol. i. pp. 368–93. The long correspondence between the two chiefs is sufficient reply to the assertion that Sir Hugh neglected his administrative duties, for almost all the suggestions come from the Commander-in-Chief. The real explanation is to be found in Sir Hugh's remark (cf. vol. i. p. 387) that all his suggestions were returned to him almost *verbatim*, as coming from the Governor-General, a few days after he had made them. Sir Henry Hardinge was a masterful man, and a masterful man naturally, and with perfect honesty, attributes to himself all vigorous action. Just as he denied any credit for suggestions to his political advisers, so he was under the impression that it was he alone, for example, who had urged the sending of reinforcements to Ferozepore (cf. vol. i. pp. 373, 377, 385–8). The question is a personal one between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, and so far as any fair judgement can now be formed, it must rest upon a survey of the correspondence. A further charge that 'the state of the army is loose, disorderly, and unsatisfactory,' contrasts curiously with the statement in the same letter, that 'our movements were so accurately combined with other posts on our line of operations that in our progress here we brought with us every available man,' and that 'we advanced in beautiful order on the morning of the 21st.' It is necessary to refer to these

letters[1] because, since their publication in the Peel Papers, they have been quoted as if the opinion of the Governor-General were a final verdict upon the Commander-in-Chief, instead of being merely the view taken, in the heat of controversy, by a military commander who differed from another military commander. There need be no doubt that Sir Henry Hardinge wrote in all honesty, and that he really felt it painful 'to make these avowals to Sir Robert Peel and not to communicate them to Sir Hugh Gough.' But, in justice to the Commander-in-Chief, we have ventured to point out that the zeal and energy of the Governor-General led him into the error of regarding all success as due to his own efforts, and all failure as the fault of his subordinate. The Home Government, rightly and properly, adopted the suggestion of the Governor-General, and we shall have to record how generous and considerate was his conduct, when the heat of controversy was over, and the circumstances had changed.

Before leaving the subject of the battle of Ferozeshah, it is necessary to refer to two further criticisms which have been made on the action of the Commander-in-Chief. The first of these was made by Sir Henry Lawrence, in an article contributed to the *Calcutta Review*, in 1847, and written as a reply to the article in the *Quarterly Review*, to which reference has already been made (vol. i. p. 384). Sir Henry Lawrence states that the combination

[1] Sir Robert Peel, from his *Private Papers*, ed. Parker, vol. iii. pp. 296–306.

was effected by midday, and asks why the attack was delayed till half-past three. Sir Henry Lawrence was not present at Ferozeshah (he did not join the army till just before Sobraon), and the explanation is simply that he was misinformed. It is true that Sir John Littler met the Commander-in-Chief shortly after midday, but his force (including artillery) did not come up till considerably later, and when it did arrive[1], the time was fully occupied in countermarching, according to the slow processes then in vogue, and in the formation of the army for the new attack. There was no 'unaccountable delay,' as the *Life of Lord Hardinge* suggests; even according to the account there given, Littler's force did not come up till about 1.30 p.m., and the army was formed opposite the entrenched camp about 3 p.m. The second criticism was made by the English newspapers of the day; why did the Commander-in-Chief not choose a weak point for the attack? The fact was that there was no weak point in the Sikh entrenchment. The whole position was strongly entrenched, and they had perfect means of obtaining reinforcement at any point. 'Ferozeshah,' wrote Sir Henry Lawrence, 'was not to be outflanked; its oblong figure was nearly equally formidable in every direction[2].'

[1] Sir Harry Smith (*Autobiography*, vol. ii. p. 150) gives the impossible hour of 10 a.m. for the junction. The Governor-General himself, in his report to the Secret Committee, places it about 1.30 p.m., and this statement is confirmed by the recollection of Sir Frederick Haines.

[2] *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence*, p. 381.

'In this case, the bull was all horns,' said Major-General Sir Archibald Galloway (cf. p. 264) in reference to the battle. Not only, as we have pointed out, was it necessary to attack Lal Singh before he was reinforced by Tej Singh, but want of water added another reason for the policy of attacking on the 21st of December, the wisdom of which has been doubted by Sir Harry Smith[2]. Both Sir Hugh Gough and Sir Henry Hardinge were agreed that delay was impossible, and both continued to hold that, if the attack on Ferozeshah was rashness, their rashness saved India. With this view Sir Henry Havelock concurred. He 'considered it of the last consequence to strike a blow at the Ferozeshuhur force—in the full confidence of success—before it could be reinforced by the army blockading Ferozepore.' 'Attack,' he said, 'in the forenoon of a long march. It was one of those cases in which it would have been better to have attacked at midnight, rather than not to have anticipated the junction of the two armies. The object was to defeat the one before the other should come to its aid. No sacrifice is too great to complete

[1] It would be unbecoming in a civilian to attempt an appreciation of the course suggested by Sir Harry Smith in his *Autobiography* as the proper alternative to his Commander-in-Chief's method of conducting 'the most glorious battle ever fought in the East.' But one may be allowed to suggest that an attack on the enemy's right centre would certainly have left open the line of his retreat, as Sir Harry Smith recommends, but the retreat would have been upon Moodkee and the British wounded.

such a manœuvre. Every risk must be run, and every fatigue endured to attain such an object in war. The entrenched camp was attacked and carried. The resistance was indeed terrific, and the loss on our side tremendous. But—this is war[1].'

[1] Marshman's *Memoirs of Sir Henry Havelock*, pp. 153–4 ('Silver Library' edition, 1896).

V

SOBRAON AND THE END OF THE FIRST SIKH WAR

WHAT, then, had been accomplished by the victories of Moodkee and Ferozeshah? There were not wanting alarmists who filled the Indian press with shrieks that the efforts of the British army had been in vain, and that nothing had been done to repel the invasion. With that strange inverted sense of fairness which led the eighteenth-century Tories to denounce Marlborough, and the nineteenth-century Whigs to exalt Napoleon by maligning Wellington, the historian of the Sikhs took what may be termed a 'pro-Sikh' view of the whole situation, and his paradoxical statement has been religiously followed by writers like Colonel Malleson, who regarded Cunningham as a 'faithful and accurate author.' The achievements of Sir Hugh Gough's army are belittled, as it is easy to belittle the achievements of any army. Banks two or three feet high had been magnified into ramparts by the Sepoy 'mercenaries.' Tej Singh's strange conduct was confidently attributed to treacherous motives (on wholly untrustworthy evidence), and credit was denied to generals and army alike. Yet, from the date of Ferozeshah to the end of the campaign, there was no reason to fear an invasion of British India. The

Sikh forces had been compelled to recross the Sutlej. The British could not hold the whole line of the river, and the enemy might cross elsewhere and make predatory incursions, but the scene of conflict was now definitely limited to the Punjab frontier, and British India was safe. Letters from the army are full of this feeling. Stern work was still before them, and they could not undertake it until reinforcements had arrived. But India was secure, and they could afford to wait. The Lahore Government, moreover, began to enter into peace negotiations.

The Governor-General took up his position at Ferozepore; the Commander-in-Chief at first encamped at Sultan Khan Walla (close to Ferozeshah), but, on the 27th Dec., moved to Arufka. The Sikhs had recrossed at the ford of Sobraon, and had taken with them such artillery as they had saved from Ferozeshah. They were quickly reinforced with men and ammunition from Lahore. The Commander-in-Chief was unable to move till reinforcements had arrived; but he was able to receive the enemy if he attempted an invasion of British territory; he had in his rear a rich country from which supplies could be drawn; and he held the inner and shorter line to Ludhiana, while the enemy had to cross two rivers and make a longer march if they desired to attack Ludhiana from Sobraon. There were two elements of danger in the situation. It was possible to prevent a Sikh invasion, but it might not be wise[1] to resist them if they attempted to entrench

[1] Cf. pp. 63–4.

themselves on our side of the river; and, in the end, they were permitted and even encouraged to do so. They might also send other troops, from Lahore, against Ludhiana; and eighty miles lay between Ludhiana and Ferozepore. The reserve force was on its way up, and the decision about Ludhiana must determine the orders to be sent to the troops as they pushed northwards. It was finally agreed to protect only the fort, the Governor-General wisely laying down the principle that 'he who defends everything defends nothing.' He would, he said, willingly take the responsibility if the town were burnt or plundered. One regiment of cavalry, under Brigadier Godby, was accordingly sent to Ludhiana, along with some native regiments, and the remainder of the reserve force, numbering about 10,000 men[1], arrived, after some unnecessary delay, on the 6th of January. Before this force reached the head quarters, news had come that a band of Sikhs had crossed at Ludhiana and burned down the cantonment. 'This was to be expected,' wrote the Governor-General, 'and is of no importance. This great feat may excite them to be impudent in your (Sir Hugh's) neighbourhood.' But the enemy showed no sign of activity, and even began to talk of coming to terms. During this pause the British troops made no advance. It was of no use to force

[1] Cavalry: H.M.'s 9th and 16th Lancers, 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry, 4th Irregular Cavalry. Two batteries of Artillery, and a company of Sappers. Infantry: H.M.'s 10th Foot, and three regiments of Native Infantry.

a passage across the Sutlej and to advance on Lahore, without an adequate supply of ammunition and siege artillery, and some little time must elapse before these could arrive from Delhi. The Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief took advantage of the interval thus afforded to arrange a plan for reducing Lahore early in the spring. It was also agreed that Sir Charles Napier should be instructed to send his force to Bhawalpore and to proceed in person, without any delay, to take Sir Henry Hardinge's place as second in command. During all this time the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief acted together with much cordiality and even with unanimity. No trace of disagreeable memories or embittered feelings can be found in their correspondence.

More vigorous action was soon necessitated by fresh operations on the part of the Sikhs. The British leader might look complacently at plundering expeditions on the part of the enemy; but when the enemy established a *tête du pont* near Ludhiana, and assembled troops under Runjoor Singh, with a view to advancing on the Native States, it became evident that such a movement, if not checked, might not only seriously endanger the fort at Ludhiana, but even threaten our communications. Immediate action was accordingly taken, and it could now be taken with safety, as the main body had been so largely reinforced. On the very day on which the Governor-General wrote, Sir Harry Smith was entrusted with the important mission of relieving Ludhiana from the pressure of Runjoor Singh's

force, which consisted of about 8,000 men and 70 guns. The first step was to secure two small forts at Futteyghur and Dhurmkote, into which the Sikhs had thrown a garrison; and, on the preceding day (January 16), the Commander-in-Chief had dispatched Sir Harry with a brigade of infantry, the 3rd Light Cavalry, and some irregular horse, to effect this purpose. Futteyghur was some twenty-six miles distant, and Dhurmkote about forty, and Sir Harry undertook to reduce them both within twenty-four hours. Futteyghur was abandoned before he reached it, and Dhurmkote surrendered at discretion on the afternoon of the 17th. Two days later, two troops of horse artillery and the 16th Lancers joined Sir Harry, along with the remainder of the corps of irregular horse, a portion of which had already accompanied him; the total force under his command thus including a brigade of cavalry, a brigade of infantry, and 18 guns. He was now instructed, instead of going directly to Ludhiana, to advance on Jugraon and there to pick up H.M.'s 53rd Foot marching up from Bussean. Having thus interposed his force between the Sikhs and our line of communication with India (along which was marching our battering-train intended for the walls of Lahore), he was to turn northwards towards Ludhiana, and effect the relief of the small garrison stationed there under Colonel Godby. This series of movements Sir Harry carried out with brilliant success. He reached Jugraon on the 20th of January, and threw a small force of two native companies

into the fort there, met the 53rd Regiment, and started for Ludhiana on the 21st. He had instructed Colonel Godby to meet him with four horse artillery guns, one regiment of native cavalry, and four of native infantry. The Sikhs were encamped at Baran Hara, about seven miles from Ludhiana, and they held two fortresses, Gungrana and Budhowal, between Smith's position and Ludhiana. When within two miles of Budhowal, a message was brought from Godby to the effect that the Sikhs had moved from Baran Hara and were stationed at Budhowal. This necessitated a change in Smith's march; his instructions had not reached Godby in time, and, although he made his way successfully to Ludhiana, it was only after losing a considerable number of men and most of his baggage. The baggage, he says in his Autobiography, did not fall into the enemy's hands, but was plundered by the inhabitants of the district. Sir Harry Smith was thus in command of a very considerable force, and, on the 22nd, Sir Hugh Gough sent the second brigade of his own division, under Wheeler, to join him. In view of the position of Runjoor Singh at Budhowal, Wheeler considered it necessary to make a backward movement upon Dhurmkote, rather than risk an action. Runjoor Singh almost immediately fell back, fearing an attack from both sides, and stationed his army at Aliwal, on the river banks. The total result of these operations was to place at Ludhiana, under Sir Harry Smith, a force of nearly 12,000 men with

28 field-guns and two 8-inch howitzers. These movements had not been effected without some trouble, and the skirmish which had ended in the loss of Sir Harry Smith's baggage raised the hopes of the Sikhs and gave a fresh opportunity to the alarmist press of India.

On the 28th of January, Sir Harry Smith fought the battle of Aliwal. For the first time the British and the Sikh armies met on fairly equal terms. There was no dust to obscure, and no jungle to afford cover for the artillery of the enemy. Runjoor Singh was encamped close to the Sutlej, between the villages of Boondree and Aliwal. Sir Harry Smith brought his infantry into action, supported on each side by cavalry and horse artillery, under cover of which the infantry was able to deploy after its march from Budhowal. An attack upon the Sikh left, near the village of Aliwal, gave Sir Harry the key of the position, and a brilliant cavalry charge, led by Brigadier Cureton, upon the enemy's right, completed their demoralization. Their gunners were, as usual, faithful to the end, but their devotion could not avail to save their guns. The Sikhs fled in wild confusion, abandoning everything on the left bank of the river, and making it their sole endeavour to cross the river in safety. Our total loss in killed and wounded was about 580.

I have gained (wrote Sir Harry Smith to his sister[1]), in a separate command of 2,700 cavalry, 32 guns, and 9,000 infantry, one of the most glorious

[1] *Autobiography*, vol. ii. pp. 398–9.

battles ever fought in India, driving the enemy over the Sutledge, double my numbers[1], posted in an entrenched camp with 75 guns, 52 of which are at my tent door, the others lost in the passage of the river, or spiked in its bed. Not a gun did they get over. And oh, the fearful sight the river presents! the bodies, having swollen, float, of men, horses, camels, bullocks, &c. Thousands must have perished, many threw away their arms and fled headlong into the broad river and difficult ford. . . . Never was victory more complete, and never was one fought under more happy circumstances, literally with the pomp of a field day; and right well did all behave.

Sir Harry Smith's conduct of these operations received a well-deserved meed of praise from his Chief and the Governor-General, and an unusual, and almost unparalleled, tribute from the Duke of Wellington.

While Sir Harry was fighting at Aliwal, the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General were watching the Sikh camp at Sobraon. From Boota-wallah, where they were conversing on the morning of the 28th of January, they could hear the sound of artillery. An officer who was with the Commander-in-Chief wrote thus of the scene:—

From not having heard of Sir Harry Smith, and various native rumours in the camp, Sir Hugh was really very miserably anxious about him, and the fine force he had given him; and I must now tell you of that gallant, glorious, good old Chief. He sent for me yesterday about a spy Hyder Ali had brought.

[1] Colonel Malleson estimates the Sikh numbers at 8,000 irregular cavalry, 4,000 infantry, and 70 guns.

We heard the cannonading which was, while it lasted, fearful. I asked him what he thought of it. 'Think of it! why, that 'tis the most glorious thing I ever heard. I know by the sound of the guns that Smith has carried the position and silenced their artillery.' 'I hope, sir,' I said, 'he has not found it too late, and retired to wait for our reinforcements.' 'Retire,' he cried, 'no! no British force would ever retire before such a cannonade as we have just heard.' He spoke with such likely confidence that, although I had gone to him fully impressed with the conviction that Smith had failed, I left him perfectly assured that I was wrong, and that the victory had been ours. He sent Bagot and Becher to bring an express. When he heard the news he was nearly frantic with joy; but Bagot told me that ere the lapse of two minutes he saw the dear old man on his knees by his couch, offering up his thanks to that Power which alone gave the victory.

The battle of Aliwal had expelled the enemy from the left bank of the Sutlej. Ludhiana was safe, and the communications were secure. There was still a large Sikh force entrenched at Sobraon, amply provided with new artillery and ammunition from Lahore, and able to afford a very considerable resistance. To this army the news of Aliwal was carried by the rejoicings in the British camp, as the echo of a royal salute reverberated over the banks of the Sutlej, followed by the cheers of the whole army, repeated until the ground shook with the noise.

The siege-train was now at hand; there was a plentiful supply of ammunition, and every reason

for delay had passed away. The Commander-in-Chief had, for the past four weeks, exercised the utmost caution, showing a brave front to the enemy, but he was unwilling to challenge a battle, unless he could succeed in tempting the Sikhs out of their entrenchments. He remained at Sultan Khan Walla, as we have seen, till the 28th of December, when a flank movement was made to Arufka, whence Sir Hugh could watch all the fords from Ferozepore to the junction of the Beas with the Sutlej, about three miles above Hurreke. It had hitherto been necessary to take up a position opposite the right of the enemy's front across the Sutlej, the Governor-General deciding that the distance between the army and Ferozepore must not be increased[1]. But after the arrival of the Meerut troops, protection for Ferozepore could be otherwise provided, and rumours of a Sikh attack[2] led Sir Hugh, on the 12th of January, to transfer his head quarters to Boutawallah, immediately opposite Sobraon, when careful reconnaissances had assured him that the enemy's force was almost entirely collected there.

I found (he writes, in a letter to the Duke of Wellington, dated the 2nd of February) that it presented an excellent ford of considerable breadth, at a bend of the river (the concavity of the arch of the circle formed by the bend facing our side of the river); that the opposite side was much

[1] Sir Henry Hardinge to Sir Hugh Gough, January 1, 1846. Cf. a correspondence in the *English Historical Review* for October, 1902, and January, 1903.

[2] There were skirmishes on January 13 and 14.

higher than that on our side, and that the enemy had collected a vast number of boats, and had commenced constructing a bridge covered by powerful batteries on the opposite side. The bridge I had narrowly watched, and found that on the 2nd of January they had completed it, with the exception of two boats next to our side.

On the 13th of January, I made another reconnaissance, with some guns and light infantry, to dislodge a considerable force of infantry which had crossed over. This was soon effected, with the loss of but one man, but I found the neck of ground, or concavity of the circle, so completely enfiladed by the guns at the opposite side (the river being only 350 yards in width) that I did not feel it prudent to attempt the destruction of the bridge; which was, on account of the practicability of the extensive ford, of little importance; and its destruction would not have compensated for the expenditure of ammunition, of which we have none to spare, while our resources are at such a vast distance.

He has since established himself on this side the river, covered by his guns on the opposite bank, and strongly entrenched himself within their range. I felt I could at any time dislodge him from this position, and have been more than once inclined to effect it; but this could not be effected without considerable loss of life, and as I have not at present the means of pushing on to Lahore, the 1st Division of the battering trains not having yet come up, I have contented myself with keeping him within the range of his guns. Whenever he moves out any force, a corresponding move upon our side makes him rapidly withdraw. Our advanced posts are within 1,750 paces of his advanced work. He appears to be, and all my information leads me to suppose that he is, in very great force, and daily parades several thousands of cavalry and infantry

close to his lines, with a few troops of horse artillery. I hear he has thirty battalions, with a numerous cavalry force, and fifty light guns at this side, covered by all his heavy guns on the other. I have given the strictest orders not to molest him, with the hope of drawing him on, but in vain. I must therefore bide my time, which your Grace may be assured I shall not let slip.

While the siege-train was making its final marches towards Boutawallah, and Sir Harry Smith was leading his victorious troops back to the head-quarters' camp, to share in the glories of a still greater triumph, and while the Sikhs were, day by day, increasing their force and strengthening their entrenchments on our side of the river, the Commander-in-Chief was carefully preparing to strike the decisive blow. Three methods of attack were considered by the Governor-General and himself. The first of these was to cross by a ford above Sobraon, and march on Lahore, but this idea was almost immediately abandoned, because of the difficulty of finding a suitable ford, and the possibility of the enemy's again invading the cis-Sutlej states[1]. The second project, which was favoured by Sir Henry Hardinge, was to send over, secretly, under cover of darkness, 12,000 or 14,000 infantry and forty to fifty guns, bringing up, for the purpose, the boats which had been located at Ferozepore. These

[1] This contingency was considered extremely improbable and almost negligible by the Governor-General, but the Commander-in-Chief, as will be seen, took a more serinos view of it.

troops would surprise the enemy's post and seize the most commanding ground on their side of the river. The place suggested by the Governor-General for the crossing was Gunda Singh Walla. When Sir Henry made this suggestion and expressed his approbation of it, Sir Hugh Gough replied in a letter which states so carefully the objections to this course, that we quote it almost in full :—

A surprise, from his (the enemy's) most ample means of information, I think very doubtful. . . . Although I own I do not contemplate the passage of the river at Gunda Singh Walla in as favourable a light as you do, I still feel it of such vast importance that as little delay as possible should take place in our renewing the contest that I would relinquish my own plan and adopt yours. But I beg to observe that to dismember this democratic army, and to lower its confidence so as to enable the Sikh Government to submit to such terms as you may deem expedient to require, another action must be fought. In my mind, the further that action is from Lahore, the better, and I feel equally persuaded that, whenever we meet the Sikh army, we shall find them in an entrenched position. Here the enemy has placed himself in certainly a very strong, still, in a false position, with a river in his rear, taking it as certain (which I feel convinced will be the case) that he would be defeated. I am morally certain that we can make no move here that will not be known immediately to the enemy, giving him the opportunity of making a corresponding move. The mere fact of our detaching our heavy artillery and encumbrances would at once arouse his vigilance; and I could not afford to leave them behind me, at any hazard, in front of, and so near to, the powerful force he has here, without strongly covering them.

When the flank movement is completed, the whole of the country between Ferozepore and Ludhiana, leading into our own provinces, and lines of communication, would be open to him, and his great superiority in cavalry will enable him to avail himself of this, and still retain a large force of cavalry with his main body; whilst that detached, even if we send the greater proportion of our cavalry to oppose it, may readily avoid a contest where the line is so extended. These are the objections which occur to me to the flank movement, prior to dislodging the enemy from this side of the water[1].

The Commander-in-Chief considered that the only practicable method was a direct attack upon the enemy's entrenchments, and the Governor-General was prepared to assent to it, provided Sir Hugh could show a reasonable probability of capturing the Sikh Field Artillery, on which the enemy largely depended, and without which they could offer no further resistance. Officers of the artillery and the engineers were consulted, and at first gave an opinion that thirty heavy howitzers and five 18-pounders would render the Sikh position untenable, and that, after one or two hours' shelling, the infantry could storm the camp. But a subsequent examination of the Sikh entrenchments, where deep ditches protected lines of earthworks, bristling with cannon and supported by batteries on the other side of the river, led them to recall this verdict, and to pronounce the scheme imprac-

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to Sir Henry Hardinge, February 6, 1846.

ticable. Sir Henry Hardinge, although he had not made the suggestion, was dissatisfied with this report, and consulted two other officers, Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Lawrence, who had just been appointed Political Agent in succession to Broadfoot, and Major Abbott of the Engineers. Pending their decision, the Governor-General gave the following permission to Sir Hugh Gough[1]: 'Upon the fullest consideration of this question, if the artillery can be brought into play, I recommend you to attack. If it cannot, and you anticipate a heavy loss, I would recommend you not to undertake it. I have great confidence in the opinion of Major Abbott on these professional points, relating to the destruction of defences.' Abbott and Lawrence thought an attack practicable, and Sir Henry Hardinge, abandoning his own project of which the Commander-in-Chief had so strongly disapproved, entered most loyally into the arrangements for the immediate execution of Sir Hugh's plan for a direct attack, and, though he had been rendered lame by a fall from his horse, gave the army the encouragement and support of his presence in person.

Part of the siege-train arrived on the 7th, and was followed next day by Sir Harry Smith's Division, which gave Sir Hugh the command of over 15,000 men. The attack was prepared on the right of the Sikh entrenchments, which was the weakest point

[1] Sir Henry Hardinge to Sir Hugh Gough, February 7, 1846.

in their defences [1], and the intention was to force an opening at this end of the semicircle, thus rendering useless the guns in the Sikh front lines, which could be taken from behind by the division that had effected an entrance. On the evening of the 9th, orders were given for the attack, and the rising waters of the Sutlej were observed, with great satisfaction, to render the ford dangerous for the enemy. At 2 a.m. the troops began to form, and ere dawn they were all in position for the attack. The British centre was entrusted to Gilbert [2], with

[1] Sir Hugh Gough had discovered, through the services of a native boy, that the entrenchments on the right did not go down to the river. This boy became known to the staff as 'the Sobraon boy,' and we shall meet him again at Gujerat.

[2] Gilbert's Division:

1st Brigade (under Brigadier Taylor)—H.M.'s 29th Foot, 41st and 68th Regiments Native Infantry.

2nd Brigade (under Brigadier M^cLaran)—1st European Light Infantry, 16th Regiment Native Infantry, Sirmoor Battalion of Goorkhas.

Smith's Division:

1st Brigade (under Brigadier Penny)—H.M.'s 31st Foot, 47th Native Infantry and Nusseeree Battalion of Goorkhas.

2nd Brigade: H.M.'s 50th Foot and the 42nd Native Infantry.

Dick's Division:

1st Line (under Brigadier Stacey)—H.M.'s 10th and 53rd Foot, 43rd and 59th Regiments Native Infantry. Brigadier Orchard also accompanied this brigade.

2nd Line (under Brigadier Wilkinson)—H.M.'s 80th Foot, and the 33rd Native Infantry.

Reserve (under Brigadier Ashburnham)—H.M.'s 9th Foot, 62nd Foot, and 26th Native Infantry.

Sir Harry Smith on his right and Sir Robert Dick on the left. To Dick was committed the charge of the main attack on the Sikh right, and his division was therefore increased in numbers, and drawn up in two lines, with a reserve; the reserve supported by thirteen heavy guns. Behind Dick's Division was a Cavalry Brigade[1] under Brigadier Scott, along with three regiments of Native Infantry[2]; on his right, between him and Gilbert, was a battery of heavy guns, while Gilbert's Division was accompanied by another battery. To Gilbert's right, between his division and that of Sir Harry Smith, was a third battery, and Sir Harry Smith was supported by Campbell's Cavalry Brigade[3]. The engineers were under Brigadier Smith[4], and Brigadier Gowan had charge of the artillery. Sir Joseph Thackwell was in command of the cavalry; we have already seen how some of it was disposed, and the remainder (consisting of H.M's 16th Lancers, and the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Regiments of Light Cavalry) was used to effect a feint. Brigadier Cureton, whose skill had largely contributed to the victory at Aliwal, was

[1] H.M.'s 3rd Light Dragoons, 3rd and 9th Irregulars.

[2] The 4th, 5th, and 73rd Regiments.

[3] H.M.'s 9th Lancers, 2nd Irregulars, and two troops Horse Artillery.

[4] His senior, Brigadier Irvine, arrived on the 9th, but waived his right to command, and accompanied Sir Hugh Gough. Brigadier Wheeler, it should be mentioned, was at Ludhiana, Sir John Littler at Ferozepore, and Sir John Grey at Attaree. They were thus unable to take a part in the final struggle.

instructed to proceed to the ford at Hurreke and to make an attempt to cross, thus diverting the enemy's attention from the real point of attack. A ford at Attaree, between Sobraon and Ferozepore, was watched by Sir John Grey with the 8th Light Cavalry and three regiments of Native Infantry.

The British army was thus stationed, in front of the Sikh position, when day broke on the morning of the 10th of February. A dense mist delayed operations, but as soon as it rose, the attack began, and by 6.30 a.m. the whole of our artillery was playing on the enemy's entrenchments. We had only sixty guns; since the battle of Ferozeshah, our 9-pounders had, by the enlargement of their bores, been increased to 12-pounders, but the capability of the guns was so greatly reduced by the process that this device only slightly relieved our inferiority in this important arm. 'Spirited and well-directed,' as Sir Hugh Gough declared our fire to be, it was hopeless to expect a victory in an artillery duel, and the definite intention was that the issue, after the effect of the cannonade had been severely felt, 'must be brought to the arbitrament of musketry and the bayonet.' The orders of the Commander-in-Chief as to the amount of ammunition had not been carried out[1], and the news was brought, after about two hours' cannonading, that only a few rounds of shot were left. Sir Hugh Gough showed no sign of hesitation or alarm. 'Thank God!' he said, to the surprise of the officer who brought the

[1] Sir Harry Smith's *Autobiography*, vol. ii. pp. 191–2.

message, 'then I'll be at them with the bayonet[1]!' A less resolute spirit would have brought about a feeling of alarm or hesitation; now men felt that, artillery or no artillery, 'old Gough' would pull them through. More distressing to the Commander-in-Chief were three messages which, by a curious accident, purported to come from the Governor-General. Colonel Benson, an officer on the staff of Sir Henry Hardinge, rode up to Sir Hugh Gough, urging him, 'if he did not feel confident of success and without much loss, to withdraw the troops and work up to the enemy's entrenchments by regular approaches.' 'Loss there will be, of course,' replied Sir Hugh, 'Look at those works bristling with guns, and defended as they will be; but, by God's blessing, I feel confident of success.' Again came the same message, and again the same answer was returned. When Colonel Benson rode up a third time, Sir Hugh exclaimed, 'What! withdraw the troops after the action has commenced, and when I feel confident of success. Indeed I will not. Tell Sir Robert Dick to move on, in the name of God[2].'

[1] 'A Field Officer,' writing in the *Times*, December 27, 1886.

[2] The account here given is taken from the letter written to the *Times* of December 29th, 1886, by the late Field-Marshal Sir Patrick Grant, who was present with the Commander-in-Chief, and vouched for the accuracy of the statement. The second Lord Hardinge had written to the *Times* of December 23, 1886, a statement, for which he personally vouched, that the message given to Colonel Benson was 'that if Sir Hugh doubted the issue he might exercise

Dick did move on, and about nine o'clock the infantry attack commenced. Dick's first line, consisting of Stacey's Brigade, advanced first, protected by batteries and horse artillery. The advance was steady and persistent, and it was delayed by an attack on the left flank by a body of Sikh cavalry, which was immediately repulsed. The fire of a Sikh battery, on the other bank of the river, laid low a number of the 53rd, which led the van. But in spite of all discouragements, Stacey's Brigade pressed on, and first the gallant 53rd, and then the whole brigade, were in possession of the first line of the

his discretion, if he only apprehended a severe loss, to go on.' Lord Hardinge, writing to Sir Patrick, on the day on which the latter's statement appeared in the *Times*, remarked: 'All I can say is that Colonel Benson must have misinterpreted his orders, and as he is now no more, the matter cannot be further cleared up.' There can be no doubt that this is the explanation of the discrepancy; and it is a curious coincidence that Colonel Benson was one of the two officers who carried the mysterious message on the night of the 21st of December at Ferozeshah. Whatever misinterpretation may be attributed to Benson, there can be no doubt as to his personal courage. Writing in this connexion, a year later, Lord Gough remarked: 'A higher-minded or more honourable man there is not in this Army. No want of nerve was ever applicable to him; he remained and exposed himself to the very last.' (Lord Gough to his son, January 18, 1847.)

The painting of Lord Gough, by Sir Francis Grant, from which the best-known engraving has been taken (reproduced as frontispiece to this volume), represents him as standing in front of the trenches at Sobraon, in his white 'fighting-coat,' saying: 'Tell Sir Robert Dick to move on, in the name of God.'

enemy's entrenchments. Wilkinson's Brigade was fast following up, and it became necessary to charge and take some Sikh batteries on the right. Two regiments, one (the 10th Foot) belonging to Stacey's Brigade, and the other (the 80th Foot) to Wilkinson's Brigade, performed this service, and shortly after this had been accomplished, the two brigades formed a continuous front along the Sikh right. They had lost their brave commander, Sir Robert Dick, and Colonel J. B. Gough, the Quartermaster-General, had been severely wounded. The division began to make its way towards the Sikh centre, and Sir Hugh Gough ordered Ashburnham to move up in support of the rest of the division. Gilbert and Sir Harry Smith were at first instructed merely to throw out their light troops and make an artillery demonstration; but when Sir Hugh perceived that the whole effect of the Sikh resistance was being directed on the brigades that had penetrated within the entrenchments, he at once changed his plans so far as to direct the right and centre to attack in force. On the right, Penny's Brigade led Sir Harry Smith's Division, protected, as Stacey's Brigade had been, by the artillery. The advance was not immediately successful, for the ground was very rough and broken up by water-courses which rendered it troublesome to maintain a firm footing. The combined difficulties of the strength and height of the enemy's entrenchments, the persistence of their fire, and the nature of the ground forced the brigade to give way, and they began to retreat. An anxious

moment followed. The second brigade, under Brigadier Hicks, was immediately behind, and was pushing forward; the repulse of the first brigade might throw it into confusion. But Hicks at once opened his ranks and allowed the retreating masses to pass through; then both brigades re-formed, with Hicks in front. Close up to the entrenchments, they could see the Sikh soldiery butchering their wounded comrades. They charged again; the entrenchments were carried.

More difficult still was the task of the central division, under Gilbert, for the centre was the strongest portion of the Sikh defences, and the entrenchments were so high that they could not capture them without scaling-ladders. The first charge was repulsed. Quickly the division rallied and a second time the attempt was made, only to meet a second rebuff. The loss was terrible among men and officers alike, and included, among the wounded, Gilbert and Brigadier McLaran. The attempt to take the centre was now abandoned, and the attack was directed a little towards the left, where the defences were not so high. Undauntedly the division charged again; the last of its three leaders, Brigadier Taylor, fell dead in front of the lines; but the men gallantly pressed on. The lack of scaling-ladders was redeemed by a device simple enough but requiring dauntless courage in the face of such a foe. One man climbing on the shoulder of another, they pressed into the entrenchment, and seized the guns.

Right, left, and centre, the Sikh lines were now in possession of Sir Hugh's soldiers, but the day was not yet his. The Sikhs fought bravely, striving to regain by the sword what had been lost to the bayonet. On their left, they even succeeded in regaining some guns, which had not been properly guarded; a charge of the 50th Foot retook them; but the incident showed that the victory was not secure. It now became necessary to sweep the camp from the enemy's right to their left, and the task was entrusted to Sir Joseph Thackwell and the cavalry which had been stationed behind Sir Robert Dick. Our sappers had prepared openings in the entrenchments after they were taken by Dick's Division, and through these openings rushed the British horse—among them the 3rd Light Dragoons—'whom,' said the Commander-in-Chief, 'no obstacle usually held formidable by horse appears to check.' While the cavalry flashed down the interior of the Sikh lines, the guns were brought up into position, and the final onslaught was prepared. Harassed by a merciless fire, and pressed by horse and foot, the Sikhs, brave as they were, could stand no longer. 'Their fire,' says Sir Hugh Gough's dispatch, 'first slackened and then nearly ceased; and the victors then pressing them on every side, precipitated them in masses over the bridge, and into the Sutlej, which a sudden rise of seven inches had rendered hardly fordable. In their efforts to reach the right bank, through the deepened water, they suffered from our horse artillery a terrible


PLAN OF THE
BATTLE OF SOBRAON
FOUGHT ON THE 10TH FEBY 1846 BY THE BRITISH ARMY
under the personal command of
GENL SIR HUGH GOUGH, BART G.C.B.
with the
SIKH FORCES ENTRENCHED
on the
SUTLEJ.
RIVER SUTLEJ
Batteries
Batteries
Batteries
Sikh Village
SIKH ENTRENCHMENTS
Chota Sobraon
Sir R. Dick's Division
Aasya
Roolawala
Nihalkee
Killee
Jillawila
Scale of Yards
0 500 1000 2000 3000
Surveyed by Capt.n Baker, Lieut.t Strachey, Lieut.t Hedgeth Bengal Engineers
REFERENCES
aa. British Camp
bb. Position preparatory to the Attack
cc. Heavy Artillery
dd. Troops in the Attack
ee. Dt on the defeat of the Enemy
f Enemy's Bridge broken down
g Rear of the Enemy driven into the deep Ford
ENEMY'S ENTRENCHMENTS
Batteries and connecting works
hh. Interior Entrenchments for musketry
ii. Exterior Main Line
ii. Second and Third Lines
jj Fourth Line
k. Tete de pont
British Infantry
Dt Cavalry
Dt Foot Artillery
Dt Horse Artillery
Sikh Forces
N.B. The Attack was made by the advance of the British Left, subsequently supported by the Centre and Right.
Edward Smith, Brigadier,
Chief Engineer
Army of the Sutlej
London, Stanford Survt Estabt

carnage. Hundreds fell under this cannonade; hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in attempting the perilous passage. Their awful slaughter, confusion, and dismay were such as would have excited compassion in the hearts of their generous conquerors, if the Khalsa troops had not, in the earlier part of the action, sullied their gallantry by slaughtering and barbarously mangling every wounded soldier whom, in the vicissitudes of attack, the fortune of war left at their mercy.'

The victory was complete, and it put an end to the Sikh resistance, but it was not gained without very severe loss. The total killed (320) included 13 European officers and 164 men; among the wounded (who numbered in all 2,063) were 101 European officers and 813 men of H.M.'s regiments in addition to those of the Company's European regiments. The conduct of the Commander-in-Chief has been frequently attacked. In the first place, he has been blamed for permitting the Sikhs to cross and entrench on our side. This objection is answered in one of his own letters. His view was that, wherever we might attack the Sikhs, we should unquestionably find them in an entrenched position, and that if they were allowed to take up a position with a river in their rear, defeat would mean annihilation, and one battle would end the war. He speaks of his sleepless nights and anxious early morning visits to his outposts, fearing that the enemy 'would recross and place the Sutlej between us.' Again, it has been stated that he deliberately

refused to take advantage of his artillery, preferring 'to give them cold steel.' The origin of this rumour is probably to be traced to the incident (recorded on pp. 57–8) when the supply of ammunition failed. The news was brought to Sir Hugh Gough, and he, it will be remembered, betraying no hesitation or fear, exclaimed: 'Thank God! then I'll be at them with the bayonet!' His confidence prevented any tendency towards a panic, and it showed that the Commander-in-Chief did not easily lose nerve. But the remark has frequently been quoted as indicating Sir Hugh Gough's contempt for artillery, and his wild craving for an infantry charge. It is not possible now, with such evidence as we possess, to determine who was responsible for the failure of ammunition, but the fact remains that Sir Hugh's plan did involve a longer play of our guns. The plan of the battle of Sobraon was submitted to the best engineer authorities available—Major Abbott and Sir Henry Lawrence—and on their verdict its adoption depended. Sir Hugh Gough was guided by the artillery officers, and they approved of the number and description of guns which were brought into the field. It has frequently been forgotten that our guns were inferior, both in number and in metal, to those of the enemy. We had about sixty guns in the field; the Sikhs had about seventy on our side of the river, and were supported by heavy guns across the Sutlej. It was, as Sir Hugh pointed out in his dispatch, 'visionary to expect that our guns could, within any limited time, silence the

fire of seventy pieces behind well-constructed batteries of earth, plank, and fascines, or dislodge troops, covered either by redoubts or epaulments, or within a treble line of trenches.' The Commander-in-Chief had entertained no such visionary expectation. His scheme was, as we have seen, to make the utmost of such artillery as he possessed, so as to weaken the Sikhs sufficiently to allow the issue to be brought to 'the arbitrament of musketry and the bayonet.' That limit had not been reached when our fire began to slacken, and it is unquestionable that Dick's task was thereby rendered more difficult. But the main responsibility for the error does not lie with Sir Hugh Gough; still less can it be ascribed to his dislike of artillery. It is true that, after Sir Robert Dick's Division had entered the Sikh entrenchments, the Commander-in-Chief, perceiving that he must be immediately supported, countermanded an artillery demonstration and ordered Smith and Gilbert to attack in force, instead of carrying out a feint. This change of plan, which became essential as soon as the Sikhs perceived the real object of the attack, has been misunderstood. The misconception passed at once into the newspapers, and even the definite contradiction of Sir Herbert Edwardes, who was himself present, has not availed to prevent its reappearance. Writing soon after the battle, Edwardes referred thus to the incident: 'The conquered trenches of the Sikhs would have been wrested again, had not Sir Hugh, with the intuitive quickness of a General's eye, marked the crisis and the

struggle, foreseen its issue, and ordered up Gilbert's and Smith's Divisions to the rescue[1].' He adds, in a footnote, 'As we have heard many officers of those divisions express their belief that their advance was a mistake and not intended, it may not be out of place here to chronicle a curious fact, viz. that both the Chiefs, present in the field though in different parts of it, *simultaneously* perceived the necessity of the manœuvre, and *simultaneously* ordered it. Both the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief sent two or three Staff Officers each to carry the order in question, so that the advance which saved the day, though it lost many men, was ordered and no mistake.' Sir Henry Havelock was of opinion that a scheme which he had himself devised would have prevented a great loss of life. 'It embraced,' he says, 'the project of turning the right by a bridge at Ferozepore, and communicating with the turning columns higher up by means of pontoons[2].' Havelock was probably unaware that plans similar to his own had received the careful consideration of the Chief and of the Governor-General, and had been rejected. In answer to such criticisms, Sir Hugh Gough was accustomed to point out that he had not a single man to spare from the main attack. He had done everything in his power to tempt the Sikhs out of their entrenchments; they were too wise to be drawn, and the British General had to bring a sufficient force to bear upon their defences. The letter to

[1] *Calcutta Review*, 1846, p. 295.

[2] *Life of Sir Henry Havelock*, ut supra, p. 157.

the Governor-General, which we have printed on pp. 52–3, suffices to explain why all such attractive schemes were impossible of realization. 'Had I followed the mode laid down by the English critics,' wrote the Commander-in-Chief, 'every man in this army knows I should have failed, and lost India.'

On a survey of the whole campaign, it must be admitted that, in one sense, the Indian Government was surprised by the Sikh invasion. The Governor-General must rely upon the advice of the Political Agents. The Political Agent at Lahore was Major Broadfoot, and it was not till the last moment that Broadfoot came to believe that the Khalsa would thus seek its own destruction. 'It was not credible,' wrote Sir Henry Lawrence, 'that the Lahore Government would calmly sit down in the midst of its difficulties, and make the horrible calculations which it did of its inability to stand another month against the army . . . and that the vengeance of a foreign army would be a lesser evil than the fury of its own—that, *therefore*, it was expedient to fling the soldiery upon British India, supplying them with every possible means of success, taking, if unsuccessful, the chance of clemency and forgiveness, and, if victorious, the merit and profit of repelling the English from Hindoostan. We repeat that this calculation was too monstrous to be altogether credible, though not too monstrous to be true[1].' To this extent Sir

[1] *Essays, Military and Political*, by Sir Henry Lawrence, pp. 262–3.

Henry Hardinge and Major Broadfoot were alike surprised, and Sir Hugh Gough shared their expectations. The Governor-General told Sir Charles Napier that he would be able to give him six weeks' notice of the outbreak of hostilities, and all the preparations of the Government were made on this assumption. The Governor-General would have willingly taken steps to secure the frontier against any emergency; had it been possible, he would gladly have permitted Sir Hugh Gough to strengthen our outposts, to provide cover for European infantry and artillery beyond Meerut (cf. vol. i. p. 374), and to arrange for a concentration in Sirhind (which Sir Hugh, in a private letter, says had always been his wish). It was not a question of economy. Financial considerations are never far from the mind of a Governor-General of India; but, had this been the sole difficulty, there would have been little excuse for Sir Henry Hardinge. The delicacy of the situation lay, as has been already pointed out, in the necessity for avoiding any suggestion of hostility on our part. To have placed on the Sikh frontier, in the end of November, the force which assembled there in the beginning of February, would have made us, in the eyes of Europe, and (what is more important) in the eyes of India, the aggressors. Every native state would have felt that our professions of moderation, and our anxiety to maintain the *status quo* were part of a policy of calculated deception. There were, at the time, those who thought that British soldiers should never enter

into a conflict with a native prince except as the attacking party. The Duke of Wellington, on the contrary, urged that no military advantage would repay us for the stain we should thus bring upon our good name, and for the profound distrust which would be the inevitable result. The latter view commended itself to Sir Henry Hardinge. It may be that his sense of honour was too fine for the situation in which he was placed; but that very sense of honour had, at least once already, prevented the outbreak of a Sikh war. As it was, the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief succeeded in increasing the force at and beyond Umballa from 13,538 to 32,479, without exciting the suspicion of the Durbar at Lahore. To do more than this would have strengthened the British forces in the initial conflicts, and it would have prevented the delay before Sobraon; but it would, on the other hand, have implied the abandonment of the policy which Sir Henry Hardinge had been appointed to carry out, and which had hitherto met with conspicuous success.

In treating of the military aspect of the campaign, we must, therefore, recollect that political considerations account for the fact that, for three weeks, only 17,727[1] men were available, and that six weeks had to elapse before the heavy guns, manned by European artillerymen, could be brought up from

[1] The remainder of the 32,479 men mentioned above were left to protect Ferozepore, Ludhiana, Bussean, and our own hill stations.

Meerut, or Sir Charles Napier could make an attack upon Multan. In other respects, where political difficulties had not interfered with military precautions, there was no lack of preparation. The Commander-in-Chief had made a careful examination of the line of the Sutlej, and had made himself acquainted with the ground. The transport arrangements left nothing to be desired. The Sikhs had crossed about the 13th of December; on the afternoon of the 18th, they were met at Moodkee by a force of 10,000 men, most of whom had covered a difficult march of about 150 miles in a week; so admirable were the arrangements of the Commander-in-Chief, and so prompt was the response to his orders, that Sir Henry Hardinge, in his letter of complaint to Sir Robert Peel, admitted that every available man had been added to the force. Sir Hugh Gough might have waited for his supports from Meerut, or even for the co-operation of Sir Charles Napier; but to do so would have been to permit the enemy to attain their first object—the capture of Ferozepore and Ludhiana, and to convince the hesitating native that the day of the British was over. Accepting the circumstances which had placed an inadequate force at his disposal, the Commander-in-Chief deliberately rejected (cf. vol. i. p. 386) the alternative of abandoning to destruction our frontier outposts, and allowing the Sikhs an undisturbed series of successes, until he could face them with a large army. He was able, not merely to save the line of the Sutlej, but to finish the war

within sixty days from its outbreak. Enough has already been said of the battles of the Sutlej campaign, and it is unnecessary again to refer to them. Sir Charles Napier (writing with only the camp gossip[1] of the time to guide him) thought that the censures of history would fall heavy upon the long delay between Ferozeshah and Sobraon; yet it was by reason of that delay the war was finished in two months. It was not possible that after their prolonged and tiring march, and three days of incessant fighting, the little force could pursue the defeated Sikh army across the Sutlej on the 22nd of December, nor would such a course have been advisable, for it might have resulted in a campaign prolonged into the hot weather, a disaster which, above all else, the Commander-in-Chief desired to avoid. It is often supposed that the postponement of operations was due to the want of ammunition, and the statement of Sir Hugh Gough's dispatch that our artillery ammunition was completely expended on the second day of Ferozeshah[2] has been interpreted to mean that the army remained, for a month, devoid of ammunition for the guns. In point of fact, Sir

[1] e.g. he describes the Sikhs as fortifying 70,000 men on our side of the river at Sobraon. Bruce's *Life of Sir Charles Napier*, p. 337.

[2] The failure of ammunition at that critical moment is explained by Sir Henry Lawrence. 'The chief reason,' he says (*Essays*, p. 329), 'for the ammunition having run out at Ferozeshah was the extraordinary number of waggons that blew up. Of eighteen that went into action under Lieut.-Colonel Geddes no fewer than seven exploded.'

Hugh Gough placed before the Governor-General a plan for an attack upon the 29th of December, and at no point during the 'stalemate' at Sobraon did the British General feel himself unable to cope with the enemy. In his letters written during these weeks (cf. pp. 49–51) he again and again describes how he attempted to draw the enemy on, 'but the moment they see me coming down with a brigade, they are off. . . . I could destroy the bridge whenever I pleased, but really we moved up in such a hurry, and so very unexpected was their crossing that we are by no means prepared, and I do not wish to throw away a shot, as we shall want all we have and can muster to drive them out of Lahore[1].' It must also be remembered that Sir Harry Smith was sent, with an ample force of men and guns, to expel the enemy from another part of our extended frontier. Sir Hugh wished to deal a really great blow at the enemy at Sobraon and then to follow his beaten troops to the walls of their capital. With the reserve force which arrived from Meerut in the beginning of January he could have made the attack at Sobraon before the 10th of February, but he would not have been able to threaten Lahore. One of the causes of the delay was the absence of a siege-train, and the absence of a siege-train was a consequence of the political decision which affected the whole course of the war. We have already discussed the military reasons for the method of the

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to Mr. A. Arbuthnot, January 15, 1846.

attack at Sobraon[1]; but some further stress should be laid upon the political considerations submitted by Sir Hugh Gough to Sir Henry Hardinge (cf. pp. 52–3). After the battle of Ferozeshah, the Durbar at Lahore entered into negotiations with the Governor-General with a view to submission. Sir Henry Hardinge felt that he would not be justified in concluding such an arrangement, because the war had broken out owing to the inability of the Durbar to control its own army, and there was no reason to believe that it was capable of doing so in the beginning of January. Sir Hugh Gough took the view that, even if it were possible to drive the Sikhs out of their entrenchments at Sobraon by an artillery duel, and to force them back upon Lahore, the result would be that the soldiers of the Khalsa would not regard themselves as honestly beaten. 'To dismember this democratic army and to lower its confidence so as to enable the Sikh Government to submit . . . another action must be fought[2].' He regarded the bayonet as the proper weapon to teach (in Sir Charles Napier's words) the 'Disciples' that they had a master, to make the Sikh soldiery understand that they were really defeated. This

[1] Sir Charles Napier, recognizing that 'such attacks depend more on muskets and bayonets' than on guns, approved of a direct attack, which he considered the safest plan.

[2] Letter to Sir Henry Hardinge on p. 52. Recent experience in South Africa shows that military successes which would bring a European nation to immediate subjection have a different effect upon an imperfectly educated fighting population.

lesson Sir Hugh Gough taught them at Sobraon, and, as he anticipated, it was sufficient. There was no siege of Lahore and no guerilla warfare. With resources for whose insufficiency he was not responsible, with artillery greatly inferior to that of the enemy, and with numbers much smaller than theirs, the Commander-in-Chief had brought a great military confederacy to its knees within sixty days. The might of the invincible Khalsa had gone down before the slender battalions of the Indian Army.

Two main causes had brought about this result. The first was the discipline and the courage of the European regiments, on whom the fire of the enemy had been chiefly directed. English newspapers, ignorant of the conditions of warfare on the Sutlej, expected the army to sweep before them, with but little loss, hordes of barbarians, and talked of Clive and Plassey. The Sikhs were not barbarians; they were disciplined soldiers, trained by European officers, equipped with all the weapons of the day, and inspired by centuries of great traditions. In a conflict with such an army, our losses were, of necessity, severe. About 11,000 men fought on our side at Moodkee, about 17,000 at Ferozeshah, and about 16,000 at Sobraon. The killed numbered at Moodkee 215, at Ferozeshah 694, at Sobraon 320; and the wounded in the three battles amounted to 657, 1,721, and 2,063 respectively. The grand total of killed and wounded was less than 8 per cent. of the whole force engaged at Moodkee, and less than 15 per cent. at Ferozeshah and Sobraon.

It may not be relevant to compare with these figures the losses of Marlborough at Blenheim (23 per cent.) or of Wellington at Talavera (25 per cent.); but the battle of Assaye furnishes a reasonable comparison[1], and, at Assaye, about 31 per cent. of the British forces were killed or wounded. At home, it had been forgotten that native opponents could fight, and the large proportion of casualties among the eleven British regiments which took part in the war caused a loud outcry against the 'Tipperary tactics' of the Commander-in-Chief. That proportion he himself explains in a letter to his son:—

There were three good causes for the heavy loss in the two first battles. First, the army generally had not recovered themselves from the fearful disasters in Afghanistan, the latter operations in which country were so unjustly lauded for political purposes. . . . The second was the natural consequence, the Native Army almost dreaded the Sikh which had never been beaten, and which they looked on as invincible. The third was that the Native Army participated in the general feeling throughout India of a desire that we should not overthrow the only remaining powerful Native Hindu Government. This is a fact that can be proved. Not that the Native Army had a wish to lose their 'salt' (as they term their maintenance), but they decidedly did not wish to see the Lahore Government annihilated. These three causes made it necessary for the European portion of the army, especially the European officers of the Native Corps,

[1] It must, however, be admitted that the enemy's superiority in numbers was much greater at Assaye than at Ferozeshah or Sobraon.

to be foremost in the fight, and to expose themselves in a manner most creditable to them, but in many instances fatal. These are facts, but facts that cannot be brought before the world, and I must bear the brunt. It is rather hard my actions in China were not accounted of any moment, because they were effected without much, indeed with very little loss. In India, I am a reckless savage, devoid of stratagem and military knowledge, because my loss is severe; whilst the reasons, to any person knowing the army I fought with, and that I contended with in both countries, must be obvious, and could not be misinterpreted. In China, my force was almost exclusively European, whilst the force I contended with, although as brave and much more athletic than the Indian, was totally without military knowledge, and allowed me, in every instance, to turn their flank and to bring the great weight of my force upon a less powerful portion of them, thus making their artillery of no use, from their immovable construction. Not so the Mahrattas and Sikhs. They were both peculiarly military nations with a powerful artillery as well served as our own, infinitely superior in numbers and in the weight of metal in their guns. Led by officers accustomed to war, and in the latter instance [the Sikhs] having a confidence in themselves and in their tactics, from the knowledge that they had never been beaten, whilst they had before their eyes the fearful disasters of the first Cabool Army, and the retreat (for it can be taken in no other light) of the second, which they gave themselves the credit of having covered:—but I find that I am entering into a justification of my conduct, and I feel as a soldier that such is not necessary. Let the world carp, let them call me savage, incompetent, and what they please; I am ready to bear all their taunts, rather than throw a shade over the bright laurels the

Indian army have won. Posterity will do me justice[1].

The second cause to which we attribute the success of the dangerous operations in which the little army was engaged is its confidence in the Commander-in-Chief, and the spirit and determination of Sir Hugh Gough and Sir Henry Hardinge. To the courage and devotion of the Governor-General and to the invaluable assistance he rendered, the private letters of Sir Hugh Gough, during these eventful weeks, bear constant witness. 'I know him to be as gallant a soldier as ever drew a sword,' he writes; and the eulogy he passes upon Hardinge in the public dispatches is not more enthusiastic than the tone of his personal correspondence with his own family. But it was, naturally enough, to the Commander-in-Chief, not to the Governor-General, that the army looked for the inspiration that they needed, and they did not look in vain. Just as Sir Hugh Gough has been blamed for winning his victories with an insufficient force (a fact which, since he was not responsible for the insufficiency, is really the highest tribute to his conduct of operations), so he has been censured for the very confidence which led his soldiers on to victory. The personality of the Commander-in-Chief was a great factor in each

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, April 18, 1846. The resolve thus made was religiously kept, and many of the current misconceptions of his policy and conduct are due to the reticence he thus imposed upon himself from a sense of loyalty to the army.

battle. 'I never,' he remarked, 'ask a soldier to expose himself, when I do not personally lead. This the army knows and I firmly believe estimates.' And, on a review of all that the army had attempted and all that it had achieved, in spite of dangers without, and fears and doubts within, he added: 'My confidence in my army went far to save India[1].'

[1] As an indication of the reciprocal nature of this confidence it should be mentioned that, during the month spent before Sobraon, only three native soldiers deserted.

THEATRE OF THE SUTLEJ CAMPAIGN, 1845-6.

VI

THE RESULTS OF THE SUTLEJ CAMPAIGN

When the Sikh army fled from their entrenchments at Sobraon, the whole of their artillery on the British side of the Sutlej fell into British hands. Sixty-seven cannon, over 200 camel swivels, and large stores of ammunition were seized by Sir Hugh Gough's troops. A vast number of Sikhs had fallen in the engagements at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Aliwal and Sobraon, and more than 200 of their guns had been abandoned to the conquerors. But their army was not annihilated, and their heavy guns on the further side of the Sutlej, not less than 25 in number, had been saved from the wreck of their artillery. After the victory, the Governor-General immediately proceeded to Attaree to make arrangements for crossing, while the Commander-in-Chief remained a day longer at Sobraon to give instructions for the treatment of the wounded, and for the transport of men and guns. On the 12th of February he moved to Attaree and found time to attend the funeral of Sir Robert Dick in the churchyard at Ferozepore. That evening and the following day the main portion of the army crossed the Sutlej, and Sir Hugh Gough wrote to Sir Henry Hardinge: 'I have

assumed the command of "the Army of the Punjab" —do you like the name?' The wounded Gilbert was left in command of three brigades which were to cross a day or two later, and to bring up the sick, the captured ordnance, and the heavy battering-train. A large number of the wounded were carried to Ferozepore; to cover these movements a brigade of cavalry was added to the three infantry brigades which were left behind. Immediately after crossing, Sir Hugh Gough, on the night of February 12, advanced towards Lahore, and occupied the 'very respectable little fort' and town of Kussoor, which the enemy had abandoned, leaving two more guns. Next day the rest of the army (except General Gilbert's force) joined; the Sutlej had been crossed and a march of thirty-five miles accomplished within three days of the action[1]. On the 14th, the Governor-General came into camp, and, on the 15th, Gholab Singh arrived at the British camp to make terms with the conquerors.

Gholab Singh was the Rajah of Jammu, the last of the Jammu brothers, and he had preserved complete neutrality throughout the war, refusing the repeated solicitations of the Lahore Government to come to its aid. He was therefore chosen by the Durbar to negotiate with the Governor-General, as the most acceptable envoy who could be sent. Sir Henry Hardinge might have declined to treat

[1] This statement is made on the authority of Sir Henry Lawrence, *Essays*, p. 299. Other authorities give the 16th as the date of the junction.

with the Sikh Government, which had so wantonly provoked hostilities, but Sir Hugh Gough and he were agreed that, for many reasons, annexation was not advisable. A series of sieges and a prolonged guerilla warfare, lasting into the unhealthy season, would have been the inevitable result. The forces at the Governor-General's disposal (even including Sir Charles Napier's 12,000 men at Bhawalpore) were not sufficient for the purpose, nor did the exhausted state of the Treasury permit of the large expenditure involved. Sir Henry Hardinge, accordingly, assured Gholab Singh of his willingness to come to terms. The Sikhs agreed to cede to us the Jullundur Doab (between the Beas and the Sutlej), and to pay us an indemnity of a million and a half sterling, or, as an equivalent, the districts of Kashmir and Hazara. Half a million sterling was to be paid on the ratification of the Treaty. The Sikhs, further, promised to surrender the twenty-five guns that they had carried away safely from the battle-fields of the Sutlej, and to restrict the numbers of their army to twenty-five infantry battalions and 12,000 cavalry. These were the leading clauses of the agreement, and they were in accordance with the views of the Commander-in-Chief as well as of the Governor-General. 'I entirely concur,' he wrote, 'in the policy of Sir H. Hardinge. Ample reparation is made and compensation given for our vast outlay, while we have a power sufficiently strong to repel them (yet not strong enough again to threaten us) between us

and the unruly Afghans[1].' Next day (February 16)[2], at one o'clock in the morning, Gholab Singh acceded to all these demands; and on the 18th the army marched to Lullianee, on its way to Lahore. In the afternoon of the same day the young Maharajah, Dhulīp Singh, entered the camp to throw himself on the mercy of the Governor-General. 'The Maharajah,' says Sir Hugh Gough, 'is a very interesting boy, and showed great nerve, very different from the Gwalior Rajah. The address of the Governor-General was manly and explicit; not availing himself of the fallen fortunes of the Monarch before him, he hoped that this meeting would lead to the renewed friendship of the two nations. Unlike Lord Ellenborough, he was moderate and conciliatory, without at all lowering the dignity of the paramount power of India.' On the 19th the British forces encamped at Kuna Kuleh, and on the 20th they were outside the walls of Lahore[3].'

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, February 19, 1846.

[2] The dates here given are from Sir Hugh Gough's diary.

[3] Sir Charles Napier, who arrived at Lahore in very bad health on March 3, records an adverse impression of the discipline of the army. A force which had just come through the difficulties we have narrated, and which had lost so large a proportion of its officers (including Major-Generals and Brigadiers, on whom camp discipline mainly depends), might well present an appearance widely different from that of a field-day; and Napier's ill-health rendered him liable to take (as he himself says) a jaundiced view of affairs. He adds a rumour as to the absence of piquets, &c., 'even in sight of the enemy'; and this statement (of which Napier can have had no personal knowledge) has been repeated as if it had his

On March 8 the treaty was signed; the signatures included the names of Lal Singh and Tej Singh. On the 9th, with great pomp and circumstance, it was solemnly ratified at a Durbar held in the Governor-General's state tent. One incident, in particular, impressed itself upon the minds of the onlookers. 'A small tin box enveloped in a shabby cloth' was passed round. It contained the famous diamond, the Koh-i-núr, which was soon to become the property of the British Crown.

The policy of the Lahore Treaty has been subjected to a large amount of criticism, and two agreements which arose out of it have been more especially attacked. The Maharajah could not pay the War Indemnity, a contingency which the Governor-General had anticipated, and for which

definite authority. The reader will remember that piquets were duly employed by the Commander-in-Chief; and the following extract from a letter to his son contrasts curiously with such statements. Writing from camp at Kuna Kuleh, on the 19th February (after the Maharajah had made a definite submission) he says: 'I made a magnificent move yesterday. Never was such a sight seen in India. An Indian army with its accompaniment of upwards of 100,000 souls, and more than that number of cattle, moving, ready to give battle at any point. . . . In a country like this we must always be prepared, and, indeed, it is that state of necessary preparation that makes me at this hour of the night, be writing to you. But I feel the awful responsibility, as I feel the lives of this living mass rest, not on one man, but upon him as the instrument in the hands of an all-wise God.' This sense of responsibility and of the never-ceasing necessity of preparations for sudden attack pervades Sir Hugh's private correspondence.

he had provided. He was desirous of weakening the Sikhs by the loss of Kashmir, but how could we hold the country when it was handed over as an equivalent for the indemnity? 'The distance,' he said, 'from Kashmir to the Sutlej is 300 miles of very difficult mountainous country, quite impracticable for six months. To keep a British force 300 miles from any possibility of support would have been an undertaking that merited a straight waistcoat[1].' In these circumstances, Sir Henry Hardinge entered into an arrangement with Gholab Singh, by which the British, while retaining the suzerainty over Kashmir, gave up that district to Gholab Singh for a payment of three-quarters of a million sterling. The agreement has been censured on many grounds—chiefly because it has been regarded as tantamount to rewarding a traitor for his treachery. It seems to us that Lord Hardinge's own answer to this objection (printed in his son's 'Life') disposes of the accusation. The policy of the arrangement is another question; the Governor-General himself regarded it only as the lesser of two evils. The administration of the Jullundur Doab was more easily practicable, and the task was assigned to John (afterwards Lord) Lawrence, to

[1] *Life of Lord Hardinge,* p. 133. Colonel Malleson disposes of the difficulty by remarking that 'a mountainous country like Kashmir, possessing a few strong passes, would have been easily garrisoned by a brigade.' *Decisive Battles of India,* p. 400. The expression used by Lord Hardinge in the text is certainly not too strong for a proposal to send a brigade to garrison the Kashmir frontier.

whose vigour and skill was due the prompt reinforcement of artillery and ammunition which made its way from Delhi to Sobraon at the crisis of the campaign.

The second sequel to the Treaty of Lahore to which we referred as arousing antagonistic criticism, was the Governor-General's compliance with the request of the Durbar to occupy Lahore for a limited time, in order that the Sikh Government might be able to overawe the soldiery into accepting the promised reduction in their numbers. To this step the Commander-in-Chief was strongly opposed.

As a military measure (he wrote) I deeply regret it. Its political anticipations I sincerely trust may be fulfilled. Sir Henry Hardinge himself was much opposed to it, and positively refused the repeated solicitations of the Sikh Government. The fact is, without such a support the present Government, at the head of which is Lal Singh, and at the head of the Army, Tej Singh, would not last a week. That they will be able to reorganize their army and rule the state, even with the aid of a British force is very doubtful indeed; but after repeated refusals, Sir Henry at last consented to leave one Regt. European Infantry, and eight Regiments Native Infantry, with two Light Field Batteries, two Companies of Sappers, and two Reserve Companies of Artillery; one Troop Native Horse Artillery and a wing of a Regiment of Irregular Cavalry—all under the command of Sir John Littler [1], one of my very best officers. We have taken possession of

[1] Sir Charles Napier regarded the post as a most dangerous one, and offered to undertake it, but Sir Henry Hardinge, in view of Napier's health, refused to appoint him.

the city and citadel, our troops have all the gates (13), and we do not allow a Sikh soldier to remain in the city, except those confidential ones around the person of the Maharajah and the Sirdars composing the Government. And this with an understanding that if they do not form a Government and reorganize the army within a limited time, we shall no longer give them our support—in no case beyond the end of this year. I shall be very much on the fidgets until that period arrives, particularly during the hot and subsequent wet season, when the health of my men may, and I fear will, suffer. Altogether it has diminished the pleasurable feelings I had entertained at our rapid and brilliant progress. It was my intention to accompany the Governor-General into the Doab, our newly acquired possessions at the other side of the Beas, but duty got the better of curiosity and I have decided on remaining until I see my men properly posted and housed at Lahore, with six months' provisions; I will then take back the remnants of the army across the Sutlej [1].

The helplessness of the Lahore Government gave Sir Hugh Gough the impression that the treaty just made might not be a basis for a permanent settlement, and he seized the opportunity of examining the Sikh defences, 'as the time may arrive when a knowledge of these places may be useful.' The day after the ratification of the treaty, the Governor-General left Lahore to traverse the newly-ceded Doab, and to make a triumphal progress to Calcutta with the 250 pieces of ordnance captured in the war. The Commander-in-Chief, remaining as we

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, from the Governor-General's camp before Amritsir, March 15, 1846.

have seen in Lahore, took full advantage of the opportunity (which might not recur) of examining the Sikh fortresses before the Durbar became again jealous of British interference. 'I have ridden round Govindghur,' he says, 'and had a perfect view of its exterior work. It is extremely strong indeed, and from what I have seen, could only be taken by sappers. I also went round a great part of the walls of Amritsir. It is infinitely weaker than Lahore, and I could easily take it by breaching, if I was hard run, by assault—by blowing in the gateways. This, however, would be attended with great loss. But as to-morrow morning I am to see the interior of both places, I shall be a better judge, and I have brought the heads of my engineer department with me to aid in the examination.' The result was quite satisfactory. 'I have had a very close and full examination of Govindghur, and I have assured myself that I should find no difficulty *whatever* in taking it, whenever it may be forced upon us. I have also gone all round the works of Amritsir, and have no doubt upon my mind that within forty-eight hours after we opened our batteries it would be in my possession, and I know from which point to attack both [1].' On the 23rd of March Sir Hugh left Lahore, having seen 'every man and officer most comfortably housed, with six months' provisions securely placed, and ample ammunition for the guns and small arms; the whole of the Sikh guns, except five, under our protection and

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, March 15, 1846.

in our keeping.' He recrossed the Sutlej on the 26th, and next day visited the scene of the battle of Ferozeshah. On the 7th of April he was again at Simla, which he had left on the 12th of November, when affairs in the Punjab began to assume a threatening aspect. Sir Hugh was now in his sixty-seventh year, and the anxieties of these months might well have weakened even his vigorous frame. He had suffered, during the campaign, from some of the minor evils to which flesh is heir, but he felt no indication of the approach of old age. 'I am not at all grateful to the sympathizing folk who would send me to my Father's many years before I intend to pay such a visit [1].'

Meanwhile, the Governor-General's letter to Sir Robert Peel had been bearing fruit in England. It will be convenient for the reader, in view of the correspondence that followed, to have before him the letter itself. It ran as follows:—

CAMP, FEROZPORE: *December* 30, 1845.

I am obliged to write rapidly, to get through the mass of work passing through my hands.

I am convinced you and your colleagues will be satisfied that I have pushed forbearance to the extreme limit which prudence would allow, and that the military arrangements made for defensive purposes were only commensurate with the necessity of securing our frontier posts, and were not calculated to invite aggression.

The sudden irruption of the Sikh army, consisting of 65,000 men and 150 pieces of artillery, was met

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to Mrs. Arbuthnot, May 2, 1846.

by a rapid march of 150 miles, the movements of which had been so accurately combined with other posts on our line of operations, that in our progress here we brought with our ranks every available man.

When the enemy attempted to surprise our camp on the evening of the 18th we beat him back at every point, advanced four miles from our camp in pursuit, and captured 17 guns.

We advanced in beautiful order on the morning of the 21st, and happily formed our junction with Littler, who brought up 5,000 fresh men, 21 pieces of artillery, and two regiments of cavalry. We then moved to the attack of the enemy's intrenched position, defended by 60,000 men and 108 pieces of well-served artillery, organised on the French system, and having carried his batteries on this side we captured 92 pieces of his artillery. The enemy has been driven back across the Sutlej, and disheartened by the severity of his loss.

Fortune, and the bravery of the British troops, have favoured us during the whole of these arduous operations. We have beaten the most warlike and best organised army of Asia, with a numerous artillery as well served and as obstinate at their guns as our own. Everything is secure; the Sikh chiefs on this side overawed and subdued; the Lahore property on this side confiscated by my proclamation of the 13th; Hindostan, Gwalior, Rohilcund tranquil; the impression of our irresistible force renewed; and a great victory on this side of the Sutlej is the forerunner of a more complete and final success at Lahore.

In policy, this is the view which I desire to take. It is the truth. And yet in the face of these facts it is my duty to her Majesty, and to you as the head of the Government, to state, most confidentially, that we have been in the greatest peril, and are

likely hereafter to be in great peril, if these very extensive operations are to be conducted by the Commander-in-Chief[1].

These are painful avowals for me to make to you, and not to communicate to him. I rely on your friendship to justify the disclosure of my sentiments in a case where the safety of India is at stake.

Gough is a brave and fearless officer, an honourable and amiable man, and, in spite of differences, a fine-tempered gentleman, and an excellent leader of a brigade or a division. He deserves every credit for his heroism in the field. The most devoted courage is always displayed by him, and his merits and his services exceed those of some general officers ennobled by the Crown—if I may venture to hazard an opinion in his favour, at a time that I am fulfilling an important public duty in expressing my opinion, that he is not the officer who ought to be entrusted with the conduct of the war in the Punjab.

If I am afraid of making this avowal of my opinion to you I am unfit for my present office. I respect and esteem Sir Hugh Gough, but I cannot risk the safety of India by concealing my opinion from you.

So long as the public safety was not compromised

[1] This letter is discussed supra, pp. 33–6. It must be remembered that it was written when the always difficult relations between a Governor-General and a Commander-in-Chief were rendered more strained than ever by a bitter controversy regarding the delay at Ferozeshah. So far was this letter, written in such circumstances, from being accepted as a final verdict, that the Duke of Wellington extended Gough's term of office on the verge of the second Sikh War, and that when the recall of Gough was again under consideration in 1849, Lord Hardinge himself advised the Duke and the Government against any such step.

I have supported Sir Hugh Gough. My Council discussed the propriety of his removal, and I overruled their interference. Subsequently, without my knowledge, the President of the Council wrote to the Chairman (of the East India Company) on the subject; and my letters to him and to Lord Ripon are simple statements of what has passed.

If I had not instructed Littler to move we should on the 21st have had 5,000 men, 21 guns, and two regiments of cavalry less in action[1].

During the night there was great despondency amongst the officers. I lay down amongst the men. It was excessively cold. I had not eaten, and had been on horseback twenty-four hours, and the poor fellows were suffering from thirst.

The C.-in-C. came to me about midnight, and said the army was in a most critical and perilous state[2]. I concurred and at once told him, as I had previously told those who approached me, that

[1] Although Sir Henry Hardinge sent the actual order to General Littler, yet this statement does less than justice to the Commander-in-Chief, who had all along included Littler's force in his calculations of the numbers at his command. It will be remembered, e.g., that in the letter to his son (quoted in vol. i. p. 392) in which Sir Hugh, writing on the 15th of December, outlined his plans for the campaign, he said: 'I shall push on so close that, if they attack me, Littler will fall on their rear; if they attack him, I shall be in the midst of them.' There is no reason to believe that, if Sir Henry Hardinge had not written the actual order, Sir Hugh would have omitted to carry out this important part of his definite scheme, but the Governor-General imagined that the idea was entirely his own.

[2] This version of the conversation would not have been accepted by Sir Hugh Gough, and was, in fact, distinctly repudiated by him in a subsequent controversy about the conduct of Colonel Benson. (Cp. pp. 26–7.)

we must wait patiently till morning, then attack the enemy vigorously, carry everything before us or die honourably; but that the suggestions of retreat, to which others had referred, were quite out of the question. Sir Hugh cordially agreed with me, and I urged him to get some rest.

I then saw Prince Waldemar and his suite, and entreated H.R.H. to retire. He declined, and I felt it prudent privately to tell him that our position was critical, and that it was my duty to order him away. I gave him an escort and he consented. He is a very amiable and gallant prince.

I sent my wounded A.D.C., R. Wood, away almost by force, and my doctor; and I then, out of a numerous staff, had only my friend Colonel Benson and Arthur, a mere boy, left by my side. He had miraculously escaped in our assault of the enemy's batteries. Charles attended me up to that time, when I compelled him to leave me, as his presence distracted me from my duty.

Towards morning, having heard where Sir John Littler was, I sent Colonel Benson and Arthur to give him orders to come up, and that Arthur should lead him. He delivered the message, but galloped back to me in time to be by my side in the advance we made in the morning. We rode twenty paces in front of the line, to prevent the men from firing, and when the line drew up, the men hurra'd, the regimental colours dropped to me as at a review, and a very disagreeable night was almost obliterated.

To return, however, to the more painful part of this letter.

Sir Hugh Gough has no capacity for order or administration. He is at the outposts wonderfully active, but the more important points, which he dislikes, of framing proper orders, and looking to their execution, are very much neglected. His

Staff is very bad, and the state of the army is loose, disorderly, and unsatisfactory [1].

At one time I had reflected on the necessity of sending for Sir Charles Napier, and appointing him to the command of the army in the Punjab. But I abandoned it, as it is uncertain whether we shall be able to concentrate means sufficient to invade the Punjab, and dictate terms at Lahore, before the hot season sets in.

If my appointment in succession to Gough is in the way, don't consider me: I am quite ready to yield for the public interest. In a few days I shall be able to determine whether we ought to cross the Sutlej or not.

I lost my most able political agent, Major Broadfoot, also Herne's, Somerset, and altogether five Aides-de-camp killed, six wounded. Arthur being the only A.D.C. unhurt.

We can beat the Sikhs in the field, but their artillery is most formidable.

I have visited the hospitals, and shall endeavour to do so again to-day. What fine fellows our countrymen are! Her Majesty may be proud of her soldiers. Pray make my most humble duty to her Majesty for not making a report on these momentous events. You know how gratefully I felt her Majesty's condescension in deigning to write to me.

I am up every morning at a quarter before four, but my health is good, and I can endure any fatigue.

As everything is in a state of security, though not free from annoyances which an active and reckless enemy may inflict, I shall act with the greatest prudence, and risk as little as I possibly can. At this extremity of the Empire a defeat is almost the loss of India.

I have told Gough I have a right to interfere, and

[1] Cf. supra, p. 35.

control him in all and every matter. We are on good terms. I have praised him as he deserves in my general orders, and political expediency requires that I should do him full justice. But the public safety also requires that you should be informed of the truth, and I should be deficient in fortitude and moral courage if I did not reveal to you opinions, and facts, which render it most important that the invading army should be placed in other hands; and in my opinion the most proper arrangement will be to make Napier C.-in-C. of the Punjab army.

In our present state I shall not write to Napier; and in case of accident to myself, Mr. Currie, my chief secretary, and my son Charles are the only persons who are aware of the contents of this letter [1].

Such a letter as this could not fail to make an impression upon the Prime Minister, and to bring before the Home Government the question of taking steps to carry out the wishes of the Governor-General. Peel had no means of judging for himself, and he believed that matters were in a critical situation. When he was able to form his own view, upon a survey of the evidence, the effect of Hardinge's letter was, if not obliterated, seriously diminished. 'I frankly own,' he wrote in 1846, 'that my impression as to Sir Hugh Gough's merits has been very much changed since I have seen the correspondence between him and Hardinge previously to the recent battles. In every other quality of a soldier than the comprehensive views

[1] *Sir Robert Peel* (ed. Parker), vol. iii. pp. 296–300. Quoted here by kind permission of Mr. John Murray.

of a great commander, in brilliant courage, in readiness to take responsibility, to sacrifice personal pretensions, to disregard professional punctilios, he is justly entitled to admiration [1].

The first indication of the difficulty created by Hardinge's letter reached the Commander-in-Chief on the 19th of April, when the overland mail brought reports of the speeches of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel in support of motions of thanks to the army in India. These speeches were made on the night of the 2nd of March, on receipt of the news of Moodkee and Ferozeshah, and before the arrival of intelligence regarding Aliwal and Sobraon. The Governor-General's letter of December 30th had reached England immediately after the dispatches. Sir Henry Hardinge was the favourite pupil of the Duke of Wellington, and the intimate friend of Sir Robert Peel, with whom he maintained a constant private correspondence, and in whose Cabinet he had held high and responsible office. Among politicians and in Government circles, Sir Hugh Gough's personality was unknown. It was only natural that the Hardinge letter should receive great weight. But the Commander-in-Chief was not unreasonably surprised to find that in the Duke of Wellington's speech he was not even mentioned by name. The Duke paid a tribute to Sir Henry Hardinge, and to the conduct of operations: 'I really must say,' he remarked, with reference to Ferozeshah, 'that I have not for a length of time heard of an action

[1] *Sir Robert Peel* (ed. Parker), vol. iii. p. 505.

that has given me such unqualified satisfaction as this, except in one particular[1].' That 'particular' formed the subject of the remainder of the speech; it was the application of the word 'panic' to the 62nd Regiment in Sir John Littler's dispatch, so unfortunately published (cf. p. 19). To a defence of the regiment the Duke devoted the rest of his speech. Similarly, Sir Robert Peel had interpreted Sir Henry Hardinge's letter to mean that he alone was responsible for the successes. Sir Hugh Gough was much puzzled by the tone adopted by the two speakers. 'By the speeches in both Houses,' he wrote, 'one would think that Sir Henry Hardinge took a military command at Moodkee. Now the contrary is the fact. He not only handed over his whole staff to me, except Charles Hardinge, but also the military officers politically employed. . . . 'Tis true this truly gallant and devoted officer [Sir H. Hardinge] joined me just before nightfall, and continued with me until the close of the action, but he took no military command whatever, and did not even know my dispositions. . . . I mean not by this to insinuate that I had not the highest respect for his military abilities, for I believe him to be as judicious, and I know him to be as gallant, an officer as ever wore a sword.' Ignorant of the existence of the letter, Sir Hugh found two other possible causes for the Duke's attitude towards him. 'I can only account for it in two ways. First, he

[1] *Speeches of the Duke of Wellington* (ed. Gurwood), vol. ii. p. 657.

was displeased with the publication of Sir John Littler's dispatch or rather report, of which I was just as ignorant as you are. . . . The other action which may have displeased is that I gazetted the Serjeant-Majors of every Queen's Regiment[1] without having awaited his sanction. I scarcely had an alternative; my loss in officers was so great that it was absolutely necessary; and I must say that I felt the policy of giving every stimulus to induce to future acts of daring. I felt the struggle was but begun, and that it would be one of life or death, firm possession, or shameful abandonment of our Indian Empire. I did then what I should do again even with the ban of His Grace's displeasure[2].' While writing thus to his son, Sir Hugh was careful to warn him against saying anything which could be construed into a jealousy of Sir Henry. 'Remember, as Governor-General, he was not only head of the State, but head of the Army, and that it was an act deserving of all praise that he took a subordinate part, which showed con-

[1] In view of the loss of British officers at Moodkee and Ferozeshah, Sir Hugh Gough had taken the serious responsibility of conferring commissions upon five non-commissioned officers who had distinguished themselves in the battles. This departure from military rules involved an encroachment, not only upon the powers of the Duke of Wellington as head of the British Army, but even on the royal prerogative itself, and considerable comment was made upon it in England. It was characteristic of Sir Hugh that he declined to allow the proprieties to interfere with actual military necessities in time of war.

[2] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, May 1, 1848.

fidence in the Head. . . . Lose no opportunity of lauding Sir Henry Hardinge; he merits it as a noble soldier, although he was not Commander-in-Chief.' These sentences are quoted from Sir Hugh's most confidential correspondence, because they show how generous was his estimate of Sir Henry Hardinge's character and services.

The Governor-General's letter had a more important result than its effect on ministerial oratory. On the 6th of May the following letter from the Duke of Wellington was handed to Sir Hugh Gough by the Governor-General:—

LONDON: *March* 7, 1846.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I duly received and was very much obliged to you for your Letter of the 27th of December, 1845, from your camp at Sultan Khan Wallah, with the Sketch Plan inclosed of the ground occupied by the enemy at Ferozeshehur, and I have perused with attention your interesting Reports of the operations of the Army under your Command. I sincerely lament the loss sustained, as all must, of the services of so many Gallant Officers and Brave Soldiers. But long experience has taught me that such operations cannot be carried on, and achievements performed and such objects attained as in the operations under my consideration without sustaining great loss, and that in point of fact the Honor acquired by all is proportionate to the difficulties, risks, and dangers met and overcome by those who have attained such objects for their country.

We may regret the loss, and even lament the fall of Individuals. But we never can the Event itself.

You may rely on my attending to all your recommendations. All does not depend upon me, but

I think that you may rely upon it that, as far as the Rules of the service will allow, everything will be done to denote Her Majesty's gracious reception of their services, for there are as there ought to be rules to regulate the grant of the Favours of the Crown as well as other marks of the Royal Prerogative.

I admire the conduct of Lieut.-General Sir Henry Hardinge in offering you the assistance of his Services in his capacity of Lt.-General in Her Majesty's Service, and I approve of, and think that you exercised your discretion wisely in accepting his Services, and in issuing the order to the Army appointing him Second in Command. But there is an important omission in this order. It ought to have contained the Terms 'till the Pleasure of Her Majesty shall be known.'

The Political state of affairs on the NW. frontier of India under the Government of Fort William has induced Her Majesty's servants to desire that the political and military Power of the State should be concentrated in one hand. There can be no doubt that, the Governor-General being on the spot, the Powers vested in the Person holding that office by different provisions of Acts of Parliament enable him to give such orders as he may think proper to regulate and control the operations and movements of the troops on the field equally as he could sitting in the Council at Fort William. Her Majesty and Her Servants are sensible that your former services have afforded every reason which should give confidence in your Talents, and your performance of any Duty with which you may be entrusted; but the Law has given certain powers to, and thrown responsibility upon, another Person, filling another Office; and they are anxious that he should have in his hands all the Power and Authority which can be conveyed to him, to enable him to provide for all the emergencies of the Service, as he may have reason to expect they will arrive, and to secure

the public interests. Under these circumstances, therefore, they are anxious that Lt.-General Sir Henry Hardinge should assume the direction of the movements and operations, and the command of the Army in the Field on the NW. frontier, and I have received Her Majesty's commands to transmit to Him a Letter of Service accordingly; and a Warrant to enable him to assemble Courts Martial for the trial of Officers and Men. Her Majesty and Her Servants have been anxious to carry into execution this arrangement, which the latter have considered necessary for the benefit and security of the public Interests, in the manner most respectful to you, and most calculated to mark the sense entertained by their Gracious Sovereign as well as by themselves, of your great services. I feel this desire most strongly, and I am anxious not only to conciliate your mind to an arrangement considered here to be absolutely necessary in the existing crisis; but that you should manifest your desire to promote it. Accordingly, I recommend you to adopt the course of conduct, which, under similar circumstances, I should follow myself, that is that you should, in concert with Sir Henry Hardinge, adopt every measure which can facilitate the arrangement, ordered by Her Majesty's Servants, through the channel of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. I tell you fairly that if I was in your situation, and it suited Sir Henry Hardinge, I would change places with him, and act as Second in Command to him as he did to you.

Believe me, my dear General,
Ever yours most sincerely,
WELLINGTON.

P.S. In the course of my military life, I have had occasion to adopt and have offered to adopt a course analogous to that which I have above recommended to you.

The secret of the speeches was now explained, nor could Sir Hugh affect to regard the Duke's proposal as other than a supersession, however courteous the language in which it was couched. To this letter he returned the following reply:—

HEADQUARTERS, SIMLA, *May* 6, 1846.

MY LORD DUKE,

Your Grace's letter of the 7th of March was only this day handed to me by the Governor-General of India. In the British Army there is not another officer with whom I would more cordially act than with Lt.-General Sir Henry Hardinge; nor is there one to whom I would merge superior rank, and serve under as second in command, more readily, under any other circumstances. But when I find Her Majesty's Servants, in the very midst of a Campaign where most important Military operations have been performed, and equally important ones anticipated, call upon me to resign my Military Command to a junior Officer, who had so nobly acted with me, throughout the whole of these most successful operations, I beg to say that I feel I should be justifying the withholding of all credit to myself, so unequivocally done by the Head of the British Army, in addressing the House of Lords on the vote of thanks to this Army, were I to serve in the subordinate capacity to which it would appear by Your Grace's letter, it is proposed I should be reduced. I think it right, therefore, to apprize Your Grace that when the Official Communication from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, to which you allude, shall reach me, I shall consider it due to myself to resign the Command of the Army of India.

I have the honour to be,
Your Grace's most obed. humble Servant,
H. GOUGH.

On the same day Sir Hugh sent to Sir Henry Hardinge and to the Secretary of the Court of Directors, copies of the Duke's communication and of his reply. To Sir Henry Hardinge he wrote: 'It is with much regret that I feel compelled to adopt the line of conduct the enclosed copy of my reply to the Duke of Wellington's letter indicates. But I think you will not be surprised at it, and I consider it due to you to place you in possession of my resolution as soon as possible. If it be fated that our official intercourse is to be brought to a close, be assured you will carry with you my warmest admiration and esteem, and my fervent prayers for your every success.' On the same day, the Governor-General sent the following reply:—

SIMLA, *May* 6.

MY DEAR SIR HUGH,

I regret the resolution to which you have come. The arrangements made by Her Majesty's Government for a Political Purpose had entirely gone by, when it came before me, and consequently it appeared to me that the most appropriate course to take for all parties was to consider the whole matter in abeyance until you or I should hear further from England. I should therefore have been gratified if you could have adopted this course, which would answer every purpose.

I have no doubt the acknowledgement for your distinguished services, when the Battle of Sobraon and its consequences be known by Her Majesty's Government, will be most satisfactory to you. I am greatly obliged to you for the friendly terms in which you express yourself towards me. I shall

in no respect act upon the letter I have received, because it is inapplicable to the present state of affairs. I shall consider the papers as strictly confidential, and entirely confined to you and to me, and I am glad you do not intend to act until you hear from the Secret Committee.

Yours, my dear Sir Hugh, with much esteem and very sincerely,

H. HARDINGE.

The closing sentence of Sir Henry Hardinge's letter indicates the way out of the difficulty. Sir Hugh never heard from the Secret Committee; the Letter of Service was suppressed by the Governor-General, and Sir Hugh's resignation did not take effect. That he had chosen the right and dignified course we do not doubt. Had the Duke's letter reached him during the campaign, it might have been his duty to comply with its request while military operations were in progress. In the new circumstances, resignation was the only course consistent with the self-respect of a victorious Commander-in-Chief. 'I hope,' he said, 'there is not an officer in the Army who would forfeit honour for emolument. I certainly never will[1].'

Before the Duke's letter had reached India, the Home Government had heard of the victories of Aliwal and Sobraon. The Duke of Wellington took the first opportunity of congratulating Sir Hugh Gough; it is clear that he did so with some feeling of embarrassment, and he did not make any refer-

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to A. Arbuthnot, Esq., May 8, 1846.

ence to his letter written exactly one month previously:—

April 7, 1846.

My dear Lord,

I am very much obliged to you for your letters, and for keeping me so well informed of your operations. I sincerely congratulate you upon your success, and it will be gratifying to you to see the sense entertained by the Sovereign and the two Houses of Parliament, and the Publick universally. I am afraid that you will not receive by this occasion the announcement of all that is intended to be done to mark the sense entertained of the services performed by the gallant officers and troops under your command, as the official forms, even in the grant of favours, require time, and a week has not yet elapsed since the official reports of your last success have been received in this country. But you may rely upon it that no time will be lost.

Believe me ever, my dear Lord,

Yours faithfully,

Wellington.

To His Excellency,
The Lord Gough, G.C.B.

Before telling of the rewards to which the Duke alluded, it may be convenient to print his reply to the letter written by Sir Hugh Gough on the 6th of May, proffering his resignation, and also Lord Gough's final answer. These letters are, of course, out of their proper chronological order.

Strathfieldsaye: *July* 9, 1846.

My dear Lord,

I have received Your Excellency's letter of the 6th of May, in answer to one which I had written to you on the 7th of March. I am concerned

to observe that you imagined I had failed to express in the House of Lords my sense of your services upon the occasion of the motion for the thanks of the House to yourself and the Army under your Command, and Lt.-General Sir Henry Hardinge for the operations previous and subsequent, and in the Battles of Moodkee and Ferozeshah. The Motion for those Thanks was made by the regular Official Authority, the President of the Board of Control, the Earl of Ripon. He was followed in the discussion by the Marquis of Lansdowne, and the noble Lords, who concurred in the well deserved approbation of your services and those of all concerned. I was sensible that an unfortunate expression in a dispatch or Report from Sir J. Littler which had been unguardedly published in India had made a strong impression against the conduct of one of Her Majesty's Regiments, the 62nd Regiment, and I considered it my duty first to endeavour to weaken or to remove the impression which had been made against this corps; in which I succeeded entirely to my own satisfaction and that of the House and the publick. But I certainly did not omit to express to the House my sense of the service which had been performed particularly by yourself. It is true that the first part, the principal and the greatest part possibly of what I said was to remove the impression against the 62nd, which nobody but myself could do.

But I certainly did not fulfil my own intentions, or perform my duty, as I ought, if I failed to state to the House my sense of the services performed by yourself and the gallant officers and brave Corps under your command. In respect to an arrangement to which my letter of the 7th of March referred, the object of that letter was to render it palatable to you, and I took the liberty of suggesting to you a course which you should take, which

I thought would redound to your honour and credit, and I suggested that the course which I recommended was analogous to those which I had adopted upon more than one analogous occasion, and had been prepared to adopt upon many.

You have been long enough in command of Armies to be sensible that it happens to a Commander-in-Chief but too frequently, to find that the essential interests of the publick require that arrangements should be made not exactly consistent with his own views or his opinions of justice to the pretentions and claims of individuals—this is the view which must be taken of this transaction, and the part which I took in it.

However it has happened that circumstances and your own good fortune, conduct and gallantry, have totally altered since the orders and arrangements of the 7th of March were written and adopted here. Great operations have been planned and undertaken and successfully carried into execution under your command, glorious Battles have been fought and victories gained, and the War has been brought to a termination by the destruction of the Army of the Enemy and the capture of all its cannon, by that under your command; and Peace has been dictated to the Enemy at the Gate of his Capital, upon terms equally honourable to the Army and to the Nation.

Her Majesty's Government and Parliament have not been slow in recognizing the services which you have performed. Her Majesty has conferred upon you the highest mark of honour and of Her favour, and Parliament has not been backward in granting to you and to your family the usual provision for the support of the Rank and Dignity to which Her Majesty by Her favour has raised you and them, in testimony of Her sense of your services.

Under these circumstances, whatever may be your sense of the arrangements on which my letter of

the 7th of March was written, you must be sensible that the necessity which had occasioned it had no influence in the view taken of your services at the close of the Campaign and of the War.

I again congratulate you upon them and upon their result. Believe me, my dear Lord,

Ever yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

SIMLA: *September* 1, 1846.

MY LORD DUKE,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's letter of the 9th of July. Having been placed in the high position I now hold through your Grace's recommendation, I will confess I felt sensitively alive to everything connected with the creditable performance of the duties of Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India; added to which I was fully aware that your Grace's approval stamps the value of all Military achievements. I trust I may therefore stand excused for having been prepared to resign—valuable to me though it be—that to which I had succeeded through your Grace, when I supposed I no longer held that place in your estimation as a Soldier, which from your Grace's having previously recommended me, I was proud in the idea of possessing. It is now to me a subject of the most heartfelt gratification to find, that my conduct and that of the gallant officers and brave troops under my command, throughout a campaign short but arduous, is stamped by the approval of the Duke of Wellington; to a higher honour I never aspired.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord Duke,
Your Grace's faithful and obedient Servant,

GOUGH.

The promise made in the Duke's letter of May 7th was amply fulfilled. No time was lost in marking the sense entertained by the Government of the operations on the Sutlej, and the speedy and successful close of the campaign. On the 2nd of April, 1846, the thanks of Parliament were conveyed to the Indian Army for the victories of Aliwal and Sobraon[1]. In his speech in the House of Commons, Sir Robert Peel spoke enthusiastically of the conduct of the campaign: 'The victory, this succession of victories, has been interrupted by no single failure; it was unsullied by any imputation on our arms or character'; and he read to the House a quotation from a letter by the Commander-in-Chief, 'which was never intended to meet the public eye.' The passage read by the Prime Minister contained these sentences:

Policy precluded me publicly recording my sentiments on the splendid gallantry of our fallen foe, or to record the acts of heroism displayed, not only individually, but almost collectively, by the Sikh sirdars and army; and I declare, were it not from a deep conviction that my country's good required the sacrifice, I could have wept to have witnessed the fearful slaughter of so devoted a body of men. . . . For upwards of a month, when the two armies were close in front of one another, notwithstanding the numerous temptations held out to our Sepoys

[1] A special vote of thanks was awarded to Sir Harry Smith for the operations under his independent command at Aliwal, and to Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh Gough for the zeal and judgement evinced in supplying Sir Harry Smith with sufficient forces.

by men of their own colour and religion; namely, increased pay from seven to twelve rupees a month, and immediate promotion, I had but three desertions from this large force. Nor should I omit to mention, as a proof of the high state of discipline of this splendid army, that trade has been carried on unreservedly, since we crossed the Sutlej, in the several Sikh towns around which our divisions have been necessarily placed for the procurance of water, and the same confidence has been shown as though we were in one of our long-established provinces [1].

Immediately on receipt of the dispatches, the Government decided to recommend the Queen to confer on Sir Henry Hardinge the dignity of a Viscounty, on Sir Hugh Gough that of a Barony, both in the peerage of the United Kingdom, and a baronetcy on Sir Harry Smith. On the 4th of May Sir Robert Peel moved in the House of Commons that pensions of the annual value of £3,000 and £2,000 respectively should be granted to Lord Hardinge and Lord Gough, for their lives. In the course of his speech in the House, Sir Robert Peel read another letter of Lord Gough—that written when Lord Tweeddale was given the command at Madras. After paying a tribute to Lord Hardinge, the Premier said:—

The career of that other gallant officer whom Her Majesty has elevated to the British peerage has not been less distinguished. For fifty-two years has Lord Gough served in the British army; and no one would have supposed from the vigour, the energy, and the heroism of his conduct, that fifty-

[1] *Speeches of Sir Robert Peel*, vol. iv. p. 159.

two years of active service could have passed over his head. Sir Hugh Gough was at the capture of the Cape of Good Hope, at the attack on Porto Rico, and at the capture of Surinam. During the Peninsular War he commanded the 87th Regiment at Talavera, where he was severely wounded; he was present at Barossa, at Vittoria, at Nivelle, where he was also severely wounded; at the sieges of Cadiz and at Tarifa. During the period of European peace, he had still an opportunity of distinguishing himself in his country's service—an opportunity he never neglected. He commanded the British army at Canton, and directed nearly all the operations in China. He was with the right wing of the army of Gwalior, which fought and gained the battle of Maharajpore. These are the services rendered by that gallant officer previous to the late campaign on the Sutlej, where he was Commander-in-Chief of the army. It would be presumptuous in me to attempt to do justice to his signal services. I believe he is known to the British army as a man of the most heroic valour, and that his valour and skill inspire confidence in all those whom he commands. I will not speak merely of his valour and skill; these are admitted by all who are acquainted with the history of our Peninsular and Indian wars. But I must take this opportunity of placing upon record an instance of his devotion to the service of his country, which he, probably, little thought would ever be mentioned within the walls of Parliament, but which I conceive to be at least as honourable to him as any services he has rendered in the field. After the termination of the Chinese campaign, Lord Gough was nominated to the command of the forces in Madras. It was thought expedient, at a period subsequent to his nomination to this command, that the military and civil command should be united in the hands of one person—that

person having the advantage of previous personal communication with Her Majesty's servants; Lord Tweeddale was selected for the government of Madras; and, as I have said, it being thought desirable, in the circumstances in which that presidency was then placed, to unite the military and civil commands, Lord Tweeddale superseded Lord Gough in the military command. That was a severe trial to a British officer—to one who had just been victorious in China. Now what was the answer returned by Lord Gough to the Commander-in-Chief, on its being intimated to him that the public service required the union of the two commands? Many officers would have felt deeply mortified; but I consider the answer of Lord Gough to be so honourable to him, and to set so striking an example of what is the duty of a British soldier, under such circumstances as I have mentioned, that I have determined to read to the House the letter written by the gallant officer on this occasion [1]. . . . This, in my opinion, is one of the most creditable letters ever written by a military man; and proved, I think, that the writer was worthy of a higher trust than that of Commander at Madras. I trust that these instances of apparent self-sacrifice and of devotion to the true interests of the military service will ever meet with their just rewards; and though Sir Hugh Gough, when he wrote that letter, never contemplated that a consequence of this might be his appointment to the chief command in India, yet I rejoice that such a noble devotion to the public service was followed by a reward to which he has proved himself to be fully entitled [2].

The announcement of the honour conferred upon him by Her Majesty the Queen reached Lord Gough

[1] The letter is printed, supra, vol. i. pp. 287–8.

[2] *Speeches of Sir Robert Peel*, vol. iv. pp. 676–8.

on the 18th of May. It would be affectation to pretend that he did not value this mark of public esteem and approval. 'For myself,' he wrote, 'I should have been well satisfied to have retired from the busy scenes of life as Sir Hugh Gough, but I will own I am ambitious for my family[1].' The peerage was a real satisfaction; and the circumstances in which it was conferred added greatly to the pleasure it gave him. In the first place, the fact that the Queen had, before she was approached on the subject, expressed her own personal desire thus to acknowledge the services of Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh Gough[2] afforded an element of peculiar satisfaction to one who cherished Sir Hugh's chivalrous and passionate feeling of loyalty towards his youthful Sovereign Lady. And, in the second place, not only was the peerage some atonement for the undeserved slight which had been put upon his conduct of the early part of the campaign on the Sutlej; but the title he was permitted to take involved an appreciation of previous services for which he had received scanty public recognition. Sir Hugh became Baron Gough of Chinkiangfoo in China and of Maharajpore and the Sutlej in the East Indies. 'I would have much preferred declining the peerage,' he said, 'than that Maharajpore had been left out.' Any remaining feeling of soreness was removed when Lord Gough received from the Court of Directors, instead of the Letter

[1] Lord Gough to his son, May 22, 1846.

[2] Cf. *Peel Correspondence*, vol. iii. pp. 307–8.

of Service, an announcement that the Court had conferred upon him a pension of £2,000 a year for life. Her Majesty's Government, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, and the East India Company had thus united to remove all trace of the unfortunate incident which was the result of the Governor-General's letter of December 30, 1845. Of the real explanation of the incident Lord Gough was never cognizant. While the correspondence regarding the Letter of Service was still unfinished he wrote to his son (on May 22): 'I pray you, at all times let it be known, my admiration of, and esteem for, Lord Hardinge, and whatever may be the result of my letter to the Duke, I most decidedly will never throw a shadow of blame on my friend. I am very happy where I am, I have no doubt I shall be more happy if I should go home. I believe I am much liked by the Army. I am sure I like and take a deep interest in them. So I am not likely to suffer much whatever turns up.' When it was settled that Lord Gough was to remain in India, it was impossible for Lord Hardinge to inform him of the actual circumstances, for co-operation would have become impossible. The secret was loyally kept, not only from the Commander-in-Chief, but from all except the few who were directly concerned, and even the fact that the Letter of Service had been prepared was not generally known. The first public revelation was made in the Correspondence of Sir Robert Peel, published in 1899, and the full story has been told, for the first time, in the present

volume. Since the publication of the Peel Papers, no good purpose would be served by continued reticence.

The Lahore settlement lasted for only a few months. Lord Hardinge had left, as British Resident at Lahore, Major Henry Lawrence, one of the distinguished brothers whose names find an honoured place in any history of British India. Among Lawrence's colleagues and subordinates were, besides his own brothers, Major Abbott, John Nicholson, Herbert Edwardes, and Harry Lumsden. If Lord Hardinge's policy proved impracticable it was no fault of the men whom he had chosen to carry it out. Lawrence's duty was to control the Council of Regency, whose head, Lal Singh, required careful observation. The first serious difficulty that arose was the refusal of the Sikh garrison in the fort of Kote-Kangra to comply with the terms of the Treaty. 'The hill fortress,' says the biographer of Lord Lawrence[1], 'which breathed this proud defiance could trace back its history, and that too no ignoble one, for two thousand years. . . . The fort stands on a precipitous and isolated rock four hundred feet high, and is connected with the main range hills only by a narrow neck of land twenty yards wide. The neck is defended by strong walls built up against the solid rock, which has been scarped for the purpose, and a winding passage through seven different gateways gives access to the fortress.' Such a stronghold as this, well pro-

[1] Bosworth-Smith's *Life of Lord Lawrence*, i. p. 174.

visioned, could withstand any force unprovided with artillery, but was helpless before siege-guns. Its commander trusted to the absence of a road by which such guns could be brought to bear upon it; but Lawrence's engineers, guided by Harry Lumsden's knowledge of the country, constructed a temporary road and surprised the garrison by the sight of a series of guns being conveyed up the steep pathway. 'In an hour,' says Lord Lawrence, 'the white flag was raised.' Kangra surrendered in the month of June. In October a more serious difficulty occurred. The Sikh governor of Cashmir, the Sheik Imam-ud-din, refused to give up his province to Gholab Singh, in accordance with our agreement. This was a distinct breach of the Treaty of Lahore, which contained a clause recognizing Gholab Singh's sovereignty over any territories about which he might make a separate agreement with the Indian Government; and it was generally suspected that the Rani and Lal Singh were cognizant of this refusal. The Durbar showed itself unwilling to interfere, and Lord Hardinge ordered John Lawrence, Commissioner of the Jullundur Doab (now acting temporarily for his brother as Resident at Lahore), to prepare a force, partly British and partly Sikh, to force Gholab Singh upon the population of Cashmir. Henry Lawrence took command of this force, and, as at Kangra, there was no fighting. Imam-ud-din surrendered and revealed the treachery of Lal Singh. An investigation into the conduct of Lal Singh was held at Lahore; he

was given a public trial, found guilty, and deposed from his position of Vizier. Henceforth he disappears from political life. Gholab Singh was duly invested with Cashmir; more fortunate but not less infamous than his defeated and discredited rival.

The treachery of Lal Singh made it clear that the withdrawal of the British troops from Lahore, in the end of 1846, as had been originally agreed, must necessarily result in anarchy. Lord Hardinge offered the Sirdars the alternative of complete withdrawal or the creation of a British Protectorate during the minority of the Maharajah. There was a unanimous wish for the latter arrangement, and a fresh agreement, known as the Treaty of Bhryowal, was concluded in December, 1846. The Rani was deprived of all power, and received a pension as solatium. A new Council of Regency, eight in number, was constituted, through whom the British Resident was to act; the powers of the latter to apply to 'every department and to any extent.' The Governor-General was empowered to determine the strength and location of the Sikh troops. Sir Henry Lawrence remained at his onerous post till failure of health forced him to return home, in the end of 1847, when he was succeeded by Sir Frederick Currie. So skilful was Lawrence's administration, and so capable were the men who supported him in the outlying districts, that hopes were widely entertained that a permanent basis of peace had at last been discovered, and that our last battle in India had been fought.

These sanguine expectations were entertained in particular by Lord Hardinge, and they led him, in his last year of office, to take a step which was fraught with dangerous consequences. He felt it to be necessary to strengthen the North-West frontier, and, while definitely negativing Lord Gough's suggestion of removing the Magazine from Delhi to Umballa, he placed three brigades at Lahore, Jullundur, and Ferozepore, and he increased the total garrison at and beyond Meerut to an establishment of 50,000 men and 60 guns. But unfortunately the Exchequer was low, and, partly to meet the additional expense thus involved, and partly to effect an economy on a wider scale, the Governor-General resolved to dismiss 50,000 Sepoys, by reducing the strength of each regiment of Native Infantry from 1,000 to 800, and each regiment of Native Cavalry from 500 to 420 Sowars, while, at the same time, adding eight cavalry regiments. This resolution he communicated to Lord Gough in a memorandum dated 2nd of January, 1847. The Commander-in-Chief replied to this letter: 'I deeply regret the financial difficulties, and the consequent reductions rendered indispensable thereby, particularly until time shall have tested the feelings which the late arrangements with the Lahore Government may produce.' There was, however, no alternative but to acquiesce in Lord Hardinge's scheme of reduction, which seemed to him, if certain modifications were made, to involve as little inconvenience as possible in the circumstances. He pointed out that

Lord Hardinge's intention to reduce the regiments of Native Infantry from 1,000 to 800 men was really a larger reduction than the Governor-General contemplated, 'as most of the regiments upon the Frontier have 100 men in excess of the establishment of 1,000'; and he made a special appeal in behalf of the Sirmoor Battalion which had done excellent service at Sobraon. The number of native non-commissioned officers, he thought, should not be reduced by more than one Havildar and one Naik in each company, as 'the non-commissioned grades are the mainstay of the discipline of our Native army, affording the Sepoy a motive for loyalty and good conduct.' He urged the Governor-General to increase each troop of Dragoons from 75 to 90 privates, and the Company's European regiments from 820 to 950 (the establishment in H.M's. regiments). The first recommendation he based upon the deficiency of cavalry in the Sutlej campaign, and the second on the ground that, the greater the reduction in the Native army, 'the more it behoves us to cause that which we retain, and cannot easily augment, to be as effective as possible.' Finally, with regard to artillery, Lord Gough was much relieved to find that Lord Hardinge proposed to reduce only the horses and not the men, while he 'earnestly advocated' that the reduction of horses (from 130 to 90) 'should be confined to Light Field Batteries stationed below the Sirhind Division[1].'

[1] Commander-in-Chief to Governor-General, January 13, 1847.

On some of these points Lord Hardinge accepted the suggestions of the Commander-in-Chief, and he increased the amount of ammunition which a battery could bring into the field; but on the main point, the reduction from about 1,100 to 800[1], he did not see his way to any modification. The whole responsibility for the reduction of the army in 1847 lies with the Governor-General; Lord Gough accepted it only as a necessity which he deplored.

Lord Hardinge's four years of rule in India had been a heavy strain upon his strength, and he gladly seized the opportunity of resigning his position and leaving India in a state of peace. The reduction of the army is the only event of importance which occurred in the year 1847, and the Governor-General had the satisfaction of leaving all departments of government in working order under normal circumstances. His administration had been thorough and strenuous; and, soldier as he was, he had left his mark upon the civil as well as upon the military situation in India. It is no part of our duty to estimate the value of Lord Hardinge's services to India; they have stood the criticism of half a century, and history has not failed to express a large and generous appreciation of them. It is pleasant to record that, between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief there remained, while life lasted, a warm feeling of regard; and when, eight years after his departure from India, Lord Hardinge

[1] These are the numbers given by Sir Henry Lawrence, *Essays*, p. 328.

was laid to rest in the churchyard of his English home, Lord Gough and Lord Ellenborough were among the mourners who stood by his bier.

Lord Hardinge's successor, the Earl of Dalhousie, arrived at Calcutta on the 12th of January, 1848. Unlike his predecessor, who was nearly sixty years of age when he entered on office, Lord Dalhousie was still young; he had not completed his thirty-sixth year. But he had already attained considerable distinction in politics, and had been President of the Board of Trade in Sir Robert Peel's Government. On the fall of Peel, in 1847, he was offered the Governor-Generalship of India by his political opponent, Lord John Russell, and, with the sanction of his former chief, he decided to give up his career in home politics and to devote his energies to the continuation of Lord Hardinge's task. On his arrival at Calcutta, Lord Dalhousie wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, announcing that he had taken over the conduct of the Indian Government, and promising, as the son of one of Lord Gough's predecessors, full attention to all the requirements of the army. The first four months of the new reign were spent in tranquillity, with only the alarm of a Chinese war to disturb the peace of mind of the rulers of India. But in the month of April the dream of years of peace was rudely disturbed, not by a revolution at Lahore, but by an outbreak on the Punjab frontier, an incident which was the prelude to the Second Sikh War.

DERA ISHMAEL KHAN
R. INDUS
DERA JAT
SUNGURH
Dera Futteh Khan
LEIA
Mangrota
Ferry
Dera Deen Punnah
Dera Deen Punnah
Dera Ghazi Khan
R. INDUS
Hurrund
SIND SAGUR DOAB
Munkhera
R. JHELUM
R. JETCH DOAB
R. CHENAB
Jhung
RECHNA DOAB
R. CHENAB
R. RAVI
Tolumba
Chicha Watni
Raj Ghat Ferry
MULTAN
Shahdoosam
Setul-ke-Mari
Sooruj khund
BARI DOAB
Sekundrabad
Shujabad
Mylsee
Loodhen
R. SUTLEJ
Khangurh
Ferry
Kineyree
R. CHENAB
R. SUTLEJ
Bhawalpore
BHAWALPORE
MULTAN CAMPAIGN 1848.
Scale, 1 Inch=25 Miles.

VII

THE OUTBREAK AT MULTAN

THE melancholy incident of April 20, 1848, which led, ere long, to the annexation of the Punjab, may best be described in Lord Gough's own words. Writing to his son, from Simla, on the 8th of May, 1848, he said:—

By the accounts which this next mail will take home, you will hear with much surprise and regret that the even tenor of our ways has been broken in upon by a very melancholy event, distressing in every point of view, as it embraces the loss of two estimable individuals, Vans Agnew of the Civil Service, and Lieutenant Anderson of the Bombay Army, who had been sent to Multan by Sir Frederick Currie, Chief Commissioner at Lahore, to fix the land tax to be paid in that district, and to reside as Magistrates. Those poor fellows arrived there on the 18th of April, accompanied from Lahore by one of the principal Sirdars, a member of the Durbar, Khan Singh, who had been chosen to replace the actual Governor, Dewan Mulraj, who had desired to be relieved when he found that English officers were to be stationed at Multan to see that the government of the district was duly and fairly administered. This policy of such interference may be very questionable, as any attack upon our people must involve us; and such attack becomes not only possible but probable, when the object is unpopular and those ordered to carry it out wholly unprotected.

On their arrival, they were most courteously, and seemingly loyally, received by Mulraj, with

whom they settled to take over the Fort, with its Stores and Garrison, the following morning, on behalf of the Maharajah. The ceremony of taking over the Fort was accordingly gone through on the morning of the 19th, and two companies of the escort which had accompanied these young men established at the gate. When they proceeded outside the Fort to mount their horses, Anderson appears to have preceded Agnew in company with Mulraj. The latter, Agnew, in mounting, was cut down by two of the garrison who had followed him, and, but for Khan Singh, who dismounted and stood over him, would have been killed. An elephant was obtained, on which he was removed; and, on their way to the Mosque, in which they had taken up their quarters, they found poor Anderson lying by the roadside with four severe sabre cuts, which had been given by men of the escort of Mulraj.

On the night of the 19th, Agnew reported these events to the Chief Commissioner; it was the last communication he received from him. . . . On the morning of the 20th, the Fort which poor Agnew, in his report to Sir F. Currie, had stated to be the strongest he had seen in India, and which was within long range of the Mosque and its garden, opened fire upon both, and continued to fire during the day, without doing other injury than killing or wounding eight or nine horses, and a little child that accidentally exposed itself. At night, the Troops in the Fort came out, and surrounded the enclosure round the Mosque, and, after a little while, the troops composing the escort, instead of defending their trust, went over in a body and joined the Enemy. The apartment where these poor fellows were lying was speedily entered by those ruffians. Agnew fired his pistol, as did Khan Singh; the latter was, it is said, wounded, but their

feeling of hatred and animosity was not directed toward him, but against our unfortunate countrymen, whom they savagely murdered and whose bodies they mutilated and afterwards exposed on the walls of Multan.

When Vans Agnew's pathetic note reached Herbert Edwardes, at Dera Futteh Khan, he collected all available troops in his own immediate neighbourhood, appealed for help to the loyal chief of Bhawalpore (Bhawal Khan), and advanced on Multan. His force was utterly insufficient, and he started some days too late. Before leaving Dera Futteh Khan, he dispatched a messenger to Sir Frederick Currie at Lahore, stating the imminent peril in which Agnew and Anderson were involved. Currie at once ordered General Whish to march from Lahore to Multan, and reported his action to Lord Gough, who thoroughly approved, only regretting that Sir Frederick had not ordered the whole of the movable column from Ferozepore to join General Whish, and the Jullundur movable column to proceed to Lahore[1]. When the news of the murder reached Lahore, Sir Frederick Currie countermanded his orders and applied to Lord Gough for instructions.

The question was really political and not military in its nature, and the ultimate decision lay with the Governor-General, not with the Commander-in-Chief. The news of the original attack, and of the treachery of Mulraj, might mean little or nothing. Possibly

[1] Lord Gough to the Governor-General, April 27, 1848.

the political agents had been injudicious, and the ambition of Mulraj had seized the opportunity to work upon the feelings of the populace. If so, it was merely an isolated riot, and the British troops might be sent, as Sir Frederick Currie had intended them to go, to aid the army of the Maharajah in putting down the Multan rebellion, and to insist upon satisfaction for the insult offered to the paramount power. It was also imperative, at all hazards, to attempt to save Agnew and Anderson. Their murder did more than remove this necessity; for the desertion of the escort revealed the utter untrustworthiness of the Sikh soldiery, created a strong suspicion that the affair was a preconcerted plot, and raised a question as to the honesty of the Lahore Government. The Commander-in-Chief had never believed in the honesty of the Lahore Government, nor had he placed complete confidence in the optimism of the political agents, and he looked upon his Sikh campaign as only half finished. A second Sikh War, he anticipated, would close his long military career, and he was determined that, when that war broke out, there must be no question of insufficient resources. If urgent and immediate action were now to be taken, it would probably provoke the final contest, and for that final contest the British forces were in no respect prepared. Confident that 'it would not be necessary to fire a gun in India for seven years to come[1],' and oppressed by financial

[1] Bosworth-Smith's *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 214, ed. 1885.

considerations, Viscount Hardinge had, as we have seen, on the close of the first Sikh War, reduced the military establishment in India. It is true that he had increased the forces on the North-Western frontier, but we shall see that the same confident prospect of a continuation of friendly relations had rendered that force unable to move at short notice.

In these circumstances Lord Gough had no hesitation in deciding that an immediate advance would be most unwise. He was prepared for the attacks of the Indian Press; it would be a pleasant change, he thought, to be abused for inaction, instead of for overaction. Abused he certainly was, and the abuse has found its way from newspaper columns to pages of textbooks and short histories, although his decision was approved and confirmed by every responsible authority. An expedition to the Punjab could scarcely fail to bring about a second Sikh War. Even if it did not, and a demonstration of British power were effective, what would be the result? The Sikhs would lay the entire blame upon Mulraj, and his punishment would doubtless follow. But the larger designs, which there was only too good reason for suspecting, might proceed undisturbed. 'Are we to undertake,' he asked, 'movements of this magnitude, merely to support a Child without an Army, or means to maintain that which we at such considerable outlay will have to achieve[1]?' Agnew and Anderson were dead; the hope of

[1] Lord Gough to Lieut.-Colonel Mountain, May 3, 1848.

avenging them was not in itself sufficient motive to undertake a great risk. And the risk was great, for the temper of the Sikh soldiery was most uncertain, and the loyalty of the Lahore Government lay under grave suspicion. If the Durbar really meditated striking a blow for independence, or if it proved unable to restrain the Khalsa, the whole of the Punjab would be in rebellion. To face such a crisis, the force at Lord Gough's command was absurdly inadequate. On May 12, he informed the Governor-General that he could not undertake an invasion of the Punjab without a force of 24,000 men and 78 guns, along with a reinforcement from Sindh. The combined force which might, within a month, be collected from Umballa, Subathu, Ferozepore, Ludhiana, Jullundur, and Lahore (without injudiciously weakening all our stations) is shown, by a memorandum of May 8, to amount to 10,000 men and 48 guns. The reason of the delay of a month Lord Gough stated to be 'the number of Furloughs universally granted the Native Army in periods of peace at this season of the year[1].' These furloughs were granted, for the sake of economy, when the Government anticipated a continuance of peace, and the Commander-in-Chief could not, on his own authority, recall the absent Sepoys to their regiments. Nor was this all. 'There is no carriage whatever for these troops, the whole having been discharged; and to move without Camp equipage, Doolies, and ample Commis-

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, April 30, 1848.

sariat arrangements, through the hottest locality in India, at the worst season of the year would be certain annihilation.' For this alarming position the Commander-in-Chief was in no way responsible; the considerations which had brought it about were financial, and the management of finance lay with the Supreme Government. 'All these delays,' Lord Gough told Lord Dalhousie, 'attending the movements of troops would have been obviated, had not the repeated assurance been given that the Sikhs were so well disposed as to render the large outlay of retaining carriage uncalled for[1].' These assurances it was his duty to act upon; the responsibility for their acceptance rested elsewhere. But, wherever the fault might lie, the conclusion to which Lord Gough came could not be avoided. 'From the foregoing causes, no force could be assembled on the Sutlej, and reach Multan before the middle, if not the end, of June[2], by which [time], from all accounts,

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, April 30, 1848.

[2] Sir Edwin Arnold, in his important work on *Lord Dalhousie's Indian Administration*, fails to understand the size of the force at Lord Gough's disposal; and the late Sir William Hunter (whose references to this subject in his *Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie* show an entire misunderstanding of the whole situation) visits Lord Gough's delay with the severest condemnation. 'It is difficult,' he says, 'to refrain from censure of the inability to move which the Commander-in-Chief betrayed . . . in spite of his two great camps of 9,000 men apiece at Lahore and Firozpur, camps standing in readiness to march at a day's notice' (p. 74); and the reader is given to understand that '50,000 men, with 60 guns, commanded the line of the Sutlej. A standing camp

the investment of the Fort would be impracticable, in consequence of the impossibility of carrying on siege operations in an inundated country. Remaining inactive before Multan would not only cause a fearful loss of life, but its moral effect would be most prejudicial to future operations, as the inaction would most assuredly be misrepresented. I quite coincide with Colonel Jones, one of our best engineer officers, in his remarks on sieges: "No policy at a siege can be worse than beginning the operations with a small quantity of material, and making the attack keep pace with the supply. It has the appearance of gaining time, but in fact it is otherwise."' Immediate action was frankly impossible. To weaken Lahore to any great extent was out of the question, for on the strength of our garrison at Lahore depended, not only what chance there was of retaining the loyalty of the Durbar, but also the safety of the Resident and his colleagues in the Punjab. As we have seen, only 10,000 men were available; ere these could be placed outside Multan, the Chenab and the Ravi

of 9,000 men held the Punjab capital, Lahore. Another great standing camp of equal strength, with infantry, cavalry, artillery complete, lay at Firozpur, ready to be hurled at a day's notice, against an enemy; everything in a state of perfect preparation, down to its commissariat carts, transport bullocks, and litters for the wounded or sick' (p. 62). Sir W. Hunter's chapter on the 'Conquest of the Punjab' leaves it to be inferred that this force was available at the date of the outbreak at Multan. The text will show how far these statements are from representing the truth.

would flood the country, rendering the district dangerously unhealthy when the waters subsided, and involving an appalling loss by disease. Multan could not be reduced without a siege-train. There were siege-trains at Ferozepore and Ludhiana, but the false economy which had guided the Government had left them without a cart to convey ammunition [1]. On the 15th of May, the Governor-General replied to the Commander-in-Chief [2]. 'I have thought it better to delay my reply to your letters,' he wrote, 'until I should have learnt the determination to which the Resident [at Lahore] should come, after consulting with your Excellency and learning your opinion. Last night I received the intelligence of his having acquiesced in your opinion, and of having resolved not to move the British troops at this season of the year. . . . The question you had to determine was a very painful and difficult one, and the responsibility heavy. I am very confident that your Excellency has exercised a most sound discretion in counselling the postponement of operations until after the rains. You will perceive from my letter to Sir Frederick Currie that I am alive to all the disadvantages—to all the dangers—arising from this delay. But I am satisfied the dangers created by following an opposite course would have been greater still.' Lord Dalhousie and Sir Frederick Currie were not alone in their approval of Lord Gough's measures. 'I am happy to say,' Lord

[1] Lord Gough to his son, May 8, 1848.

[2] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, May 15, 1848.

Dalhousie was able to write to the Commander-in-Chief, 'that Her Majesty's Government, the Secret Committee, and the Duke of Wellington 'cordially' approve of the resolution not to move till October[1].' In less responsible quarters, the outcry was vehement and continuous. They say, Lord Gough told his son, 'that if we do not immediately advance, our honour will be tarnished, that sun and inundation are mere shadows, that we have the boats of the four rivers at our command, and, if we can't get at the Fort by land, we can by water—the first time in my life I ever heard of an inland fortress invested by water. So laughable are some of the ideas promulgated, that I was almost tempted to answer them by saying that nothing can be done without the horse marines to man those boats[2].'

The policy of the Commander-in-Chief was delay, but not inaction. After a consultation with Major Robert Napier (afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala), who was possessed of accurate information regarding Multan, he dispatched, on the 11th of May, the official statement to the Governor-General which has already been quoted. In this document he laid down the principles that the force to be prepared must be large enough for all emergencies, and that it must be made so without the withdrawal of a single soldier from the interior of the Punjab, and without weakening too much our own provinces. A sufficient force he estimated as about 24,000 men

[1] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, August 14, 1848.

[2] Lord Gough to his son, May 25, 1848.

of all arms and 78 field-guns[1], along with a column from Sindh. An elaborate statement showed how the main force was to be collected from the Bengal Presidency, and Lord Gough recommended that it should rendezvous at Ferozepore as early as possible in November, that an ample supply of ammunition (of which he gave details) should be stored in the Ferozepore magazine, and that the Principal Commissary of Ordnance should proceed there to superintend the preparation of the siege-train and the artillery. He further suggested suitable arrangements for the commissariat for horses, for carriage, and for a field hospital and other medical necessities. The Sindh column, he considered, should include a troop of horse artillery and a light field battery of artillery, a regiment of British dragoons, with one or two regiments of European, and from two to four regiments of native, infantry, and should pass through Sindh up to Multan. Although he did not anticipate having to move before November, yet, in view of the uncertainty of the situation, he urged the Governor-General to give orders that active preparations might at once begin.

In conclusion he brought forward a highly important question. 'The Commander-in-Chief begs

[1] 7 troops of Horse Artillery, 6 Horse Field Batteries, 3 regiments of British Dragoons, 5 regiments of Light Cavalry, 5 regiments of Irregular Cavalry, 7 reserve companies of Artillery, 6 companies of Sappers and Pioneers and Head Quarters of the Corps, 5 regiments of European Infantry, 18 regiments of Native Infantry.

that the expediency of recruiting the Native Army to the former establishment of 1,000 Privates per regiment of Native Infantry, and Corps of Irregular Cavalry to the revised establishment of 500 Sowars each, may be considered. . . . If the increase now proposed is sanctioned, the present is a most favourable time for effecting it. If instructions to enlist men were conveyed to the men on furlough, there is every reason to believe that our ranks could be at once filled, and, to a very great extent, with the ready trained soldiers who last year took their discharge with gratuity, and are now again anxious for employment, it is understood. The average strength of regiments of Native Infantry of the Line, it will be seen by the annexed return, is at present 829·54 Privates.' In the private letter which covered this official communication, Lord Gough stated still more strongly the necessity for so large an army and for the proposed increase of the establishment. 'There are,' he said, 'from 12,000 to 15,000 drilled soldiers out of employment, ready to take service wherever they may get it. If we do not enlist them, those opposed to us assuredly will exert every nerve to get them[1].' The same knowledge of Sikh measures impelled him to suggest that, on taking the field, our native troops should receive the Lahore rate of pay, and it affected his estimate of the proportion of European to native regiments in the proposed army of the Punjab. The danger arising from the small proportion of European troops in our frontier

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, May 12, 1848.

forces he considered sufficiently urgent to call for immediate measures, and, without waiting for Lord Dalhousie's sanction, he strengthened the Europeans on the frontier, on the ground that 'the disaffected are tampering with our native troops.'

Of all such immediate measures Lord Dalhousie approved, and he gave Lord Gough discretionary powers as regards moving troops on the frontier, in order to avoid the delay consequent on an application to the Government. But he did not see his way to accepting the more important suggestions of the Commander-in-Chief. In an official communication, dated 10th of June, 1848, Lord Gough was informed that 'though the Governor-General in Council has fully resolved on assembling a force calculated to inflict the fullest punishment and exact ample reparation, he is persuaded that the force proposed by His Excellency is larger than will be necessary, even although everything most unfavourable should have occurred in the meantime.' Lord Dalhousie considered that 'an army of 24,000 men from Ferozepore co-operating with 6,000 or 5,000 from the side of Sindh is a force greater than can be required by any combination of enemies' in the Punjab. A force amounting to about 20,000 men with a second-class siege-train seemed sufficient to the Governor-General. Even in the preparation of this force, the necessity of economy weighed heavily on the mind of the Government. Lord Gough's request for immediate preparations was refused on the ground that no expense could be incurred for

the actual movement of the troops until the arrival of the cold season, and none for provisions until the rains were over. The proposal to re-enlist soldiers, either as a temporary or as a permanent [1] expedient, the Governor-General could not recommend to the Board of Directors, who would not be inclined to reverse the policy of economy inaugurated at the close of Lord Hardinge's rule. This policy, Lord Gough declared to Lord Dalhousie, would have been abandoned by Hardinge 'could he have anticipated that the army of the Power we have engaged to uphold were ready, to a man, to turn against the present Government [2].'

While these important questions were in course of settlement, events were following each other in rapid succession. The story of Herbert Edwardes, the gallant young subaltern, who upheld British prowess in the Punjab for so long, has been told both frequently and well; and a mere outline must suffice for our purpose. We left Edwardes on the march to Multan. On the night of the 24th of April he crossed the Indus with 1,000 Sikhs and 500 or 600 Pathans, and marched on the town of Leia in the Sind Sagur Doab. There he received the news of the fate of Agnew and Anderson and, at the same time, a rumour reached him that Mulraj intended to cross the Chenab and march against

[1] Lord Gough explained in a later communication that he intended the restoration of the former military establishment as a permanent arrangement.

[2] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, June 9, 1848.

him. The revelation of the treachery of the escort at Multan, and subsequent information forced Edwardes to decide that, at all hazards, a meeting between his own Sikh regiment and the soldiery of Mulraj must be prevented. Accordingly, on the 2nd of May, he recrossed the Indus, and awaited, at Dera Futteh Khan, the arrival of General van Cortlandt, who was in charge of the district of Dera Ishmael Khan, and with whom Edwardes had communicated immediately after the outbreak at Multan. In estimating the services of Herbert Edwardes, it must not be forgotten that he had the advantage of the co-operation of van Cortlandt, and of two of his own Mohammedan attachés, Foujdar Khan and Futteh Khan. The former of these, in particular, was possessed both of knowledge and of wisdom which proved invaluable to the young Englishman on whom so much depended. Edwardes spent an anxious night on the 3rd of May, for the enemy was at Leia, and he had, with great difficulty, conveyed his mutinous Sikh soldiers over the Indus. Fortunately, the Pathans were loyal, and their hatred of the Sikh Infidel stood the British in good stead. Early next morning came General van Cortlandt, with an infantry regiment of Mohammedans and six horse artillery guns. Next day, the rise of the Indus forced them back, and by a fortunate coincidence, Mulraj, believing that a British force was moving on Multan, retreated, and even made overtures for surrender, receiving from Edwardes the promise of a fair trial. Encouraged by this,

Edwardes prepared to cross the Indus again and attack Mulraj, being strongly convinced that the Derajat, for which he himself was responsible, could not be regarded as safe while Mulraj remained undisturbed in his rebellion. If Mulraj crossed the Indus, every Sikh in the Derajat, and beyond it, would join his standard.

At this stage, the independent operations under the charge of Herbert Edwardes were interrupted by a scheme which had been arranged by Sir Frederick Currie, in order to employ the interval which must elapse before Lord Gough's army could take the field. 'The Resident was well aware,' says Edwardes[1], 'that few, if any, of the Sikh troops could be trusted to act against Moolraj in any military operation to reduce Mooltan; but he determined to employ the most trustworthy of them, and the most influential chiefs, in taking possession of the districts heretofore attached to the Mooltan Government, leaving the occupation of the city and fort of Mooltan Proper to be accomplished by British troops, whenever the season might permit them to take the field.' The force under Edwardes and van Cortlandt was to form, in accordance with this arrangement, one of five columns to operate in the Multan district and to confine the rebellion to a circle of some fifty miles in diameter. Three of these columns were composed of Sikh soldiers, under Sikh commanders, the most important of whom was the Rajah Shere Singh. The remaining column

[1] *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii. p. 205.

was composed of the army of the loyal Bhawal Khan of Bhawalpore. The success of this scheme depended upon the honesty of the Sikh Government, against which Mulraj was technically in revolt; and it can scarcely have been a surprise that the plan had to be entirely abandoned, because the three Sikh columns failed to appear, and the Bhawalpore troops did not venture to advance without their support. To the Sikh commanders we shall hereafter have occasion to refer; meanwhile, we must trace the fortunes of Herbert Edwardes, on whom the whole responsibility again devolved.

The task which had been assigned to Edwardes was the occupation of the Lower Derajat, consisting of the two districts of Singurh and Dera Ghazi Khan. The more northern of these, Singurh, was commanded by the fort of Mungrota. This fort was held by a Governor named Cheytun Mull in the interests of Mulraj, and Edwardes, by enlisting the support of a local chieftain, immediately obtained possession of it without a struggle, Cheytun Mull retiring to reinforce the garrison of the southern fortress, Dera Ghazi Khan, which was held by his nephew Longa Mull. After the capture of Mungrota, Edwardes anticipated that van Cortlandt would take Dera Ghazi Khan, while he himself crossed the Indus to Leia, where he had established a piquet of 100 men. These movements had actually been begun when the failure of the larger scheme of Sir Frederick Currie gave Mulraj fresh courage. He left a small garrison in Multan and, crossing the

Chenab with 6,000 men and 15 guns, marched towards the Indus, with the intention of destroying van Cortlandt's force before a junction between van Cortlandt and Edwardes could be accomplished. Even united, their forces amounted to little more than half that of Mulraj, and one of van Cortlandt's two regiments was not to be trusted. In these circumstances, Edwardes sent an urgent appeal to the Resident at Lahore, asking that the Bhawalpore troops, which had been halted on the failure of the original enterprise, should be sent into the Bari Doab to alarm Mulraj. Meanwhile he himself marched southwards, and on the 18th he joined van Cortlandt at a point on the right bank of the Indus, opposite the ferry of Dera Deen Punnah, prepared to oppose the enemy's crossing. 'If a British force does not threaten Multan,' wrote Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore, 'or Bhawul Khan cross the Sutlej, General Cortlandt's force and mine must, sooner or later, be destroyed. If neither of these moves seems advisable, I can only assure you of my protracting what resistance is in my power as long as possible.' In point of fact, Currie had already directed Bhawal Khan to cross the Sutlej into the Bari Doab and to advance on Multan. Of this Edwardes was unaware, but, on the 21st, unexpected good news reached him from the South. The son of a Khosuh chief had defeated and captured Longa Mull, and the fortress of Dera Ghazi Khan had surrendered. The tribesmen seized the boats collected by the rebels, and Mulraj could

not cross the Indus. The scene of operations now changes from the Derajat to the Bari Doab, where a junction was arranged between Edwardes and the Bhawalpore troops. This movement was accompanied by great risk, but it was successfully accomplished on the morning of Edwardes' brilliant victory over the army of Mulraj, at Kineyree (18th June). The way to Multan was now open, and Edwardes began to march upon the fortress. Mulraj prepared to oppose him, and on the 1st of July the battle of Suddoosam was fought by Edwardes at the head of 18,000 troops and with 30 guns. It resulted in the defeat of Mulraj, who was now forced within the walls of Multan.

The skill of Herbert Edwardes, aided by the Khosuhs and the Bhawalpore troops, had thus succeeded in accomplishing, by the 1st of July, the end which Sir Frederick Currie had desired when he set on foot his original scheme, and at which he had aimed since it became apparent that a campaign in the summer was out of Lord Gough's power. Mulraj was enclosed within the walls of Multan, and the area of the rebellion was limited to the scene of its original outbreak. The danger of the situation lay in the presence of an armed force of Sikh soldiery, nominally loyal to the Durbar at Lahore, itself not free from suspicion. The three Sikh columns which had failed to operate against Multan had been placed under three Generals, named, respectively, Imam-ud-Din [1], Jawahir Mull, and Shere Singh. Imam-ud-

[1] Cf. p. 115.

Din had actually joined Edwardes prior to the victory of Suddoosam, but only his Mohammedan troops had accompanied him to the British camp. His example was followed by Jawahir Mull, but he, too, was deserted by his Sikh followers. Shere Singh remained at Gogran, five miles from Multan, uncertain which side he intended to support. Edwardes took advantage of his indecision to persuade him to leave Gogran and take up his position in the rear of his own victorious army, which could thus prevent his communicating with Mulraj.

While carrying on his negotiations with Shere Singh, Edwardes had formed a plan more ambitious than the mere blockade of Multan. He had a force of 18,000 men and 30 guns, and, immediately after the victory of Kineyree (June 18th) he conceived the idea of taking Multan itself and putting an end to the rebellion. Undeterred by the known strength of the fort (cf. pp. 130–1) he applied to Sir Frederick Currie for guns and mortars, and for permission to commence the siege. 'I would suggest,' he wrote on the 22nd of June, 'that the siege be commenced at once. We are enough of us in all conscience, and desire nothing better than to be honoured with the commission you designed for a British army. All we require are a few heavy guns, a mortar battery, as many sappers and miners as you can spare, and Major Napier to plan our operations[1].' Sir Frederick Currie, on receiving this communication, consulted Major Napier upon

[1] *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii. p. 485.

the feasibility of operations against Multan. Major Napier considered that operations were perfectly practicable, and might be undertaken with every prospect of success[1]. He stated that a single brigade with the guns and twenty mortars and howitzers would be sufficient for the purpose.

Ordnance could not be sent without artillerymen, and Sir Frederick Currie declined to take the responsibility of overruling the decision of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief. The request made by Edwardes was therefore communicated to Lord Dalhousie and Lord Gough, who were now called upon to decide whether Edwardes' proposal, to attack Multan before Mulraj had time to strengthen it, had sufficient probability of success to justify them in changing their own plans. Neither of them was disposed to underrate the services rendered by Edwardes, but they knew better than he could the difficulties of the situation. They had just been compelled to remove the Rani (mother of the Maharajah) to safe keeping at Benares, and the knowledge of her complicity in the rebellion rendered it highly improbable that the movement could be confined to Multan, or that even a successful attempt on that fort would lead to the restoration of peace. If the siege were unsuccessful, or if its success did not put an end to the rebellion, the dangers of a summer campaign remained unaltered. Lord Gough, accordingly, took a view adverse to the suggestion made by Edwardes.

[1] But cf. p. 144.

I cannot (he wrote[1]) see anything in the altered position of affairs which would justify me in taking upon myself the siege of Multan, at the present moment. On the contrary, the success of Lieut. Edwardes renders it less necessary in my opinion, to risk the lives of the European soldiers at this season. Mulraj is shut up in his Fort[2]—all, I take it, that was contemplated by the movement of the Bhawalpore force, and that under Lieut. Edwardes. The revenue of the whole country will now be collected by us, whilst the Dewan's disheartened followers will undoubtedly, it may be expected, daily desert from him, and his means of paying and feeding them have been, by the recent events, greatly lessened, if not wholly prevented. . . . The Force now proposed by Major Napier and apparently assented to by you, I consider quite inadequate. I never could consent to recommend an insufficient Force, such as a Brigade of any strength, being sent. . . . I have always understood from you that both the Sikh Army and the Sikh population are disaffected and should be guarded against. I take it that these objections to weakening our Force at Lahore and on the Frontier still exist. The movement of a siege train under these contingencies, with so insufficient an escort as a Brigade, would in my mind be a most hazardous measure. The supposition from recent inquiries that the neighbourhood of Multan is not so inundated as you at first supposed would make the undertaking of a siege less difficult.

[1] Lord Gough to Sir Frederick Currie, July 1, 1848.

[2] This was the impression given by the words used by Edwardes: 'In a few days the task assigned to this army will be accomplished, and Moolraj and his rebels will be confined to the fort of Mooltan' (letter of June 22, 1848, in *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii. p. 420). In point of fact Multan was not actually invested, and Mulraj could move out to the north and west. Cf. footnote on p. 165.

That it could be attacked from the Town side, as proposed by Major Napier, was always self-evident, as the Town itself could not be supposed to be under water; but it must be remembered that this would conduce to two operations—the taking the Town itself as a preparatory one, always inadvisable when it can be avoided, as in such attacks discipline is rendered almost nugatory[1]. A Siege Train must be accompanied by Artillery; four Companies would be the least that would be required for the train of 30 guns proposed by Major Napier. One of these Companies would have to move from Subathu. Major Napier has much changed his opinion with regard to the amount of the Siege Train, as it was at his suggestion I named 50 instead of 40 guns, which I at first proposed.

In the same letter, Lord Gough pointed out that transport train bullocks would have to come from Lahore, and that supplies could not be provided otherwise than by the Durbar. His view, in brief, was that Edwardes would add most to the services already rendered by remaining inactive in front of Multan, and not risking the precipitation of a general rebellion by pressing Mulraj. He stated this view both to the Governor-General and to the Resident at Lahore, adding, in each case, a list of the force which he should consider adequate, in the event of the Supreme Government's deciding to accept the view of Herbert Edwardes.

The recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief

[1] Readers acquainted with the history of the Peninsular War will appreciate the force of this argument, which was doubtless suggested by Lord Gough's experiences in the Peninsula.

caused a recurrence of the outcry against him in the Indian Press, and the complaints of the Indian Press have passed into what is occasionally given as the sober verdict of history. Yet his view was once more adopted by every responsible authority. The Governor-General entirely agreed with Lord Gough, and wrote to Sir Frederick Currie his conviction that no change of circumstances had occurred 'which either calls for, or would justify, a change of the course originally recommended by the Commander-in-Chief, acquiesced in by yourself, and approved by the Government.' Sir John Littler, 'whose opinions,' says Edwardes, 'have an historic value on all points connected with the military policy of the Punjab,' placed on record, in a formal Minute, his entire concurrence with the Commander-in-Chief 'as to the inexpediency of immediate operations against the fort of Mooltan with a British force.' Major Napier, as we shall see, found reason to modify his sanguine views, and, years afterwards, he told Sir William Hunter 'that the gallant young officer could not have comprehended the nature of the task. The fortifications were of an extent and a strength which demanded a very large force if they were to be approached without disaster, quite apart from the question of taking them[1].' Even Herbert Edwardes himself, in his wonderful account of that eventful year, writing with the fuller experience of two sieges of Multan, contents himself with the following very frank and

[1] *Life of Lord Dalhousie*, pp. 74–5.

moderate defence of his own policy: 'I am by no means sure,' he says, 'that the irregular attack I originally contemplated might not have succeeded, at that time, more easily than General Whish's vastly superior force succeeded at a later period, when Moolraj had completed the most formidable preparations for resistance[1].'

Herbert Edwardes was, accordingly, forbidden to follow his own plan of an irregular and immediate siege. The possibility of the success of that scheme was but slight—subsequent events were to show how slight. Past experience afforded an important warning, for Lord Gough reminded the Governor-General that, in 1826, Bhurtpore had held out for a month against 25,000 men with 112 pieces of heavy artillery and 50 field-guns. The policy ultimately adopted was, unfortunately, very different from that of Lord Dalhousie and Lord Gough. While Sir Frederick Currie was waiting for the decision of the Supreme Government, the news reached him of the victory at Suddoosam. This intelligence decided him to put into operation the discretionary powers with which it had been the invariable practice to invest the Resident. Events were to show that the Commander-in-Chief was wise in regarding with suspicion such a delegation of authority[2]. These powers Currie employed, not to carry out the suggestion of Edwardes, but

[1] *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii. p. 485.

[2] He had even suggested the possibility of the withdrawal of these powers, in view of the crisis in the Punjab.

to carry out a scheme of his own. Edwardes had asked to be strengthened in the end of June. Sir Frederick Currie, on the 10th of July, decided to order a British force from Lahore and Ferozepore to move on Multan, which it could not be expected to reach for some weeks. It was a middle course, and subject to the difficulties that beset every compromise in action.

When the Resident at Lahore reported to the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief the step that he had taken, he received, from both, assurances that they would do their utmost to support him in his departure from their avowed intentions, a departure which neither approved. Sir Frederick Currie had determined to place under the command of General Whish 'a siege train with its establishment, and a competent escort and force.' Lord Gough, in writing to Sir Frederick on July the 14th, referred him to the letter in which he had stated what he considered an adequate force, in view of the report of Edwardes, and expressed his convictions that 'it would be ill-judged to trust a smaller force amongst such a heterogeneous set of men as that now before Multan.' The effect of this was to increase the force suggested by Currie to two brigades of infantry (each containing a British regiment), one native cavalry brigade, with two troops of horse artillery, and a siege-train with foot artillery. Lord Gough also offered to send reinforcements to Lahore, and he acted on his own responsibility in giving the native troops the

rate of pay in force at Lahore (cf. p. 132). The Ferozepore column started on July 24th, and the Lahore column on July 26th [1]. Lord Gough never

[1] It is necessary here to advert again to the misrepresentation of Lord Gough's action into which want of sufficient information has led the late Sir William Hunter. He thus describes the events we have now narrated: 'Lord Gough was still [in July] calmly planning on the cool heights of Simla a regulation campaign for the winter. "As if the rebellion," so runs an indignant letter from Multan, "could be put off like a champagne tiffin with a three-cornered note to Mulraj, to name a date more agreeable." It could not be put off. Lahore, the capital of the Punjab, was seething with rebellion, the frontier tracts of Hazára were in open revolt. The Afghans entered into an alliance with the Sikhs, and poured through the Khaibar Pass to sweep the English out of the Land of Five Rivers. Sir Frederick Currie, the Resident at Lahore, felt himself compelled, civilian though he was, to dispatch, on his own authority and from his own slender battalions, a relief force to Edwardes at Multan. Then at length Lord Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, realized the situation. To the brigade which Sir Frederick Currie determined to send from Lahore Lord Gough added a siege train and column from Firozpur.' It is comparatively unimportant that only part of Sir Frederick Currie's relief force was to be dispatched from the 'slender battalions' at Lahore, and that a siege-train, so far from being Lord Gough's 'addition,' constituted all that Sir Frederick originally intended to send. It is more important that, when Lord Gough insisted on the increase of Sir Frederick's force, none of the things had happened which Sir William Hunter asserts to have made him realize the situation. Sir Frederick Currie, at Lahore, was still confident in the loyalty of the Durbar; the frontier tracts of Hazara were not yet in open revolt; the Afghans had not yet allied themselves with the Sikhs, and were not pouring themselves into the Punjab. That these things did

regarded the expedition as hopeful, but he was now satisfied that, with the reinforcements he had offered, Currie's force could be trusted to take care of itself.

On the 18th and 19th of August—two months after Edwardes had appealed for immediate assistance—the reinforcements arrived at Multan. The siege-train was disembarked on the 4th of September. The events which followed seem to us to form a complete justification of the decision arrived at by the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief and reversed by the Resident at Lahore. Major Napier at once decided that success was improbable, but operations were commenced in the beginning of September. On the 9th of that month, an unsuccessful assault was made on the fortress. On the 12th, a small success was gained by the British, who pressed half a mile nearer the walls of Multan. Two days later, there occurred the event which Lord Gough had foreseen. Believing that a war was imminent, he had opposed the reduction of Multan on the ground that it would precipitate the outbreak of that war. His anticipation was fully realized. The failure of the assault on the 9th had left the position of Shere Singh unaffected, but the

happen is unquestioned; that they should happen was probably inevitable; that they happened before Lord Gough was quite ready to meet them was, we think, due to the abandonment of the policy on which he and Lord Dalhousie were agreed. The last statement may be reasonably debated; but it is impossible that Lord Gough was roused to action in July by events which happened between August and October.

slight success of September 12th forced the Commander of the army of the Durbar to decide on immediate action [1]. On the 14th of September he deserted his British allies. In order to accelerate the junction of his own men with the reinforcements, Edwardes had, in the middle of August, changed camps with Shere Singh, who was now no longer separated from Multan by a British force. Shere Singh, having failed on the 13th to entrap Edwardes and the other British officers of his force, marched next day to join the rebels at Multan. The second Sikh War had begun.

[1] The loyal Imam-ud-Din stated that the failure of the 9th September decided Shere Singh to join the enemy, and that he remained irresolute till the 13th. If this be so, it is strange that he took action immediately after the success of the 12th; but in any case our argument that the war was precipitated by the attempt to reduce Multan remains unaffected.

VIII

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

THE desertion of Shere Singh was immediately followed by the abandonment of the siege of Multan. Not only was the siege rendered impracticable; it was now unsafe for the besieging army to remain in front of so large a force of the enemy; and General Whish wisely ordered his different detachments to take up entrenched positions. But this was only a minor consequence of the desertion, for Shere Singh immediately began to rouse the Khalsa to arms, and, on October 9th, he marched from Multan.

We must leave General Whish and Herbert Edwardes encamped at Tibbee, Sooruj Khond, and Ram Teerut, while we trace the sequence of events elsewhere than at Multan. Scarcely had the columns from Lahore and Ferozepore set out for Multan when the attention of the authorities was called to an outbreak in the Hazara district, across the Indus. The Nazim or Governor of this district was Chutter Singh, father of Shere Singh; and of his honesty, the British Resident, Major Abbott, had been suspicious ever since the first news of the outbreak at Multan; but, largely owing to the personal influence of Abbott himself, and to the antagonism between the Sikh soldiery and the Mohammedan

population, peace remained unbroken till the beginning of August. Early in that month, Chutter Singh ordered out the troops at Hurripore, and shot an American officer who declined to acknowledge the authority of Chutter Singh without a confirmation from Abbott. The incident had no immediate consequences, for Abbott was able to restrain the Sikh soldiery by the threat of an attack from the Mohammedan population. He applied for instructions to the British agent at Peshawur, Major George Lawrence, and Lawrence sent no less distinguished a person than John Nicholson, who seized Attok, a fort at the junction of the Kabul river with the Indus. Chutter Singh took no further immediate action, but succeeded in sending treacherous suggestions to Shere Singh at Multan, to Dost Mohammed, Amir of Kabul, and to Sultan Mohammed, Governor of the district of Kohat, and brother of Dost Mohammed. While these negotiations were in progress, Lawrence and Nicholson urged the Resident at Lahore, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Governor-General to send a brigade of British soldiers. This was an invitation to adopt, on a small scale, the policy of which Lord Dalhousie and Lord Gough had disapproved in connexion with Multan, and neither of them saw any reason for a second departure from their own view. Nor did Sir Frederick Currie disagree.

I entirely concur with you (wrote Lord Gough to Currie [1]) as to the utter inexpediency of a compliance

[1] Lord Gough to Sir Frederick Currie, August 21, 1848.

with Lt. Nicholson's suggestion for the movement of a British Brigade, with a field battery, into the Hazara country. I am distinctly of opinion that such a movement would be most premature and hazardous, and would be more likely to lead to a concentration of the disaffected in that wild country, than to the extinction of a rebellion; from the inability of the Force sent, to act with vigour and effect. . . . I feel it necessary here to add that I am not at all prepared to assent to the expediency of moving so small a Force as that proposed, to such a distance, and to the very point of concentration of nearly the whole of the disaffected Khalsa Army, leaving, between that force and Lahore, a great proportion of the Sikh Territory, in which the disbanded Sikh soldiery reside.

Even if Lord Gough had looked more favourably upon the suggestion of Nicholson, he had no troops to send. In the same letter to Sir Frederick Currie, written in the end of the third week of August, he says:—

So far from being in a position to give additional troops to move to the North-West, I am not prepared as I could wish, and military precaution requires, to support the Troops at present in the Punjab. . . . Although the Government have hitherto kindly approved of the movement of Troops which I have been compelled to make [mainly to strengthen Lahore] in consequence of the course events have taken in the Punjab, still you will perceive by the enclosed copy of a letter from H. M. Elliot, Esq. (Secretary to the Supreme Government), to the address of the Adjutant-General of the Army, that I am prohibited from taking any steps for the formation of a Force on the Frontier[1]. That I am alive to our present

[1] Permission to do so reached Lord Gough about ten days after he wrote this.

unprepared state, and to the expediency of having an effective support upon the Frontier, the enclosed copy of a letter to the Governor-General will prove. It was written several days previous to my hearing of the outbreak in the Hazara country. I expect shortly an answer to this letter, and as fortunately yours of the 12th will probably be before the Government, I hope I may be empowered to make such military arrangements as to ensure success in whatever movement may be undertaken, by immediately recalling the men of the Native Army now on Furlough, which, it must be remembered, is one-fourth of our Native Force.

Prudence and necessity, then, were combined in favour of the policy of allowing events in the North-West to take their course, in full confidence that one great winter campaign would be necessary, and that it alone would be required, to settle all difficulties of the Punjab. To young and enthusiastic officers the decision seemed craven, and they found it difficult to believe that the Commander-in-Chief realized the consequences of inaction. Those consequences followed, much as they had foreseen. The Sikh troops in the Hazara and in Peshawur were in open revolt, which Abbott and Lieutenant Herbert (who succeeded Nicholson at Attok) strove in vain to subdue. Chutter Singh offered Peshawur to the Afghans as a reward for their assistance, and about the end of October (but not till then) the British officers had to leave Peshawur, and Afghan troops began to 'pour themselves in.' An insurrection in the Jullundur Doab was suppressed by the vigorous hand of John Lawrence. Meanwhile,

the optimism of Sir Frederick Currie, at Lahore, gradually gave place to a conviction of the disloyalty of the Durbar; and, when Shere Singh openly revolted in the middle of September, the Resident felt himself compelled to take action. He placed Runjoor Singh and a brother of Shere Singh under arrest, and shortly afterwards succeeded, by a stratagem, in securing the Sikh fortress of Govindgurh [1], where the British troops faced no fewer than fifty-two guns collected, in place of the two which were officially supposed to constitute its entire equipment. Scarcely had this been accomplished when Shere Singh moved rapidly from Multan, apparently towards Lahore, but really with a view of uniting with the revolted troops which were marching from the North-West.

We have seen that, towards the end of August, Lord Gough confessed to Sir Frederick Currie that he was unable to spare troops for the North-West, even if he had thought it wise to send them. As the murders at Multan had occurred four months previously, some explanation of this inability is obviously required, and it can be found only in a survey of the correspondence of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief. It will be remembered that, in the beginning of May, Lord Gough urged on Lord Dalhousie the reinforcement of the army, and the preparation of an adequate

[1] Lord Gough had long considered this step advisable. The actual seizure was cleverly planned and executed by Lieut. Hodson, afterwards notable as a leader of Light Horse.

force, although that force might not be required till November. As events progressed, the Commander-in-Chief continued to press these demands upon the attention of the Governor-General, but, all through the summer, Lord Dalhousie found himself obliged to decline the Commander-in-Chief's reiterated invitations to energetic measures. 'I am well aware,' he wrote on the 12th of July[1], 'of the necessity of not deferring preparations too long; but the state and prospects of our finances which are before my eyes for ever, although they are not forced on you, create a necessity *at least* equally strong for not incurring expense in preparation until it can no longer be possibly avoided.' On the 22nd of August Lord Dalhousie, becoming more alarmed as Sir Frederick Currie's optimism declined, asked Lord Gough to furnish him with a statement of the force necessary to seize and hold the Punjab, thus bringing matters to the point at which they were when the Commander-in-Chief addressed the Governor-General on May 11. Even in this communication, Lord Dalhousie found it necessary to give the warning that 'financial considerations must weigh greatly in the determination the Government may form on this deeply important matter. It is upon the military part that I beg now to request the benefit of your counsel and experience. No decision, I need hardly say, has yet been formed[2].' A week before this letter was written, Lord Gough had again appealed

[1] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, July 12, 1848.

[2] Ibid. August 22, 1848.

for immediate action, and his letter reached the Governor-General on the 24th of August. Lord Gough reported that he had, on his own responsibility, strengthened Lahore; and, in view of the alarming reports sent by Sir Frederick Currie, and the approach of 'the feast of the Dupuraj, which is the great period for Sikh excitement,' he laid before Lord Dalhousie a plan for assembling at Ferozepore, 'a force ready to be formed into an army, for support, or to carry out the views of the Government, consisting of 10,000 well organized men, at trifling cost.' On receipt of this letter, and without waiting for a reply to the larger question raised by himself in his letter of August 22, the Governor-General went so far as to say that 'Financial considerations must yield at once to considerations of military security, and the adoption of such military precautions as may be necessary in your judgment.' He now gave Lord Gough permission 'to issue such orders as you may think necessary for ensuring a sufficient support to the force now at Mooltan, in case it should need it, and for providing a defence against any outbreak at any time or anywhere upon the frontier[1].' The letter reached Lord Gough in the beginning of September, and he at once used the power vested in him, 'to strengthen Ferozepore very materially under the apparent annual relief of the native force at Lahore'—so as to avoid arousing the suspicion of the Durbar. Meanwhile, he had informed the Governor-General,

[1] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, August 24, 1848.

in reply to his inquiry of August 22, that he would require, to conquer the Punjab, the force described in his letters of the month of May—'24,000 men of all Arms, exclusive of the Forces now at Lahore, in the Jullundur Doab, and at Multan,' along with the Bombay column. At the same time he revived his earlier proposal of an increase in the army. 'The first step to be taken is, it appears to me, to recruit Native Infantry and Irregular Cavalry, up to the old Establishment of the former 1,000 Privates and the latter 500 Sowars per Regiment, and this could be done within a very short time—indeed, I do not see how, otherwise, such a Force as I have specified can be collected without denuding the Provinces of Troops to an imprudent and unsafe extent[1].' Still the Governor-General hesitated to take this final step, which he had so definitely repudiated in May. On the 6th of September, Lord Gough again addressed Lord Dalhousie, urging immediate action. Instead of complying with Lord Gough's request, the Governor-General, on September 13, expressed himself as still in doubt whether war was inevitable, and asked the Commander-in-Chief not to recruit the army, but to assemble on the frontier, the smaller force which the Governor-General had, on June 10, considered all that was necessary[2]. Ere this reached Lord Gough, he had heard rumours of the defection of Shere Singh, and Sir Frederick Currie was begging for reinforcements. The un-

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, September 1, 1848.

[2] Cf. p. 133.

fortunate aspect of events at Multan did not surprise Lord Gough [1], nor did he regard the probable delay as a real evil. The real evil he considered to be 'the undertaking it before we were well prepared to put down at once with a strong hand any outbreak in the Punjab.' But even so, if the advice which the Commander-in-Chief had pressed on the Governor-General had been adopted, Lord Gough would have been able to answer Sir Frederick Currie more satisfactorily. 'Had the Army I proposed,' he replied, 'been formed, I should now, or shortly after this, have had a force of from 12,000 to 15,000 men ready to move upon Woozeerabad or to its neighbourhood (the point I always considered advisable), which would have kept all—Goolab Singh, the Maharajah, and Peshawur—in check, and effectually have protected Lahore and repressed insurrection in the Mangha Doab [2].' As it was, (writing some days before receiving the Governor-General's letter of September 13), he could only reply [3]—'I may call spirits from the vasty deep, but will they respond to my call? I may say that an Army should be immediately collected, but where are they to come from? That which I have proposed and which has been sanctioned is infinitely too small, should we be on the eve of another general

[1] On the 15th of August he had written to Lord Dalhousie: 'I am not quite as sanguine as to the time it will take in its reduction as my friends at Lahore.'

[2] Lord Gough to Sir Frederick Currie, September 15, 1848

[3] Ibid.

Punjab War, and even that which I have since suggested will be too limited, if we have to suppress internal risings within our own Territories. I have long felt a conviction that the Army should be augmented, and that our European Force is by no means as strong as it ought to be. . . . Troops are now on their march to Ferozepore, which I cannot but repeat I consider the proper base of operations, imperatively called for to check open revolt at this side the Sutlej. I will take good care that Lahore shall not be threatened without giving it effectual support; but, for a general Punjab War, I am not prepared. Such preparation must rest with the Government, which is, in simple truth, the immediate augmentation of the army.' Following on Sir Frederick Currie's alarming letter, came the news of the slight check sustained by the besieging force outside Multan on the 9th of September. Lord Gough immediately made arrangements for a cavalry force to cross the Sutlej, and move on Multan, and for H.M.'s 29th Foot and two regiments of native infantry to proceed to Bhawalpore. This arrangement had no sooner been made than the report of the defection of Shere Singh reached the Commander-in-Chief, and (again on his own responsibility) he ordered the 3rd Light Dragoons and H.M.'s 98th Foot to Ferozepore, at the same time strongly urging Sir Frederick Currie to demand the help of a force from Sindh, over which Lord Gough had no control. In his letter to the Governor-General, Lord Gough showed no signs of alarm. He fully

realized the difficulties of the situation. 'No one,' he said, 'sees more clearly than I do the necessity for prompt and energetic measures, nor would be more anxious to put them into execution, but for my utter inability for want of Troops.' He made, accordingly, one final effort to persuade the Governor-General to accede to his repeated request to reinforce the army: 'I earnestly beg to press upon your Lordship the indispensable necessity of increasing the army, without the delay of a day. . . . I am ready to take upon myself all the odium of having pressed it upon the Government[1].' On receipt of this letter, the Governor-General at length gave way: 'The time has now come for decided measures. I have to-day proposed to the Government, who have fully concurred in my opinion, that the Army should be forthwith augmented to 1,000 rank and file for the Infantry and 500 Sowars[2].' At the same time, he sanctioned movements of troops from Bombay and Sindh, much as Lord Gough had suggested in the month of May.

While, in point of fact, Lord Dalhousie was sending refusal after refusal to Lord Gough's demands for adequate and active preparation, he has been credited with showing signs of profound dissatisfaction with the supposed tardiness of his Commander-in-Chief[3]. In view of the facts we have

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, September 20, 1848.

[2] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, September 30, 1848.

[3] This statement appears, in its most emphatic form, in Sir William Hunter's *Life of Lord Dalhousie* (p. 76):—

just narrated, the assertion is ridiculous; but it may be well to show how fully he expressed his approval of Lord Gough's policy. We have seen that, in the first instance, he cordially approved of the original decision not to move till October. We have also seen that he gave an equally unreserved approval when Lord Gough declined to comply with the request of Edwardes in the beginning of July, and the Council unanimously agreed with the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief[1]. When Sir Frederick Currie's precipitate action upset the arrangements thus made, Lord Dalhousie, while condemning Sir Frederick's interference[2], again expressed entire satisfaction with Lord Gough's

After narrating the abandonment of the siege of Multan in September, he writes: 'Meanwhile, the Governor-General had, from his distant post in Calcutta, watched with profound dissatisfaction the tardiness of the military authorities in the Punjab. During his first months of office he prudently abstained from over-ruling the local knowledge and long experience of his Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough. But, before the summer was over, he determined to act on his own judgment. "There is no other course open to us," he wrote to the Secret Committee, "but to prepare for a general Punjab War, and ultimately to occupy the country."' This series of errors closes very appropriately with the statement that Lord Dalhousie 'with swift resolution ordered an addition of 17,000 men to the army, and hurried up troops to the Punjab from Sind and Bombay,' i. e. his swift resolution ordered on the 5th of October what Lord Gough had pressed upon him on the 11th of May, and had repeatedly urged in August and September.

[1] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, August 7, 1848.

[2] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, July 24, 1848.

measures. 'Sir Frederick Currie,' he wrote[1], 'has thought it his duty to direct the movement of troops, to issue orders for preparations, and to make public his intentions; when this has once been done, it is very certain that nothing could possibly be worse than to countermand that order or to dawdle over it. I am, therefore, much indebted to Your Lordship for the prompt aid you have given, and the distinct order you have issued for expediting the movement of this force and for ensuring its efficiency. I am equally indebted to you for your judicious assurance to the troops that they will receive on this duty the rate of pay given for foreign service, which is their due.' Three weeks later, in congratulating Lord Gough on his reappointment, at the expiry of his term of office, he summed up the whole situation in the words: 'You have done right in every respect[2].' Nor, after the siege of Multan had been raised, did Lord Dalhousie express any dissatisfaction except with the military operations under General Whish. 'Sir Frederick Currie,' he wrote, 'must be grateful to you [Lord Gough] for having rejected his proposal of sending one brigade with the guns, as he proposed, and for having saved him from the consequences.'

Before proceeding to the last of Lord Gough's many wars, it may be well to state in a few words

[1] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, August 14, 1848.

[2] This reappointment, at such a crisis, is an indication that Lord Hardinge's letter of December, 1845, had made little permanent impression on the Duke of Wellington.

the results which arise out of the foregoing discussion of the policy of the Commander-in-Chief during the summer of 1848. It is a discussion the details of which might easily have been spared; but the accounts now in vogue of Lord Gough's attitude, and the criticisms of writers who desire to be fair to his memory, as well as of those who, following the newspaper press of his own time, make him the scapegoat for all errors, render it impossible for his biographer to be silent on the subject. On a general review of the whole discussion, his defence is complete. When the outbreak originally occurred, in April, 1848, he was unable to take the field immediately with a force in any way large enough to face a second Sikh War, which he believed to be inevitable; he was not even able to send a force large enough, in his opinion, for the immediate reduction of Multan. That inability was no fault of his own; it was caused by the reduction of the military establishment, which the pressure of financial considerations, together with the optimism of the political agents, had induced Lord Hardinge to order. In that reduction he had most unwillingly acquiesced, and even this acquiescence under protest had been conditional on certain modifications which had not been carried out[1]. That a brief spring campaign was impossible was the fault of the Indian Government, not of the Commander-in-Chief. A summer campaign he deemed impossible for reasons of

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Hardinge, January 13, 1847, and to Lord Dalhousie, June 9, 1848. Cf. p. 119.

health, and the losses of the few European regiments which did actually take the field in an exceptionally healthy summer show that his scruples were well founded [1]. His judgement was confirmed by the Governor-General and the Indian Government, and it was further approved by the Duke of Wellington and the Home Government. When Herbert Edwardes' pluck and skill drove Mulraj back upon Multan, Lord Gough's policy was to remain quiescent until the cool weather. Herbert Edwardes, in spite of all his great qualities, had not sufficient experience to render him a safe adviser. He miscalculated the strength and resources of Multan; he miscalculated the loyalty of Shere Singh; he minimized the warnings of incipient rebellion in the North-West; and, like Sir Frederick Currie, he placed undue reliance on the honesty of the Durbar. Lord Gough fell into none of these errors, and he strongly deprecated any premature attempt on Multan as very unlikely to succeed and as very likely to precipitate a general rising. Herbert Edwardes believed that his original designs on Multan were just conceivably capable of success; the combined views of Lord Gough, Lord Dalhousie, Lord Napier of Magdala, the lessons of the past in regard to sieges in India, and subsequent experience at Multan itself make it difficult to adopt his view.

[1] e. g. on the march from Ferozepore to Lahore two sergeants and fourteen privates of the 14th Light Dragoons died of apoplexy, and eighty men had to be taken into hospital. Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, August 25, 1848.

When a premature attempt was made, in defiance of his policy, Lord Gough trebled the force sent by Sir Frederick Currie[1]. Finally, when the attempt to reduce Multan brought about the defection of Shere Singh, and the consequent outbreak of the second Sikh War a month before it was anticipated by the Government, an immediate advance into the Punjab was impossible because the Governor-General had, from May to September, been compelled by financial considerations to decline to carry into effect the measures which the Commander-in-Chief had persistently urged. On the 11th of

[1] It may be objected that the force actually sent by Lord Gough was insufficient for the reduction of Multan. To this the obvious reply can be made that Lord Gough was assured that Edwardes required only guns and scientific officers to conduct the operations in conjunction with the force under Shere Singh. The desertion of Shere Singh completely altered the aspect of affairs, and rendered the force actually sent (though treble what Edwardes asked) inadequate. Moreover, the authorities were misled in another important point by Edwardes' speaking of Multan as 'invested' (cf. p. 142). As the siege progressed, Lord Gough gradually realized, as he himself expresses it, that 'the besiegers were in reality the besieged,' that not half the place was invested, and that Mulraj could receive 'whatever reinforcements the disaffected choose to throw into the place.' Lord Gough greatly regretted his being misled on this point, as he would have supplied General Whish with a large force of cavalry to complete the investment. (Letters to Lord Dalhousie and the Hon. G. Gough, September 15 and 18, 1848.) But he never regarded the step taken by Currie as at all likely to prove successful, and his main object in insisting on the reinforcement was to make sure that Whish and Edwardes could take care of themselves.

May, Lord Gough had, as we have seen, asked the Governor-General to give orders for the creation of an army of the Punjab, to consist of 24,000 men (apart from the Lahore and Sindh forces), to recall men from furlough, and to increase the establishment to its former numbers. Had these orders been given, Lord Gough could, in the month of September, have assembled a force of this size on the frontier, or (as he himself suggested [1]) sent an army to the vicinity of Wazirabad on the outbreak of the Hazara revolt. The orders were not given till the last day of September, although request after request had been made for their issue. It is not easy to avoid the conclusion that the responsibility for such errors as were made lay elsewhere than with the Commander-in-Chief.

[1] Ante, p. 158.

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IX

THE ARMY OF THE PUNJAB

On the 22nd of September, 1848, the Commander-in-Chief in India laid before the Governor-General two alternative plans for the conduct of a second Sikh War. The news of the defection of Shere Singh and of the withdrawal from Multan had reached him two days before; but Shere Singh was still outside Multan, and had as yet made no open attempt to co-operate with his father, Chutter Singh, the leader of the revolt in the Hazara. Peshawur had not joined the rebels, nor had the Afghan treaty been made. The Governor-General had not yet sanctioned the augmentation of the army. It was in these circumstances that Lord Gough now addressed Lord Dalhousie: 'I can see but two lines of proceeding. First, to abandon the siege of Mooltan for the present, and collect a powerful Army in the North West to carry out the views of the Government, without a risk of failure, and, after arranging all the Punjab affairs either by conquest or occupation—in the latter case, a great augmentation of our Army must of necessity take place—to move down with an overwhelming Force on Mooltan, crush it, and signally punish its rebel leader and the deserters from their Sovereign. This, most decidedly, would be the more likely plan

to command success, but it may be said, whilst it will assuredly give confidence to the Sikhs generally (this I do not deem a subject of much consequence, as a short time would prove its fallacy) it may also create feelings, at our side of the water, adverse to our supremacy, and this is a subject of such vital importance to the stability of our rule in India that although I see the advantage of it in a military point of view, I cannot feel satisfied in recommending it.' Having thus definitely rejected this course of action, Lord Gough proceeded to consider the alternative—to prosecute the siege with vigour, a course not by any means free from difficulties. It 'would have been very different indeed had all our preparations been matured.' There were about 7,000 effective men outside Multan; reinforcements, amounting to 3,500, were already on their way; about 7,000 more might reach Multan between October 15th and November 1st. The besieging army would then amount to over 16,500 men; but the frontier stations would be almost denuded of troops, and the force available for a general advance into the Punjab would be dangerously slight. In the existing condition of the army Lord Gough much feared that the prosecution of the siege of Multan involved the relinquishment of any other immediate operation in the Punjab[1], and he, therefore, proposed to pro-

[1] In a letter to Lord Fitzroy Somerset (dated September 30) Lord Gough says: 'I feel it right to observe that I have placed all the difficulties of our present position fully before the Government, in order to stir up their energies, feeling at

ceed in person to the beleaguered fort. 'If we are to proceed, the earlier the support arrives the better, and in that case, I propose to take the command, as I feel assured that my presence will give confidence, not only to the Army employed, but to the Army in general; the times admit of no false delicacy, or I might be less inclined to speak of self.' Lord Dalhousie's answer was decisive. 'As long as there is a shot or a shell in the Indian arsenals, or a finger left that can pull a trigger, I will never desist from operations at Mooltan, until the place is taken, and the leader and his force ground if possible into powders. . . . I have therefore to request that Your Lordship will put forth all your energies, and have recourse to all the resources which the Government of India has at their command, to accomplish this object promptly, fully, and finally. I am in hopes that troops may be forthcoming in sufficient quantities, when all our arrangements are completed, to enable us to undertake military operations in other quarters of the Punjab also, simultaneously with those directed against Mooltan; but the capture of that fortress and the utter destruction, so far as humanity and the ordinary mercy of war will permit, of the Sikh army assembled there, are the first and prime objects of our attention now[1].' It was only on receipt of this letter that Lord Gough was assured that the

the same time the [ut]most confidence in an honourable and successful result.'

[1] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, October 8, 1848.

Government really understood the situation, and that the long delayed orders had at last been given; he did not yet know whether the Government intended to sanction a second Sikh War, or merely an expedition to aid the Durbar in reducing Multan. A force was dispatched from Bombay which, it was hoped, might reach Multan about the middle of November; the increase of the army to the old establishment was ordered by the Government, and the utmost energy was shown by the Governor-General in arranging for transport and ambulance. Up to the middle of October Lord Gough had no final orders for the conduct of a campaign in the Punjab.

Reinforcements are moving forward from all points, and, by the 15th of November, I shall have an imposing force ready to act. But will the Government let me? That is the question. The papers are crying out at my not at once pushing on Troops, forgetting that I am not the Government, to make War or Peace, whilst the truth and fact is that everything that has been done, has been upon my own and sole responsibility. Our commissariat is in a fearful backward state, not a week's supplies at Ferozepore, although since last May I have been both publicly and privately urging the subject. Lord Dalhousie is a young man, his blood is very hot, and he speaks of walking over everything. But to walk we must eat [1].

Before the Commander-in-Chief had heard of the Governor-General's often quoted sentence: 'I have

[1] Lord Gough to Mr. A. Arbuthnot, October 13, 1848.

drawn the sword and thrown away the scabbard,' the situation had once more been altered, and by an event which greatly reduced the importance of the siege of Multan. On the 9th of October, Shere Singh deserted Mulraj, and, taking with him some of his ally's cavalry, disappeared from the neighbourhood of Multan, without any attempt at pursuit by Whish or Edwardes[1]. Lord Gough at once concluded that he had arranged a junction with his father, Chutter Singh, on the Hazara frontier. About the same time came the news of a revolt in the Derajat, which had been deserted since Herbert Edwardes undertook the siege of Multan. He had left a Mohammedan chief, Futteh Khan[2], in charge of the Sikh soldiery in the Bunnoo district; these revolted, murdered Futteh Khan, and marched to join Shere Singh. The Commander-in-Chief now decided that the siege of Multan must be only a subsidiary operation, and that the force under Whish, along with that marching up from Bombay[3], would be sufficient to conduct it; he therefore countermanded the orders for other troops to proceed to Multan, and he abandoned his intention (which the Governor-General had not approved) of going in person to superintend the operations there. Lord Dalhousie was of opinion that the military authorities took too serious a view of the difficulties of the siege,

[1] *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii. pp. 635–6.

[2] Cf. p. 135.

[3] 8,200 men of all arms, with a siege-train, and reserve artillery.

but Shere Singh's desertion of Mulraj prevented any disagreement between the two authorities; now that there was no army to support the besieged, the Commander-in-Chief was in a position to adopt the more optimist views of the Government.

What, then, was to be the locality of the real campaign? Besides Shere Singh and Chutter Singh, and the rebels at Bunnoo, there were two other possible sources of trouble. In the Peshawur district, Lieutenant Herbert was still holding out the fort of Attok against the Sikh soldiery, and the attitude of the Afghans was becoming more and more suspicious. There were also rumours that Gholab Singh intended to make common cause with Shere Singh, and to lead a revolt in the Kashmir district, so recently handed over to him. Lord Gough did not credit these rumours ('I am certain he is too cunning a fox to do so[1]'), but the untrustworthy character of the Maharajah of Kashmir made him unwilling to send a small force to the North-West; he preferred, by sending a detachment across the Beas, to prevent any communication between Lahore and Gholab Singh. The Commander-in-Chief considered (as he had always done, except while Shere Singh was actually in alliance with Mulraj) that the key to the situation lay at Wazirabad. He had wished to send an army there in September (cf. p. 158); but his suggestions had been negatived, and now the army could not be collected till the middle of November, and the middle of November

[1] Letter to Mr. A. Arbuthnot, October 1, 1848.

was still three weeks off. All that Lord Gough could do at present was to send Cureton across the Sutlej, with a cavalry division and horse artillery, supported by a brigade of infantry, with another brigade in reserve.

Preparations for the campaign were interrupted by difficulties with regard to Sir Frederick Currie. The Resident at Lahore had still the powers he had exercised with regard to the Multan force in July, and he had now sent a brigade, under Wheeler, to support John Lawrence in the Jullundur Doab. He was also much alarmed about the safety of Lahore, which Shere Singh began to menace. On the 23rd of October, Lord Gough found it necessary to take the entire command into his own hands, in spite of the definite instructions of the Government to comply with the Resident's requisitions for troops; that Shere Singh would march on Lahore he regarded as much too good news to be true. The Commander-in-Chief thus explained his position to the Governor-General:—

As there is strong reason for believing that Shere Singh is moving on Wuzzeerabad, there to be joined by his father, it will be an object of the greatest importance that we should attack him, if he does, with the least possible delay, and eject him and his army from the finest portion of the Punjab. By the 15th of November, I shall have a sufficient force assembled at, and in front of, Ferozepore, to effect this, if Sir Frederick does not fritter away the troops in little and useless operations. At this moment, I am really very nervous about

Brigadier Wheeler[1]. I therefore trust your Lordship will approve of my reply to the Resident. In short, my dear Lord, I cannot be answerable for operations rendered abortive by the proceedings of others. I feel I have taken upon myself a deep responsibility in disobeying the orders of the Government, but I am confident in Your Lordship's support. . . . As for Shere Singh's moving upon Lahore, it is all a farce. If he does, and if [Colin] Campbell does not give a good account of him, I am very much deceived in that officer. . . . I am now hurrying on to Ferozepore to complete my arrangements and combinations[2].

Currie, who had been worried for some months by demands for brigades in the Hazara, at Attok, and elsewhere, seemed, on the whole, to be relieved by the removal of responsibility from his own shoulders. Shere Singh, on his part, moved rapidly northwards, making no attempt on Lahore beyond sending some cavalry to burn a few boats on the Ravi, about two miles from the capital. When Shere Singh changed his course and began (as the Commander-in-Chief had expected) to move up the left bank of the Chenab towards Wazirabad, Lord Gough increased the force across the Ravi to two brigades of infantry

[1] A letter of the 29th of October (also to the Governor-General) says: 'Your Lordship will be gratified to find that Brigadier Wheeler has accomplished his second operation, the rebels having evacuated the fort of Morara, which appears to be a contemptible place. I own I cannot see much good resulting from such operations, whilst they occasion some risk.'

[2] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, October 23, 1848.

and one of cavalry, and instructed Wheeler and his brigade to cross the Beas into the Bari Doab.

Meanwhile the Commander-in-Chief was moving rapidly up to the front. On the 6th of November he reached Ferozepore, and was greeted with the news that the Sikh force, under Major George Lawrence at Peshawur, had deserted to the Sikh cause, and that their commander was a prisoner.

That force consisted of six Regiments of well disciplined Sikh Infantry, about 1,000 Cavalry, and thirty guns, which, although in Major Lawrence's possession for months (all which time he must have known what would be the finale) he never attempted to render unserviceable. Such is the infatuation of every man who gets into the Political Department, but which I have thrown overboard, so much so as to order my officers in advance to send those attached to them, in irons, back to Lahore, if they interfere with my military operations. I had enough of interference before and felt the ill effects of it[1].

The news from Peshawur made Lord Gough anxious lest Shere Singh should attempt to carry the war into the difficult country across the Indus, and he made immediate arrangements to enter the Punjab.

Upon hearing this news, which I always contemplated, I deemed it right at once to order on the Force, which I had taken on myself to collect there [at Ferozepore], but which the Government have since entirely approved, consisting of six Regiments of Infantry (including the 24th and 25th Foot), one Light Field Battery, and six siege guns (drawn by elephants, with bullocks to take them into action),

[1] Lord Gough to his son, November 16, 1848.

with a reserve Company of Artillery and a Pontoon Train. I have in advance, eight regiments of cavalry (including the 3rd and 14th Light Dragoons and the 9th Lancers), and six regiments of Infantry (including the 2nd European infantry), with five troops of Horse Artillery, and two Light Field Batteries—exclusive of Brigadier Wheeler, who is acting on my right flank, with one troop of Horse Artillery, and one Light Field Battery, three regiments of Cavalry and two of Infantry (including the 61st Foot). Coming on in my support are a brigade of Infantry, two regiments Irregular Cavalry, and a siege train, whilst I have, to protect the N.W. frontier, a Brigade of Infantry (one regiment of which is European, the 98th) and a Brigade of Irregular Cavalry, exclusive of the corps doing station duty at Ferozepore, Ludhiana, and Umballa. At Lahore, I have six regiments of Infantry (including the 53rd Foot), a troop of Horse Artillery, and a Light Field Battery, with a regiment of Irregular Cavalry coming from the rear, from the lower provinces, I have six regiments of Infantry, including the 18th Royal Irish. So you perceive I am moving as an Army with Advance, Centre Column, Flank Corps, with support and Reserve[1].

The aim of the Commander-in-Chief was to entice Shere Singh across the Chenab to Ramnuggur, where a Sikh force had collected, and to drive them across the river with loss (if possible, capturing their guns). He then hoped to make a rapid flank movement of cavalry, under Cureton, supported by Colin Campbell's infantry division, to Wazirabad, 'to cross the river there, so as if possible to get in the rear of

[1] Lord Gough to his son, November 16, 1848.

Shere Singh and prevent his crossing the Jhelum in the direct line for Peshawur[1].' Meanwhile, his orders to the advanced force, under Colin Campbell and Cureton, were not to risk anything until his own arrival, but to be ready to meet any attack. He specially warned both Campbell and Cureton not to attack the Sikhs at Ramnuggur, on the ground that it would prevent Shere Singh from crossing the Chenab. 'If Shere Singh does not cross within a few days,' he told Campbell, 'he will not cross at all, but wait for his father. If that is the case, we must punish the fellows now at Ramnuggur, if we can capture their guns; otherwise it would be only throwing away a chance of a great object to effect what would be of no use, driving a lot of fellows on their own support. If the cavalry could get between them and their rear and we could smash them, all well, but keep in mind that merely driving them across the river without taking their guns, would be of no effect whatever[1].' When Lord Gough reached Lahore, on the 13th of November, he was informed that the Sikh force at Ramnuggur had only a few guns, and he therefore sent to Campbell some fresh instructions.

> Shere Singh will not cross, therefore it will be best at once to dislodge the fellows at Ramnuggur, if you can effectually do it. . . . Attack them with your whole force, if possible; you may not be able to surprise them, but such a host cannot get across

[1] Lord Gough to Brigadier-General Colin Campbell, November 11, 1848.

the river all at once, and if we could get one or two of those Sirdars, it will be a grand coup. But if you do not think you could effect this, it would be useless your marching merely to make these fellows fall back on Shere Singh. When you effect this, if you think you can without risk, I would then wish you to make a flank movement, without hurrying the men, upon Wuzzeerabad, as if you were going to support Wheeler [who had been detailed to subdue an isolated rising]. . . . Then let Pope's force [cavalry] join you at Wuzzeerabad, and cross your whole force there, whilst I shall push on to Ramnuggur. If you can get in rear of Shere Singh, and between both him, Chutter Singh, and the Bunnoo corps, we shall be able to take all in detail[1].

The Commander-in-Chief remained only three days at Lahore; on the 16th he crossed the Ravi, and commenced the final stage of his march. It was not till after leaving Lahore that he knew the definite decision of the Governor-General and that the war was to be against, and not in support of, the Durbar. 'I do not know,' he said on the 15th, 'whether we are at peace or war, or who it is we are fighting for.' On the 17th, he heard of the junction of Shere Singh with the Bunnoo troops on the right bank of the Chenab, and directed Campbell, should the enemy cross, not to attack, but to close up his support and watch them carefully, waiting for the arrival of the main body[2]. Any attempt to recross

[1] Lord Gough to Brigadier-General Campbell, November 15, 1848.

[2] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, November 17, 1848.

was, of course, to be the signal for an immediate attack by Campbell. The rumour that Shere Singh was to cross seemed to Lord Gough too good news to be true, and, next day, he was not surprised to hear that the Sikhs had retired to the right bank before Campbell could reach them. 'I feared the flight across the river,' he wrote to Campbell, 'the moment they heard of your advance, but it cannot be helped. We must carry on our former plans, but you must not leave Ramnuggur unprotected until Thackwell arrives, which will be on the 22nd, I hope. . . . Make all your arrangements slowly but surely, and, above all, find out fords for me, either to cross, or to bridge with my Pontoon Train, between Ramnuggur and Wuzzeerabad[1].' Lord Gough now pushed forward so rapidly that he joined the advance some miles from Ramnuggur, on the 21st of November. He had, in deference to the entreaties of Sir Frederick Currie, pushed up rapidly from the Sutlej to Lahore, and more rapidly still from Lahore to the Chenab. The army was now complete, except for the heavy artillery (which was being brought up as quickly as possible), and for the besieging force outside Multan, the doings of which we shall record later. The force actually under the command of Lord Gough consisted of a cavalry division under Cureton, two infantry divisions under Sir Walter Gilbert and Sir Joseph

[1] Lord Gough to Brigadier-General Campbell, November 18, 1848.

Thackwell, and the artillery under Brigadier Tennant [1].

[1] Cavalry Division, under Brigadier Cureton:

1*st Brigade*—3rd and 14th Light Dragoons, and 5th and 8th Light Native Cavalry, under Brigadier White.

2*nd Brigade*—9th Lancers, and 1st and 6th Native Light Cavalry, under Brigadier Pope.

Infantry. Gilbert's Division:

1*st Brigade*—H.M.'s 29th Foot, 30th and 56th Native Infantry, under Brigadier Mountain.

2*nd Brigade*—2nd European Light Infantry, and 31st and 70th Native Infantry, under Brigadier Godby.

Thackwell's Division:

1*st Brigade*—H.M.'s 24th Foot, 25th and 45th Native Infantry, under Brigadier Pennycuick.

2*nd Brigade*—H.M.'s 61st Foot, 36th and 6th Native Infantry, under Brigadier Hoggan.

3*rd Brigade*—15th, 20th, and 69th Native Infantry, under Brigadier Penny.

Artillery. Horse Artillery, under Lieut.-Colonel Huthwaite:

Six troops, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Lane, and Majors Christie, Huish, Warner, Duncan, and Fordyce.

Field Batteries—Three, under Major Dawes, and Captains Kinleside and Austin.

Heavy Batteries—Two, under Major Horsford.

X

RAMNUGGUR AND THE CHENAB

THE main body of the Sikhs was now posted on the right bank of the Chenab, opposite Ramnuggur, but outposts remained on the left bank, watched closely by Cureton's cavalry. The position at Ramnuggur was excellently chosen, because it afforded possibilities of communicating with Gholab Singh, should that wily chief be inveigled into the rebellion, and Lord Gough decided to drive off the Sikh outposts and to encamp on the left bank himself. These outposts were reported to possess some guns.

Deeming it necessary to attack this force, if possible, before it could get across the Chenab, which is a difficult river, I directed Brigadier-General Campbell, commanding the troops in advance, with an Infantry Brigade, and the whole of the Cavalry Division, with three troops of Horse Artillery and one Light Field Battery, under Brigadier-General Cureton, to proceed during the night of the 21st to effect this; the Troops under my personal command coming up, in support, the following morning, should the enemy be in too great force. I joined the advance at three in the morning, to witness the operation. Just as the day dawned, the Troops were brought up in beautiful order to the town of Ramnuggur, situated on rather a high bank, having a commanding view of the low ground between it and the river, distant about two miles. The enemy appeared to have crossed with the main body of his force, but there were several

large bodies of Horse upon the flat, to drive away which, with as much punishment as possible, two troops of Horse Artillery, with five Regiments of Cavalry, were ordered to advance as rapidly as the nature of the ground would admit, and to punish the enemy in crossing the river. I regret to say the Artillery, in their eagerness to overtake the enemy, pushed to the very banks of the river, and the leading gun was precipitated down a bank of several feet into a deep sand, and this, under the guns of the Enemy, which opened from the opposite bank, placed in battery. Every exertion was made to get it free, so much so, that Brigadier Campbell dismounted personally to assist; but in vain, and it was spiked and abandoned[1].

The cavalry regiments, of which Lord Gough speaks, were the 3rd and 14th Light Dragoons, and the 5th and 8th Light Cavalry, under Brigadier White; the two troops of horse artillery were commanded by Warner and Lane. White had managed his cavalry with great skill. The 3rd Light Dragoons made the first charge; when they came near the river-bed, they halted, and began to withdraw. This became the signal for another Sikh attempt, but they again fell back when the 3rd Light Dragoons (now joined by the 8th Light Cavalry) again advanced. Another withdrawal from the dangerous ground near the river-bed was once more followed by a Sikh advance, and a third charge was made. It was at this juncture that Lane, anxious to cover the cavalry, pushed his guns too far into the deep

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, November 26, 1848.

heavy sand close to the river-bed. Lord Gough's object had been accomplished; the casualties were slight, and the loss of the gun and two ammunition-waggons would have been borne with equanimity had no further blunder occurred.

To the left of the scene of conflict there was another ford, and some Sikh light cavalry ('Gorchurras') crossed and threatened our flank. Lord Gough ordered the commanding officer of the 14th Light Dragoons, Lieut.-Colonel William Havelock, to deliver a charge and clear the ground. Havelock was a brave man, and he possessed the gift of inspiring courage in others. 'Now we'll win our spurs,' he said, and, in his brother's words, 'happy as a lover, he placed himself in front of his cherished dragoons.' Cureton sat watching the result. Havelock pushed on, but apparently 'losing the direction of the body of Gorchurras which General Cureton had sanctioned his attacking, he charged across an arm of the river, under the bank of which numbers both of Infantry and Cavalry were concealed[1].' 'My God!' exclaimed Cureton, 'this isn't the way to use cavalry!' and he immediately started off, with a few of the escort of the 5th Light Cavalry, to warn Havelock not to charge into the sand of the river-bed. He had ridden only a short distance when he was shot through the heart. The escort returned to say that the General was dead. Lord Gough, unaware of Cureton's

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, November 26, 1848.

intention, sent Major Tucker to Havelock with a similar warning; 'but he went at such a pace that Major Tucker could not overtake him . . . leaving the body of cavalry he was supposed to be about to attack about half way between us and where he was. These men, finding themselves free, moved to attack the reserve, a squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry.... Seeing the 5th hesitate, I naturally was anxious that the 14th reserve should charge[1].' They did so, and effectually. But meanwhile Havelock had charged into the sandy river-bed, lined with the enemy and commanded by their guns. He paid for his mistake with his life; the regiment (though it suffered sadly) made its way back, but without its Colonel.

The loss was at once ascribed by the press to the rashness of the Commander-in-Chief, and the generosity of his references to the dead in his public dispatches lent authority to the accusation[2]. Lord

[1] Lord Gough to his son, March 18, 1849.

[2] Colonel Malleson (*Decisive Battles of India*, pp. 425-6) states (1) that Lord Gough in the morning 'joined and placed himself at the head of the advanced party of cavalry, unknown to the majority of his staff.' (2) That the Sikhs were withdrawing from our side of the river, when Lord Gough, thinking 'of nothing but that the enemy were escaping him, and rendered wild at this thought, dashed his cavalry and horse artillery at the Sikhs as they were crossing the ford'; and (3) that 'Burning with indignation at the very idea of the enemy carrying off a trophy in the very first action of the campaign, Colonel Havelock demanded and obtained permission to drive the enemy back' (from the gun which had been abandoned). Our narrative will make clear, with regard to the first of these

Gough desired no general action; we have shown that he was fully convinced of the mistake of

statements, that Lord Gough did not put himself at the head of the advanced party, but remained far out of range till he rode down to see if the gun could be extricated. The statement is made by Colonel Malleson on the unsupported testimony of Lawrence-Archer, a young officer, who many years afterwards published *Commentaries on the Punjab Campaign*, and who can have had only the authority of camp gossip for his misstatement. In the second place, Sir Frederick Haines and Sir Charles Gough, who were present, confirm the statement, made by Lord Gough to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, that it was necessary to dislodge bodies of Sikhs from our side in order to clear the ground for encampment. This is quite clearly recorded in the *Memoirs of Sir Henry Havelock*, and it is fully explained in the important letters, contributed by a writer signing himself 'Φ,' to *The Mofussilite* of June 26, July 3, and July 5, 1849. It is generally understood that 'Φ' was Major Tudor Tucker. Lastly, the mistake of saying that Havelock was permitted to charge the enemy who were trying to seize the captured gun, involves a double error. Havelock was not permitted to attempt the recovery of the gun, nor did he attempt it. The lost gun was to the right of where the Commander-in-Chief was standing, and Havelock charged to the left. Colonel Malleson also ignores the distinct statement in Lord Gough's official dispatch that Havelock 'mistook the body he was instructed to charge and moved upon and overwhelmed another, much closer to the river, which exposed him to a cross fire from the enemy's guns,' a statement corroborated by the authorities on which Colonel Malleson mainly relies (Sir H. Durand, Mr. E. J. Thackwell, and Lawrence-Archer), but of which he makes no mention. Colonel Malleson's omission to give his readers any hint of this, and the consequent imputation of blame to the Commander-in-Chief, is characteristic of his treatment of the subject. So many of Colonel Malleson's misstatements of

making an attack which could only result in driving bodies of the enemy upon their support (cf. pp. 176–9). His aim was to make a reconnaissance in force and to obtain information. Cureton was in command of the reconnaissance, and Lord Gough intended to be merely a spectator. The eagerness of the Sikhs to come once more into collision with the British forced him to give orders as occasion required, and once (when at the end of the skirmish he ordered the reserve of the 14th Light Cavalry to aid that of the 5th) he came into actual contact with the enemy.

I intended (he told his son) having as little to do with the reconnaissance at Ramnuggur as you. I was upon a high summer house of Runjit Singh, which overlooked the plains and the river banks, three miles from the latter. Cureton went on with a portion of the Cavalry. I remained a quiet spectator, when, to my astonishment, I heard that one of the guns which went with the cavalry had advanced as far as the sands, having plunged down a bank, under the fire of the Enemy's Guns (on the opposite bank) and had been abandoned, which [sands] it was never contemplated they should have come near. It was then and not till then that I went down to see if it could be

fact have become current that it will be necessary to expose, in detail, some of the other inaccuracies into which he falls in his desire to bring discredit upon the memory of Lord Gough. Here, however, we may make the general remark that, whatever objection may be taken, rightly or wrongly, to Lord Gough's strategy or tactics, Colonel Malleson's picture of the Commander-in-Chief (*Decisive Battles*, pp. 425–70) is so clearly the result of invincible prejudice as to fail entirely in its purpose.

extricated, and it was a considerable time before I met Cureton, who commanded the reconnaissance. He was at the time in front of the 14th Light Dragoons, and not under fire. Havelock rode up to him, and asked permission to charge a body of the Enemy's Cavalry, which appeared to be close. . . . The number of the enemy was much less than the 14th. Leave was given him, and Cureton went on towards the reserve of the 14th under Lt.-Col. King. To my astonishment, Havelock took his Regiment, with a portion of the 5th Light Cavalry, in Column of Troop, right down to the river, when he wheeled into line, and charged along the whole face of the Sikh Batteries at the opposite side. . . . Why Havelock charged where he did, no human being can now tell. I myself believe he considered the Guns at this side of the river, and was determined to try and take them. I knew the greater portion were on the other side, because I actually went within 200 yards of the river, making my staff stay behind, not to draw the Enemy's fire upon me—or on them. . . . I am sure Cureton was as much surprised as I was to have seen the career of the 14th, and it must have puzzled him to guess what object was aimed at[1].

The loss, though not large in numbers, was severe in proportion to the troops engaged. Twenty-six were killed or missing, and fifty-nine were wounded. Among the killed the most important were Cureton and Havelock. Cureton was a general of great ability, in whom Lord Gough placed special confidence. He had risen from the ranks to the grade of Brigadier-General, and the skill with which he handled cavalry in the Sutlej Campaign had induced

[1] Lord Gough to his son, March 18, 1849.

the Commander-in-Chief to place him in command of the cavalry division of the army of the Punjab[1]. 'A better or a braver soldier,' said Lord Gough's report, 'never fell in his country's service.' Of Havelock, too, the Commander-in-Chief spoke most warmly, suggesting explanations for his misinterpretation of his orders, and emphasizing the courage which had marked his whole career. 'The brave leader of the 14th is missing; he charged into a *gole* of the enemy, and has not since been seen, regretted by every soldier who witnessed his noble daring.'

Despite the loss incurred by Havelock's error and the capture of Lane's gun, it is easy to take too serious a view of the cavalry skirmish of Ramnuggur. The main object was attained, the enemy were driven from the left bank of the Chenab; and they had suffered severely in the engagement. The Commander-in-Chief continued his preparations for the crossing of the Chenab. 'I am now (November 26th) making my combinations for a flank movement, passing the river several miles above the enemy's position, and turning it; but the river is so difficult and my information so defective, whilst the Enemy with his numerous Irregulars, both Cavalry and Infantry, watch everything like a Ford, that I shall have to await the arrival of some heavy guns (which I expect the day after to-morrow), in order to

[1] He had been Adjutant-General of H.M.'s troops, and his place was supplied by the appointment of Major Tucker as Deputy Adjutant-General.

THE CAVALRY SKIRMISH AT RAMNUGGUR, Nov. 22, 1848.



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clear the opposite bank where the detached Force is to cross[1].' Lord Gough's reasons for crossing the Chenab have been generally misunderstood. Durand, in the *Calcutta Review*[2], regarded the movement as 'untimely, objectless, and fruitless.' He considered that Lord Gough's object should have been 'to remain in observation on the left bank of the Chenab, to regard himself as covering the siege of Multan, and holding Shere Singh in check until that place fell; to give time for the completion of commissariat arrangements; to cover Lahore, and cut off all supplies from the districts on the left bank of the Chenab reaching the enemy; jealously to watch the movements of the latter, whether to the northward or southward.' This sentence has become what one may term the *locus classicus* for criticism upon the policy of crossing the Chenab immediately; it is the basis of almost every attack upon Lord Gough's movement. Yet it ignores some of the most important elements in the situation. The reader will remember that Lord Gough stated to Colin Campbell (cf. pp. 177–8) his reason for planning an immediate movement. Chutter Singh, with a large Sikh force, was engaged in the siege of Attok; when it fell (as fall it must) the strength of Shere Singh would be largely increased, and the

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, November 26, 1848. Elsewhere in the same letter he speaks of the difficulty of obtaining information 'where every man is your enemy.'

[2] Vol. xv. p. 261.

Commander-in-Chief desired to inflict a defeat on the enemy before the arrival of these reinforcements. A further danger lay in the possibility of Shere Singh's marching to join his father in the difficult country across the Jhelum; and Lord Gough hoped that, should fortune favour him, he might be able to pursue and rout him before he made any attempt to do so. The crossing of the Chenab would not interfere with the objects of covering Lahore and cutting off the enemy's supplies from the left bank[1]. It would, on the other hand, drive the enemy further from Lahore, and, most important of all, it would cut off his supplies from the right bank, and place at the disposal of the British commissariat a very rich portion of cultivated land on the other side of the river[2]. To deprive the enemy of the rich

[1] In a letter to Sir Frederick Currie, Lord Gough complains that he had been misled as to the possibility of securing sufficient provisions for his own army from the left bank of the Chenab.

[2] Colonel Malleson (who says that Lord Gough's sole idea was 'to seek the enemy wherever he could be found, attack him and beat him,' and that 'larger aims than this lay outside the range of his mental vision') remarks that 'the Sikhs, having crossed to the right bank of the Chenab, were now in the strong but inhospitable territory between that river and the Jhelum. A really great commander would have been content that they should remain there, eating up their scanty supplies.' One of Lord Gough's aims in crossing was just to drive them into this inhospitable territory. The right bank of the Chenab was richly cultivated (the phrase applied to it in the text was supplied by Sir Frederick Haines). Colonel

lands beyond the Chenab was in itself sufficient object for the movement, and we shall see that it was productive of a result which really decided the campaign, by forcing the Sikhs to give Lord Gough the opportunity of attacking them in the open at Gujerat. To attribute the crossing of the Chenab to 'the smell of powder' is deliberately to misunderstand the character of the Commander-in-Chief.

Such were the reasons for the passage of the Chenab. We shall find that it was accomplished safely, and with trifling loss.

The alternatives before Lord Gough were either to force the ford at Ramnuggur or to cross at one of the other fords further up the river. The first alternative was soon found to be impracticable.

Malleson would have found in Lawrence-Archer's *Commentaries* references to the cultivation on the right bank. The rich and fertile character of the right bank of the Chenab is well known to all students of Indian history and topography, but it may be well to quote from Sir William Hunter's *Gazetteer of India* on the subject. The two districts concerned are those of Gujerat and Gujeranwala. Under the heading 'Gujerat,' the *Gazetteer* says: 'The Chenab lowlands have a fertile soil of consistent loam, whose natural fruitfulness is enhanced by artificial water supply from the mountain streams. . . . Close to the actual channel, a fringe of land, some 2½ miles in width, is exposed to inundation from the flooded river, and produces rich crops upon the virgin silt.' No artificial water supply, of course, existed in 1848, but otherwise the circumstances are unchanged. The same work, *sub voce* Gujeranwala, says: 'On the northern frontier, a belt of alluvial land, some 2 to 6 miles in breadth, fringes the Chenab throughout its course.'

The Chenab is there very broad, and the shifting sand at the bottom causes frequent alterations of the channels; the enemy were known to be strongly entrenched, and, even after the arrival of the heavy guns, Lord Gough could not hope to dislodge them without unnecessary loss. The remaining course was not free from difficulties. On the 18th of November, Lord Gough had asked Sir Colin Campbell to prepare a report upon the fords of the Chenab between Ramnuggur and Wazirabad. Campbell had employed for this purpose no less able an officer than William Hodson (of Hodson's Horse), who was with Wheeler in the vicinity[1], and, on Lord Gough's arrival, fresh inspections were made under the direction of the Quartermaster-General. The result of these inquiries, the records of most of which are still preserved, was to show that there were four possible fords. The first of these, at Ghurriki, seven miles from Ramnuggur, was practicable for artillery, only if two or three hundred camels were sent across first, and it would be

[1] It is an illustration of the difficulty of trusting the evidence of individuals who have taken part in a campaign that Mr. Edward Thackwell (who wrote, under the title of *The Second Seikh War*, a defence of Sir Joseph Thackwell) regrets that 'the fords were not subjected to a minute scrutiny, in which the highest authorities should have actively participated.' This is the source of the numerous statements that the fords were not examined. On the *ipse dixit* of Mr. Thackwell, Colonel Malleson practically accuses Lord Gough of deliberate falsehood in asserting that the fords were examined. Cf. footnote, p. 201.

difficult to perform this operation so near the camp of the enemy. The next, at Runniki, was described as practicable, but 'objectionable on account of its steep bank, of the stream being very strong, and the passage not straight.' The depth of water, in both these cases, was about 4 feet. The report on the third ford, at Ali-Sher-ke-Chuk, has not been preserved, although Hodson refers to it in his letter to Campbell [1]. Finally, at Wazirabad, about 22 miles from Ramnuggur, the greatest depth of water was reported, by Major Tucker, to be 'about four feet, and that only for about 20 or 30 yards in the main stream. The two smaller channels are described as about knee deep only. The bed is hard and level—the stream slack—and the passage of sufficient breadth for crossing without risk of any sort [2].' The amount of information preserved among Lord Gough's MSS. proves that the Intelligence Department was far from idle while the two armies lay facing each other at Ramnuggur. Lord Gough learned from them that Sikh troops had been sent to guard the fords nearest to Ramnuggur. He was now in a position to decide on the method of attack.

It was, as we have said, impossible to force a passage at Ramnuggur; it was equally impossible to evacuate that position and leave open the way to Lahore. In these circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief had no option but to divide his force in

[1] November 20, 1848.

[2] Major Tucker to the Quartermaster-General, November 26, 1848.

the face of the enemy. The detached portion must march at least 10, and possibly 20, miles up the left bank before crossing, and 10 or 20 miles down the right bank before it could again be in touch with the main body. The force which Lord Gough selected for this purpose was entrusted to Sir Joseph Thackwell[1]. It consisted of White's Cavalry Brigade, along with H.M's 24th and 61st Foot, and five regiments of Native Infantry[2]. In the cavalry brigade, the 3rd and 12th Irregulars took the place of the 14th Light Dragoons. The artillery force comprised three troops of Horse Artillery, two Native Light Field Batteries, and two 18-pounders. The heavy guns came up on the 30th of November and, on the same day, Lord Gough gave his instructions to the officers concerned. 'I have no councils of war, but, having made up my mind, I clearly explain my views, and ask each if he understands them, giving each then a written statement[3].' Thackwell's force was instructed to assemble at midnight and march towards Wazirabad, crossing at Runniki if possible. Of the other fords, Ghurriki was known to be too well guarded, and Ali-Sher-ke-Chuk was considered too dangerous. But Thackwell was given discretionary powers,

[1] Sir Joseph Thackwell had been appointed to succeed Cureton, and Sir Colin Campbell had been given the command of Thackwell's Division.

[2] The 25th, 31st, 36th, 46th, 56th, and four companies of the 22nd.

[3] Lord Gough to his son, November 30, 1848.

both as regards crossing and in choosing a suitable opportunity of attacking the enemy. Lord Gough hoped to be able, by keeping up a spirited fire at Ramnuggur, to deceive the enemy into the belief that he intended to force a passage there. A joint attack by Thackwell and himself would result in an overwhelming victory. While Lord Gough entertained a hope that this scheme might be realized in its entirety, he did not take too sanguine a view of the prospects of its complete success, nor did he definitely count upon securing, by means of it, more than the crossing of the Chenab. 'I attack to-morrow,' he wrote on the 30th, 'if my flank will be successful; that is, if it can get across, everything will go well; if, on the contrary, they find the ford impracticable, they will have to go on to Wazirabad and force a passage. If my friends opposite me move in any numbers, one way or the other I shall punish them; but with a treacherous river in my front, I cannot prevent their running away. They have all the boats, and, by keeping eight or ten guns at the only ford here, and sending off the rest a couple of days' march ahead, they may say "Catch me who can." For a Sikh Army will march three miles for two any other army can march. However, if they fly, and fly they must, the moral effect will be good, and the numbers now moving to take service will be likely to return to their homes[1].'

At midnight on the 30th of November the cavalry brigade duly assembled, but owing to some accident

[1] Lord Gough to his son, November 30, 1848.

Sir Colin Campbell's infantry were two hours late in reaching the point from which the start was to be made. In consequence of this delay the force did not arrive at Runniki till eleven a.m., when they halted to discover if the ford was practicable. Sir Joseph Thackwell decided that it was not practicable, and this decision seems to have been made, not in view of the presence of bodies of the enemy on the other side, but because of the nature of the ford[1]. The resolution not to cross at Runniki, if adopted for this reason, was unquestionably an error on Thackwell's part. Not only had Lord Gough good reason for telling him that the ford was practicable (if not too closely guarded), but, on the following day, Brigadier Hearsey passed over it some irregular cavalry and found it passable both for cavalry and infantry; and later on Brigadier Markham crossed with the whole of his brigade. That the Chenab was fordable at Runniki, as Lord Gough's information led him to believe, is beyond question. The real explanation of the discrepancy is given in a private letter from Lord Gough. Thackwell never found the real ford. He did not employ the boatmen whom the Commander-in-Chief had provided to point out the precise locality; they had been sent on some other errand[2]. Campbell seems to have regarded the failure to cross at Runniki as involving the necessity of a return to camp; but Thackwell,

[1] Mr. E. J. Thackwell's *Narrative of the Second Seikh War*, pp. 74–7.

[2] Lord Gough to his son, March 18, 1849.

who had been instructed to proceed to Wazirabad if he could not cross sooner, resolved to advance thither. When this resolution was adopted, John Nicholson, who was with Thackwell, pushed on to Wazirabad, where he had placed a body of Pathans to guard the ford. Nicholson's energy in collecting boats received a deserved tribute in Lord Gough's despatch. Thackwell's force crossed on the evening of the 1st and the morning of the 2nd of December; the ford was so easy (cf. p. 193) that a detachment of native infantry marched over without a halt. The operation had been effected by noon on the 2nd, and Thackwell commenced his march down the right bank of the Chenab. He was in constant communication with Lord Gough, who, on hearing of the successful achievement of his purpose, sent him instructions. 'I shall make,' he said, 'as great a fuss as possible here to-day, by a cannonade, to keep their guns here, and . . . I hope to throw a body to cooperate with your left. Do not hurry your men; bring them and your guns well up in hand, and we are sure of success.' Meanwhile, Lord Gough's cannonade was deceiving Shere Singh into the impression that he desired to force a crossing. But as the progress of Thackwell's troops along the right bank drove back the Sikh outposts from the fords, the enemy realized what was actually taking place, and resolved to meet Thackwell. Leaving a portion of his force opposite Ramnuggur, he marched up to a position near Sadulapore. By this time Thackwell's forces had reached the ford

of Ghurriki, which was no longer guarded by the Sikhs. Lord Gough had taken advantage of the feasibility of this ford to direct the 9th Lancers and the 14th Light Dragoons, along with Godby's brigade of infantry, to cross the Chenab and act as the promised reinforcement to Thackwell. In announcing this, he told Thackwell not to seek a collision with the enemy until these additional troops had arrived[1]. Thackwell interpreted this as a limitation upon the discretionary powers which had been given him, and as an injunction to protect the ford at Ghurriki. He remained, accordingly, in a position to cover the crossing, and allowed Shere Singh to occupy three villages, which provided him with a somewhat formidable position. About two o'clock in the afternoon of the 3rd of December Shere Singh opened a cannonade on the British. Thackwell drew back his forces so as to prevent a plantation of sugar-canes from serving as cover for the enemy; this movement encouraged them to advance, but, never strong in attack, they would not come to close quarters. The usual artillery duel

[1] Some newspaper correspondence took place on this subject in 1897, and it may be as well to quote the precise words of the message (from an article on 'The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars' contributed to the *Gloucestershire Chronicle* of May 8, 1897). 'Message to Sir Joseph Thackwell. When General Thackwell has taken possession of Ghurri ka Patten, Lord Gough desires that he will not move his force on to the attack till reinforced from Ramnuggur by a brigade of infantry and cavalry, which are prepared to move at a moment's notice. By order. (Signed) J. B. Tremenhere.'

followed, and (Shere Singh's heavy guns being still opposite Ramnuggur) the British ordnance proved superior. Thackwell understood Lord Gough's prohibition against 'moving his force on to the attack' as applying to the new circumstances created by the Sikhs taking the initiative, and he contented himself with repulsing the enemy. About three o'clock in the afternoon came a fresh message from the Commander-in-Chief. Divining that Thackwell might misunderstand the earlier message, he sent Lieutenant Tytler, of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, to say that Sir Joseph Thackwell was to act on his own judgement and to regard the previous letter merely as an announcement that support had been sent[1]. Thackwell still hesitated. His men had been moving for a considerable time; he was ignorant of the strength of the enemy; the warning recollection of Ferozeshah can scarcely have failed to occur to him, and the thought of the waning light of that other December afternoon probably determined his decision. He refused to attack[2], and, when the enemy began to retire, he made no effort to pursue. Historians are generally agreed in regarding it as

[1] Now General Sir J. B. Fraser-Tytler.

[2] Sir Colin Campbell stated in his *Diary* that he twice asked Thackwell's leave to attack (Shadwell's *Life of Lord Clyde*, vol. i. p. 194). Sir Joseph Thackwell denied this assertion both in a letter to Sir William Napier (printed in Napier's *Life of Sir Charles Napier*, appendix to second edition), and in another letter which was published in 1895 by Major-General W. Thackwell. It is impossible at this date to clear up the misunderstanding.

an error[1], but it was an error in defence of which something might be said.

The cannonade at Ramnuggur continued during the 2nd of December. The Sikh guns were so cleverly covered that only their muzzles were visible, and the breadth of the river made it impossible to hit so small a mark, although nine 24-pounders were brought close to the brink. Leaving six guns thus skilfully concealed, the Sikhs were able to keep Lord Gough's artillery fully employed while they removed the remainder of their own. Under cover of darkness, about ten o'clock on the night of the 3rd, they abandoned their camp and retreated towards the Jhelum, leaving empty batteries to receive the fire of the British guns. At dawn, the Commander-in-Chief was at the ford, and he immediately ordered the cavalry to pursue; but it was too late. The opportunity which had been missed was not again to recur. This was an eventuality which, from the first, Lord Gough had regarded as probable, and his intention was simply to effect the difficult and complicated operation of crossing the Chenab; if opportunities occurred of punishing the enemy, they would be welcome, but they formed no part of his main design. That design had been effected without any delay, and with but small loss of life. The casualties at

[1] Lord Gough himself regarded it as a grave error, although, in his Dispatch, he shielded Thackwell. In a private letter, he writes:—'I placed the ball at Thackwell's feet, and he would not kick it.'

Sadulapore did not exceed seventy—twenty killed and fifty wounded. There was good cause for congratulation. We have seen the reasons which appealed to Lord Gough when he decided to cross the Chenab. The necessity of dividing his forces, to accomplish this movement, caused him grave anxiety, and its successful accomplishment brought a corresponding relief. Although the enemy's flank had not been turned as Lord Gough desired, they had been driven in disorder, and with considerable loss, from a strong position on the cultivated bank of the Chenab to the barren country of the Jhelum. Two guns had been thrown into the river and six had been elsewhere concealed [1]. About sixty boats had been abandoned and a large quantity of ammunition exploded. The Sikh artillery had been worsted in the combat at Sadulapore, and artillery was the arm in which they placed most confidence. The much-abused dispatch [2] in which Lord Gough narrated these events was written on the 5th of December. The results of the flight of Shere Singh were not fully known, and it is possible that the

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, December 12, 1848.

[2] Colonel Malleson asks his readers to compare the facts regarding the fords 'with Lord Gough's bulletin of the 5th of December.' The insinuation conveyed in the word 'bulletin,' and expressed more obviously in several other passages, would be unnecessarily offensive even if Colonel Malleson were right. But the documentary evidence from which we have quoted (pp. 192–3) proves that the facts are in consonance with the statements made by the Commander-in-Chief and not with the inferences made by Colonel Malleson.

Commander-in-Chief took a somewhat optimistic view of its moral effects. But in estimating the effects of that flight it must be recollected that the Governor-General decided to place restrictions upon Lord Gough's movements, and forbade his pursuit of Shere Singh. This prohibition, if it was to be regarded as definitely controlling his movements, deprived him of two of the main results of the successful passage across the Chenab—the opportunity of defeating Shere Singh before his junction with his father, and the chance of intercepting his possible retreat upon Peshawur—and it meant that a considerable time must elapse before a general action could be fought. Two of Shere Singh's regiments had made overtures with a view of joining the British, but his rapid retreat on the night of the 2nd of December prevented their desertion; this circumstance led the British to attribute to the Sikhs more disorganization than was actually the case, or, at all events, than proved to be the case after they had been left unmolested for some weeks. The importance of the success has been denied by some recent historians; a juster view was taken by Sir Henry Havelock. 'The British career in India,' he wrote (*Memoirs of Sir Henry Havelock*, Chap. IV), 'has been attended with such great and wonderful successes, as entirely to vitiate the judgment of the European community. Nothing but a grand victory, whenever there is collision with the enemy, will satisfy a public mind so marvellously spoilt by good fortune. Howbeit, war is not a

romance but always a matter of nice calculation, of fluctuating chances; a picture not seldom crowded with vicissitudes, and oftentimes a season of patient waiting for small advantages. So the passage of the Chenab to the politicians of India was a great disappointment. But it may be predicted that the deliberate judgment of those who have meditated much on military operations will be widely different from this crude condemnation.'

While Lord Gough was engaged in making his combinations for the passage of the Chenab, he became aware that, if Shere Singh did not await his attack, an immediate pursuit, with his whole force, would be impracticable, owing to the want of provisions. The Commissariat Department had done its best, but, utterly unprepared as it was (in spite of Lord Gough's representations[1]) when the war broke out, it failed to keep pace with the speed of the Commander-in-Chief's movement to the Chenab. Once more he

[1] We have now reached the period at which a temporary estrangement occurred between Lord Gough and Lord Dalhousie (cf. Mr. Bosworth Smith's *Life of Lord Lawrence*). The first indication of ill-feeling occurs in a letter from Lord Dalhousie remonstrating with Lord Gough for having inserted in an official Dispatch a reference to his unheeded protests against the refusal of the Government to sanction preparations, especially with regard to the commissariat. Lord Gough, in his reply, reminded the Governor-General that for the Commander-in-Chief to neglect making such communications to the Government 'would have been most wanton neglect, whilst, on the part of the Government, from financial considerations, it became almost an act of duty' to decline to comply with them.

had bitterly to regret the refusal of the Governor-General to attend to the requests he had pressed upon him in the summer. Lord Dalhousie was also conscious of the commissariat difficulty, and he laid great stress upon it in forbidding Lord Gough to pursue Shere Singh. But on the 27th of November he went further than this. 'I have to convey to you my request that on no consideration shall Your Excellency advance into the Doab beyond the Chenab, except for the purpose of attacking Shere Singh in his present position, without further communication with me, and my consent obtained. The arrival of reinforcements at Multan, and the surrender of that fortress, will shortly place such an additional force at your disposal as will admit of the army advancing without exposing our present position to the imminent risk in which it would otherwise be placed[1].' The Governor-General had left Calcutta early in October, and was now at Umballa, on his way to the frontier, in order to facilitate speedy communication between the civil and the military authorities. Lord Gough had hoped to be able to pursue as soon as sufficient provisions had been collected or sent from Lahore (as he had urgently demanded). He was now, unless he exceeded his instructions, forbidden to advance until Multan had fallen[2]; the Bombay

[1] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, November 27, 1848.

[2] The actual instructions are that he was not to advance, 'except for the purpose of attacking Shere Singh in his present position,' without the permission of the Governor-General, who

authorities had been guilty of criminal negligence in delaying the Multan column, and the Governor-General's letter was equivalent to forbidding him to anticipate the junction of Shere Singh and his father. Still more definite instructions followed the Governor-General's receipt of Lord Gough's dispatch on the crossing of the Chenab. Lord Dalhousie thoroughly approved of the movement, and rejoiced in its success, but added: 'I cannot, as at present advised, consent to your advancing from the line of the position I mentioned, in order to attack them, until the fall of Mooltan. The cursed delay which has been permitted renders it uncertain when this event may come to pass [1].'

After the flight of Shere Singh, during the night of the 3rd of December, Lord Gough had not failed to attempt a pursuit. Thackwell's force moved in different directions upon the two main lines of the enemy's retreat, but so difficult was the country, and so hostile the population that they could see or hear nothing except that both guns and men were far ahead and could cross the Jhelum before they could overtake them. This information was probably incorrect, but the ground would, in any case, have made pursuit impossible. The 9th Lancers did actually get into touch with a portion of their

was at Ferozepore. This practically amounted to an absolute prohibition; the opportunities of warfare do not wait for the sanction of Governments.

[1] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, December 8, 1848. On the subject of this delay, cf. infra, pp. 248–9.

rearguard, but the jungle was so dense that neither the Lancers nor the Horse Artillery could act, and Major Grant, who was in command of the detachment, returned to camp[1]. On the 5th of December, Lord Gough proceeded in person to a flying camp at Heylah, ten miles from the right bank of the Chenab, to consider the situation. He determined to concentrate his force at Wazirabad, holding Gujerat as an advanced post, until the fall of Multan. 'If the Sikhs, joined by the Peshawur force, move to get between me and Lahore, it is just what I want; if they come to attack me it will be equally convenient[2].' On the 7th of December came the news that Shere Singh, reinforced by four regiments and twelve guns from Peshawur, had taken up his position at Moong, close to the Jhelum and near to the classic ground where, more than two thousand years before, Alexander the Great had defeated Porus[3]. He entrenched himself there, not without taking the precaution of collecting boats and securing fords in the event of a flight into the Sind Sagur Doab[4]. The advantages of the proposed British position, with the base at Wazirabad and the advance at Gujerat, were that Lord Gough held the richest portions of the two Doabs, could intercept any attempt on Lahore or any communication with Gholab Singh in Kashmir, could keep in touch

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, December 6, 1848.
[2] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, December 7, 1848.
[3] The Jhelum is the Hydaspes of the Greek historians.
[4] Lord Gough to Sir F. Currie, December 8, 1848.

with Wheeler, whose position in the Jullundur Doab caused some anxiety, and could maintain a restraining influence upon the restless Sikh population near Sialkote. Lord Dalhousie approved of Lord Gough's intention to take up a position stretching from Wazirabad to Gujerat. He suggested that the interval which must elapse before the arrival of reinforcements from Multan should be occupied in reducing the Sikh forts and strongholds scattered throughout the Rechna Doab. This involved the question of detached forces and of petty operations, against which Lord Gough had all along protested; and he did not see his way, even at the Governor-General's request, to abandon his principle of 'No small wars.' On the contrary, he determined that, if necessary, he would exceed the orders given him by Lord Dalhousie. He informed the Governor-General that he could not regard these orders as restricting him from 'promptly acting at a moment when prompt measures might be beneficial and might bring to a termination a rebellion that time might strengthen[1].' Accordingly, while giving all due consideration to Lord Dalhousie's strongly expressed opinion, he kept (and informed the Governor-General that he would keep) his force in hand and together, ready to take advantage of any opportunity that the Sikhs might give; he trusted that the Governor-General was willing to allow something for the prudence and judgement of the Commander-in-Chief; and, at the worst, his

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, December 22, 1848.

duty to his country came first. But the Sikhs had given no opportunity.

Could I on the 8th [December] have attacked the rebel force, I would either have taken all their guns or drove them across the river. This latter I by no means wished. I felt I was too far from any support, and my communications much too extended, and my supplies too uncertain to justify a very forward movement, whilst a retrograde one even after the flight of the enemy (except in the event of his guns being captured) was much to be deprecated. But on the 10th, when I found he had taken up a position, having been joined by the 1st Division of the Peshawur Troops, with 12 guns, I had made up my mind that it was most desirable to attack the position at Moong, before he entrenched himself, and previous to his being joined by the 2nd Division of the Peshawur forces; if the reconnaissance which I directed upon all the approaches to his positions proved satisfactory. Those turning out much less so (from the denseness of the jungle) than I had anticipated, and also finding that a great portion of the 2nd Division had either joined or was upon the other bank of the Jhelum on the morning of the 11th, I addressed a letter . . . intimating what I would have taken upon myself to do, had the occasion called for my taking such a responsibility upon myself[1].

It is thus clear that, while the Governor-General may have restrained the Commander-in-Chief from attempting to follow up the passage of the Chenab, as he had intended to do, the latter was himself of opinion that no great chance had been lost, and Lord Dalhousie must, to this extent, be acquitted of

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, December 22, 1848.

the serious interference with military operations of which he has frequently been accused.

The effect of the reconnaissance of all the approaches to the enemy's position at Moong was to lead Lord Gough to abandon his intention of concentrating at Wazirabad with an advance on Gujerat. He left a force at Ramnuggur to protect the wounded and to complete the bridge; and on the 29th of December moved his camp to Janukee, a position to the left of that which he had intended to take up; his reason being that Shere Singh (who had been threatening Dinghi) might attack his base of operations by crossing at a ford some miles below Ramnuggur. On this, the Sikhs moved a part of their force from Moong to Tupai, near Russool, where they were constructing a bridge over the Jhelum. On the 9th of January Lord Gough advanced to Loah Tibba, three miles nearer Dinghi (from which the Sikhs had retired). The movement was mainly for the purpose of obtaining forage for the innumerable cattle attached to the army[1]; had he not feared the retreat of the Sikhs across the Jhelum, the Commander-in-Chief would have gone on to Dinghi, to be within striking distance. On the day on which this movement was made Lord Gough received an important communication from the Governor-General. Lord Dalhousie announced the successful assault upon the city of Multan and expressed his hope of hearing any hour of the fall of the fort. 'It would give me no less

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, January 9, 1849.

pleasure to announce a similar blow struck by you on the Jhelum. I am in ignorance as to the details of the position taken up by the Sikhs, and as to your own views of the means at your disposal for assaulting it, as well as of your plans . . . I shall be heartily glad to hear of your having felt yourself in a condition to attack Shere Singh with success[1].' This permission to attack before the arrival of the Multan forces was an admission of the wisdom of the policy which Lord Gough had pursued in spite of the suggestions of the Governor-General, when he declined to send men to reduce petty fortresses, and kept his army ready for an action. Lord Dalhousie's letter was more than a permission, and Lord Gough, feeling himself strong enough to attack Shere Singh, determined to do so without delay. Attok had fallen in the beginning of January, and Chutter Singh was marching to add his resources to the 27,000 men, and 60 guns, already at the disposal of his son. One day's delay might be fatal. On the 9th of January, Lord Gough wrote in his diary: 'Heard from the G.-G. that he would be glad if I gained a victory.' So advanced were his preparations that on the 11th he was ready to march to Dinghi.

[1] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, January 7, 1849.

XI

CHILLIANWALLA

No misunderstanding of Lord Gough's policy has been more persistent than the statement of his original plan for the battle of Chillianwalla. Sir Henry Durand, in his article in the *Calcutta Review* (which has generally been taken as the main authority), states that the 'left of the Sikhs rested on the heights of Russúl, whilst the line, passing by Futteh Shah ke Chuck, was said to have its right resting on Múng. It was known that the belt of jungle was thick along the front of this position; but a frequented road from Dingí led straight upon Russúl, and the country was ascertained to be more open and free from jungle along the line of road; and as the enemy's line must be very extended and weak to cover the ground from Russúl to Múng, and the great mass of the troops must necessarily be in the plain, it was clear that to march in the direction of Russúl, to force the enemy's left, and to double up his line, and thrust it back in the direction of Futteh Shah ke Chuck and Múng' would be the most feasible plan of attack[1]. There

[1] Colonel Malleson (*Decisive Battles of India*, p. 440) says that Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Durand was summoned to attend a deliberative council of war; that he proposed the attack upon Russool, and that Lord Gough accepted this

was certainly a general impression that this represented Lord Gough's intentions; the battle was fought quite differently; and to the supposed abandonment of the plan of attacking at Russool have been attributed the misfortunes of the day at Chillianwalla. The enemy occupied, at Russool, a strongly entrenched position 'at the southern extremity of a low range of hills [lying east and west], intersected by ravines,' and it is difficult to understand its suitability as a point of attack. Mr. Thackwell says that 'the village of Russúl was in the middle of the Khalsa camp, separated from the front chain of Seikh batteries by one ravine of extraordinary depth of several hundred feet. Had our army directed its attacks against this naturally formidable intrenchment, the enemy, in the event of their being driven from their front batteries, would have retreated across this ravine and destroyed the bridge[1].' Sir Colin Campbell, who examined the position at Russool after its evacuation by the Sikhs,

scheme (which Durand forthwith described in the *Calcutta Review* as one which 'would have done credit to a Frederic'). For this statement Colonel Malleson assigns no authority whatsoever, nor does he allude to the fact that the official biography of Sir Henry Durand, by his son (published in 1883), makes no reference to Sir Henry's having devised the scheme, or to any formal council which he attended. The statements made in the *Life of Sir Henry Durand* are, in fact, scarcely reconcilable with Colonel Malleson's assertion. It will be shown in the text that the whole conception of an intended attack on Russool is erroneous.

[1] *Narrative of the First Seikh War*, p. 122. Thackwell's description is confirmed by the account given by Lawrence-

wrote thus in his Diary (14th Feb. 1849): 'Rode this morning to Russúl to look at the position and the works which the enemy had abandoned. I never saw a stronger position, nor did I ever see one so well improved by works so admirably arranged, and so well adapted for the purposes of defence. It was indeed most fortunate that we had not to storm this place, for most probably we should have failed, and even had we been successful our loss must have been frightful.' (*Life*, vol. i. p. 216.) If these descriptions are in any way accurate, it is impossible to conceive how an attempt to roll up the Sikhs, from their left flank, would have had any chance of success. It is true that their line of regulars was stationed below these heights, but if Lord Gough had directed his attack on this point, an enemy so skilled in entrenchments as the Sikhs could not have failed to make use of the advantages which nature and their own ingenuity had combined to offer them. But apart from this, Lord Gough's correspondence, and his Diary, show clearly that this interpretation of his intentions is entirely erroneous.

His general scheme is stated most fully in a letter to the Governor-General, dated January 11. 'Shere

Archer, who says: 'This range of hills presents a sloping aspect to the plains; but, as was afterwards discovered, on the side towards the Jhelum, it forms innumerable ravines and fissures, and is abruptly terminated by precipitous bluffs along the sandy flats and channels of the river. The spurs of these hills were crowned by extensive earth-works.' *Commentaries on the Punjab Campaign*, p. 39.

Singh with his principal force is at the village of Kotlia [Kot Baloch] one mile and a half in front of Mong. The Bunnoo troops are at Luckneewalla, and the Peshawur Force at Futteh Shah ke Chuck, whilst the great body of the Irregulars are at Mong and reaching up the river Jhelum to Russool, near which the boats are collected. I move to-morrow to a position a mile and a half in front of Dinghée, and with God's blessing, I propose to attack the enemy on the following day, with a hope I shall be enabled to give your Lordship a favourable report of the result. It is my intention to penetrate the centre of their line, cutting off the regular from the irregular portion of their army. The only fear I have is that the former, when routed, will throw themselves into the jungle close to which they are stationed, but I hope they will fight for their salt, and if so, and I can get close to them, it will be hard if I cannot take their guns, 22 in number. Kotlia and Mong I shall easily dispose of, with about 30 more guns. In all, they have 62 guns and about 40,000 men. I shall, I hope, take into action 60 guns and from 11,000 to 12,000 men.' These sentences explain two errors in Durand's account of the situation. He remarks that the Sikh line was 'said to have its right resting on Múng.' The note of uncertainty in these words was quite unnecessary. It was definitely known that the Sikh right was at Moong. But Durand had reached the British camp only a fortnight before the battle[1],

[1] *Life of Sir H. N. Durand*, vol. i. p. 112.

and he had failed to grasp the real situation. He was uncertain about the Sikh right and he did not appreciate the real nature of the heights on the Sikh left. In point of fact there were two Sikh lines, the one (composed of regulars) extending from Lucknawalla, by Futteh Shah ke Chuck, to Kotlia, or, as it is often called, Kot Baloch; the other (made up of irregulars) holding the line of the Jhelum from Moong to the entrenched position at Russool. Lord Gough had in his possession reports from the intelligence department (many of which have been preserved) showing how the Sikhs were posted at these various stations, and the nature of the ground in front of them. His scheme was to attack the centre, break through their entrenched line and separate the regular from the irregular troops. The latter might make their way across the Jhelum, but the former would thus have their left flank turned and would be 'rolled up' upon the jungle on their right.

The Commander-in-Chief formed his resolution on the 11th of January. On the following day (Friday) he marched to Dinghi, and that evening, in accordance with his usual custom, he summoned a meeting of generals commanding divisions and brigades, and gave them his instructions for the morning. 'Made arrangements,' he wrote in his diary, 'for attacking the enemy at Rasool, Lullianwalla, Futteh Shah ke Chuck, Luckneewalla, and Mong, to-morrow—except I find it more convenient to halt at Chillianwalla.' On the morning of Saturday, January 13, the army commenced its

march with all the regular military precautions[1]. The fact that Lord Gough did not move directly on Chillianwalla, but proceeded for some distance along the road to Russool, has lent plausibility to the error we have just mentioned; but he explained in his dispatch that he did so to avoid the jungle and to obtain the advantage of a frequented road. 'I made a considerable detour to my right, partly in order to distract the enemy's attention, but principally to get as clear as I could of the jungle.' At the point where an advance upon Chillianwalla necessitated his turning off the road to Russool[2], Lord Gough halted, in order to reconnoitre. His intelligence department had reported, some days previously, the existence of a Sikh outpost upon a mound overlooking the

[1] Each column was protected by its own advance guard, and the cavalry, which was on the flanks, sent out patrols and officers with reconnoitring parties.

[2] Sir Henry Durand, in the *Calcutta Review*, states explicitly that Lord Gough's intention was 'to march in the direction of Russúl to force the enemy's left'; and that, while on the march, he altered his intention and turned off towards Chillianwalla. That this was not so we have shown (a) by Lord Gough's letter written to Lord Dalhousie on the 11th, (b) by the quotation from his *Diary* of the 12th ('except I find it convenient to halt at Chillianwalla'), and (c) by the statement in his dispatch, 'I made a considerable detour to my right.' The source of Durand's error cannot now be ascertained, but it must be remembered that an officer holding the rank of major, and unconnected with the staff, had no special means of knowing either the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief or the nature of the positions at Russool and Moong.

village of Chillianwalla. Lord Gough decided to drive off this outpost so as to have an opportunity of a more accurate reconnaissance than had previously been practicable, owing to the danger of sending out small parties of officers into the jungle; he had also found that the jungle rendered it quite impossible to employ cavalry for this purpose. When the outpost had been dislodged by the heavy guns, the whole army advanced to the village of Chillianwalla. It was now midday, and Lord Gough, standing on the top of a house in the village, had to make up his mind whether to attack or to bivouac for the night. The jungle in front of the Sikh forces was thick enough to prevent his discovering precisely the strength of the enemy's position; but its density has been frequently exaggerated, and he describes it as, in many parts, sufficiently open for all arms and as being nowhere so dense as that in which he had himself fought at Talavera and elsewhere in the Peninsula[1].' To turn the flank was, as usual, impossible, for the left rested upon the heights of Russool, and the right upon the jungle, which extended almost to Heylah. The temptation to attack lay in the fact that the Sikhs had evidently come beyond their entrenchments along the line of villages from Lucknawalla to Kot Baloch; but, on the other hand, the jungle, and the Sikh cleverness in securing cover, prevented

[1] Lord Gough to his son, May 11, 1849. Lawrence-Archer (p. 39) mentions that the wildest character of the jungle ceases at the village of Chillianwalla.

the British commander from discerning their exact locality. In these circumstances, Lord Gough resolved to encamp, and gave instructions to the Quartermaster-General to lay out the ground, and to the engineer officers to make an examination of the Sikh position. Preparations were being made for carrying these orders into effect, when Lord Gough's attention was called to the fact that the enemy had advanced some horse artillery, and had opened fire upon his outposts. To silence these, he ordered the heavy guns to proceed in front of the village of Chillianwalla, and to reply to the Sikh fire. His artillery was answered by a response from the whole Sikh line, the position of which was thus revealed—'their whole line evidently thrown out much in front of their different positions[1].' This fact altered the whole complexion of affairs. The Sikhs, in the first place, had completely abandoned their entrenched position; if the attack were delayed till next day, they would have time to throw up entrenchments. In the second place, they would be able to open a cannonade at any time in the night. Retreat was impossible and to encamp was unsafe. In these circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief resolved upon an immediate attack[2].

[1] Lord Gough's diary, January 13, 1849.

[2] It may be useful here to advert to two misstatements about the battle. That Shere Singh had 'despatched to the front a few light guns and opened fire on the British position' in order to draw Lord Gough into an action (as stated by

The army was still in the order in which it had marched[1] prepared either to fight or to reconnoitre

Colonel Malleson), is a rumour totally devoid of foundation. Not only did Lord Gough expressly state that he saw the whole of the Sikh line advanced, but his statement is confirmed both by the recollection and by the diary of Sir Frederick Haines, as well as by other sources. It may be of some interest to quote, for example, the account given by Lieut.-Col. A. J. Macpherson in his *Rambling Reminiscences of the Punjab Campaign* (pp. 30–1): 'Urged by the restless inquisitiveness of youth, I, with two brother subalterns, Lutman and Williams, climbed up a tree to get a clear view over the low jungle. . . . After peering closely around, rubbing our eyes to see more clearly, "Hallo," cried Lutman, "What's that yonder?" Sure enough, there was something flitting to and fro, appearing and disappearing on the outskirts of the screen of jungle, which turned out to be the white turbans of the Sikhs, whom we could now distinctly see. They were bringing up their guns to enfilade the beaten tracks they knew we must traverse, should we attack. "By jove, the place is alive," replied Williams.' The similar myth that Lord Gough's 'Irish blood' was raised by a few shots falling near him is equally groundless. The shots fell on the British outposts; the Commander-in-Chief was on the top of a house in the rear far beyond the range of the enemy. It is an interesting coincidence that Colonel Macpherson mentions a Sikh rumour of precisely the same nature as this 'Irish blood' story. 'It was subsequently discovered,' he says, 'that the intention of the Sikh General was to attack when the European soldiers were engaged in pitching tents, with arms and accoutrements laid aside, but the Sikh commander of artillery could not resist the tempting opportunity of a shot at our skirmishers, still out, which precipitated the engagement.' We have not met this story elsewhere, and we give it only for the interest of the parallel.

[1] It may be convenient to repeat here, *mutatis mutandis*, the information given on p. 180 regarding the composition of

—Gilbert's Division on the right and Campbell's on the left, and the heavy guns in the centre. While the heavy guns were being directed against the Sikhs, Lord Gough formed his army for the action. The flanks were protected by the two cavalry brigades (White's on the left and Pope's on the

the Army. Thackwell, it will be remembered, had succeeded Cureton, and Campbell had been given Thackwell's Division.

Cavalry Division, under Sir Joseph Thackwell:

1*st Brigade*—3rd (and 14th) Light Dragoons, and 5th and 8th Native Light Cavalry under Brigadier White.

2*nd Brigade*—9th Lancers, and 1st and 6th Native Light Cavalry under Brigadier Pope. The 14th Light Dragoons were attached to this brigade at Chillianwalla.

Infantry: Gilbert's Division:

1*st Brigade* (Mountain's)—H.M.'s 29th Foot, and the 30th and 56th Regiments Native Infantry.

2*nd Brigade* (Godby's)—2nd European Light Infantry, 31st and 70th Native Infantry.

Campbell's Division:

1*st Brigade* (Pennycuick's)—H.M.'s 24th Foot, and 25th and 45th Native Infantry.

2*nd Brigade* (Hoggan's)—H.M.'s 61st Foot, and 36th and 46th Native Infantry.

3*rd Brigade* (Penny's)—15th, 20th, and 69th Native Infantry.

Artillery, under Brigadier Tennant.

The six troops of Horse Artillery (Lane, Christie, Huish, Warner, Duncan, and Fordyce) were commanded by Brigadier Brooke, with Colonels Brind and C. Grant.

Foot Artillery under Brigadier Hathwaite:

Two heavy Batteries (Shakespeare and Ludlow) under Major Horsford.

Three Field Batteries (Walker, Robertson, Dawes; Kinleside being ill, and Austin wounded).

right) to prevent any danger from the overlapping of the Sikh line on both sides. The left of the infantry was formed by two brigades of Campbell's Division (Hoggan's and Pennycuick's—the former on the left of the latter). The right wing consisted of Gilbert's Division (Mountain's Brigade next to Pennycuick's, and Godby's on the right). The 3rd Brigade of Campbell's Division (three native regiments under Penny) was placed in reserve. The heavy guns, in the centre, covered the general advance. Attached to Campbell's Division were three troops of horse artillery, under Brind, and to Gilbert's the remaining three troops, under Grant. Walker's and Robertson's field batteries (under Major Mowatt) were assigned to Campbell, and Dawes' field battery to Gilbert.

When the army had formed into line, Lord Gough bade the men lie down, addressing a few words to corps as he passed them. 'I then advanced parallel to the position of the heavy Guns which I had ordered forward, to a spot where the jungle was more open. I there quietly watched the effect of our fire, occasionally sending orders for the light field batteries to advance and support this heavy battery. From this position, I saw the effect of our fire. I plainly saw that a great portion of the Enemy's guns were either disabled or withdrawn. I then ordered the advance after upwards of an hour's cannonade. A simultaneous order was issued to advance, but the right division, having more ground to go over, moved off first with its two Field

Batteries[1].' It was now between one and two o'clock[2].

The course of the battle is difficult and confused, and it is desirable, for the sake of clearness, to deal with each wing independently of the other. It will also be necessary to repeat information, already given, regarding the location of different brigades. The left, it will be remembered, was composed of Hoggan's and Pennycuick's Brigades, under the general direction of Sir Colin Campbell. The story of the advance of these two brigades must, unfortunately, be told separately, for the initial misfortune of the day was caused by Campbell's decision to make no attempt to perform his duties as a divisional general. 'The Right Brigade,' he says, in his report to Lord Gough, 'moved under the immediate command of Brigadier Pennycuick, and was accompanied by the Assist. Adj. General of the Division, while the left, or that of Brigadier Hoggan, advanced under my own personal direction.' The right brigade had much the more difficult ground to traverse, and the two brigades, Lord Gough told his son, 'never saw one another after the order to advance was given[3].' Nor was the advance of one brigade, unsupported by the other, the only disaster that followed Campbell's mistake. Brigadier Pennycuick, a gallant soldier, advanced so rapidly that Mowatt's Light Field Battery, which had been

[1] Lord Gough to his son, May 11, 1849.
[2] Report of Sir Colin Campbell.
[3] Lord Gough to his son, March 18, 1849.

ordered to cover his attack, found it impossible to keep pace with it[1]. Separated from the other brigade, and unsupported by artillery, Pennycuick passed on. As they advanced, the ground became interspersed with large trees, 'disordering and breaking the line, and in various places reducing the companies to sections in front, while the remaining portions became unavoidably crowded and confused to the rear[2].' The enemy's guns, hidden behind the jungle, now opened fire, and, as usual, the fire was concentrated upon the British regiment, H.M.'s 24th Foot, which was advancing between the 25th and the 45th Native Infantry. The result was a frightful mortality among the leaders. Brigadier Pennycuick fell dead[3], as did also his major of brigade, the two majors of the 24th, and several other officers. But the troops pushed through the jungle fiercely and persistently, scarcely conscious of the fall of their comrades. On they pressed, past trees, through bush, and over water, cheering convulsively as they went, feeling nothing but 'the devouring animal passion to slay—to shed blood[4].' At last they were rewarded by the sight of the

[1] Mowatt afterwards told Sir Patrick Grant that Pennycuick advanced so rapidly that his brigade was carried in front of the battery at the very commencement of the action.—*The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, p. 221.

[2] Campbell's Report.

[3] Pennycuick's son was killed on his father's body. He had seen him fall, and, rushing to his assistance, was shot through the heart.

[4] Macpherson's *Reminiscences*, p. 33.

enemy's guns, posted on a mound. Between them and this mound was what Brigadier Campbell describes as 'a swampy piece of ground,' which added to the confusion. Crossing this, they rushed on the batteries and the guns, and carried them. But the loss had been terrible, and the regiments had been much shaken. The contempt for the most elementary rules, which had marked the conduct of their attack, is illustrated, not only by the errors we have already noted, but by a remark of their divisional commander himself. 'The batteries were carried,' says Campbell, 'without a shot being fired by the Regiment or a musquet taken from the shoulder.' Lord Gough comments on this as 'an act of madness[1],' and adds that if proper precautions

[1] Colonel Malleson states that 'Lord Gough, wild with excitement, ordered his infantry to advance and charge the enemy's batteries,' and speaks of 'the reckless nature of the order given by the Commander-in-Chief—viz. to carry the guns in front at the point of the bayonet.' This is a complete misstatement. The orders were that the guns should be taken by the brigades, with musketry and bayonet, and covered and supported by the artillery. There has been a considerable controversy on the question of the responsibility for the advance of Pennycuick's Brigade. The biographer of Colin Campbell prints an interesting letter from Sir Patrick Grant, relieving Campbell of the charge of having made unsatisfactory arrangements for the artillery. But this leaves open the main question of the reckless advance of the brigade, and some light is thrown upon it by an interesting letter addressed to Colonel Mountain by Colonel Smith, who succeeded to the command of the 24th after Chillianwalla. 'The 24th advanced,' he says, 'with loaded firelocks, but the greatest pains were taken by Campbell (previous to going

had been taken, 'the 24th would not have been cut up, as they were, without firing a shot[1].' It was not possible to maintain a position thus gained. Behind the Sikh guns were, as usual, the Sikh infantry; they had not been actually seen before the guns were carried, but no soldier who had fought at Moodkee, at Ferozeshah, or at Sobraon can have had any hesitation regarding their presence. These infantry, from their superior height on the top of the mound, and from both flanks, now sent volley after volley upon the leaderless brigade which

into action) to inculcate upon them the merit of taking the Enemy's Guns, without firing a shot. He told me so himself, and blamed himself for it—and for a long time previous to Gujerat, I drilled the Regiment by his order, in firing by files while advancing. There seems to have been a confusion of Principles in this. To stop to fire after the Charge is commenced —supposing it is not begun till within reasonable distance, is, of course, a grievous and destructive error, but the 24th were told to march up, under a storm of fire, in front of the muzzles of Guns, for several hundred yards, without attempting to stagger or dismay the Enemy by making use of the Arms.' Readers of Colin Campbell's *Life* will read these sentences with surprise, for Campbell, as a regimental commander, had taught his men to advance firing in line, and he attached great importance to it. There seems, however, to be nothing in General Shadwell's *Life* which is inconsistent with Colonel Smith's most explicit statement. The copy of Smith's letter to Mountain, preserved in the Gough MSS., is in Lord Gough's own handwriting.

Several contemporary letters suggest that the success of a charge at Sobraon, made by the 10th Regiment, without firing, affords the explanation of the experiment so disastrously tried, under very different circumstances, at Chillianwalla.

[1] Lord Gough to his son, May 11, 1849.

had, alone and unaided, penetrated so far. As it became evident that the position must be abandoned, efforts were directed towards spiking the guns, and it was while engaged in this operation that the commander of the 24th (Colonel Brookes) was killed, and other officers fell with him. At last the brigade gave way. 'Under these circumstances, having their Lt.-Colonel and thirteen of their officers killed, and nine severely wounded . . . this gallant Regiment [the 24th] was at length compelled to relinquish the advantage it had gained with such valour, and at such a tremendous sacrifice of life, no less than 231 men having actually fallen, whilst 266 men were wounded, all within a few minutes[1].' Without the 24th Foot, the native regiments (which had also distinguished themselves in the attack and had suffered heavily) were unable to retain their ground, and the whole brigade fell back. There was, naturally, considerable disorder, but several parties of the native regiments were rallied by their officers and protected the retreating brigade from attacks of the Sikh cavalry, and, subsequently, took further part in the action.

Meanwhile we must trace the movements of the troops led by Colin Campbell in person, who, as a brigadier, did something to atone for the great error he had committed as a divisional commander. The left brigade was led with the brilliance which is naturally associated with his name, and which

[1] Campbell's Report.

raised him, ultimately, to the position of Commander-in-Chief in India. Here, also, there was a mistake regarding the artillery—a mistake which, curiously enough, was to some extent redeemed by the fatal error made by Pennycuick. Robertson's Field Battery had been given the task of protecting Hoggan's Brigade; when Hoggan's skirmishers began to advance, Robertson moved forward with them, but was at once restrained by a staff officer who, on his own responsibility, ordered him to move to the left and assist the horse artillery to silence some Sikh guns which were threatening our flank. He had no choice but to obey, for he could not know that the order was unauthorized. When this object had been effected, Robertson succeeded in rejoining Hoggan's Brigade (a movement requiring no small skill), but the advance would have suffered severely in the interval had it not received aid from another quarter. When Mowatt had in vain attempted to keep up with Pennycuick's Brigade (for his guns could move only very slowly among the trees) he emerged from the jungle and engaged in an independent contest with a body of Sikhs, to whose shot, shell, and musketry he replied with a heavy fire. He suffered little and the Sikhs withdrew. Mowatt now looked round for the brigade to which he had been attached, but could find no trace of it. On his left, however, he discovered Hoggan's Brigade, and, as we shall see, came to its aid at a critical moment. The initial movements of Hoggan's Brigade, which

Campbell himself accompanied, are thus described in his report:—

Although the jungle through which the Brigade passed was close and thick, causing frequent breaks to be made in the line, yet, by regulating the pace so as to make allowance for these obstructions, the Left Brigade, after an advance of half a mile, reached a comparatively open tract of country in a tolerably connected Line. On this open tract we found, formed in our front, a large body of Cavalry and regular Seik infantry, with four guns, which had played upon us during our advance. H.M.'s 61st Regiment charged this Cavalry, and put it to an immediate and disorderly flight, while the 36th Native Infantry on the right made an attack upon the Infantry, which, however, was not successful, and, in consequence, they (the Sikhs) came down upon the 36th Regt., obliging it to retreat in rear of H.M.'s 61st. The two right companies of the 61st were instantly made to change front to the right, and, while the remainder of the Regiment was ordered to form rapidly in the same direction, the two right companies charged the two guns, and captured them. The fire of those two companies upon the Enemy who were in pursuit of the 36th compelled them to desist and retreat.

It was at this juncture that Mowatt came upon the scene, and he forthwith opened fire upon the Sikh infantry. The brigade was now attacked from two sides at once. On the right, the Sikhs who had just been routed by the 61st, formed again, and advanced with reinforcements and supported by two fresh guns. The 61st again charged them, dispersed them, and captured their guns. Almost simultaneously, the 46th Native Infantry, on the

left, was attacked by the Sikh cavalry; it faced round and quickly drove them off. The position in front had now been carried; Campbell had driven back, with comparative ease, the Sikhs in his own front, and he at once proceeded to attack the troops which had just repulsed Pennycuick's Brigade with such loss. The whole brigade formed to the right, for the purpose of sweeping down the enemy's line and capturing their guns. This operation was rendered difficult, not merely by the customary devotion of the Sikh gunners, but by attacks on the flank and rear of the brigade, causing it, twice or thrice, to face about and drive them off. But, in spite of this, it carried everything before it, notwithstanding that the failure of Pennycuick's Brigade had deprived it of the support which, at this juncture, it should have received[1]. Thirteen guns had fallen to its onslaught ere it came into touch with Mountain's Brigade, which formed part of the right wing.

Before describing the course of events on the right, it remains to explain the part played on the left by the troops of horse artillery and the cavalry. The horse artillery (under Brind), at the beginning of the conflict, were ordered to silence a Sikh battery, and it will be remembered that, for this purpose, they received the assistance of Robert-

[1] The companies of Pennycuick's Brigade which succeeded in keeping together (cf. ante) after protecting their own retreat, advanced to the right with White's cavalry and joined Hoggan's Brigade.

son (whose battery ought to have been advancing along with Campbell). Robertson performed effective service in this part of the field, repulsing some Sikh cavalry and, by a well-designed movement, enfilading the guns opposed to the horse artillery. The combined efforts of Brind and Robertson silenced the Sikh fire, and the horse artillery, under orders from the Commander-in-Chief, proceeded to the left to guard the left flank from being turned. The cavalry (White's Brigade), although commanded by Thackwell in person, rendered less service, largely owing to the nature of the ground. After Brind had disabled the guns on the left, Thackwell ordered the 5th Light Cavalry and a squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons to charge a body of cavalry which threatened the left; the former regiment was repulsed, but the latter, under Captain Unett, cut through the Sikh line, re-formed, and made their way back to the British lines. Thackwell was now convinced that the ground was not suited for offensive movements of cavalry, and ordered the brigade to move to the right and support Campbell's infantry. Finally the brigade followed Campbell's movement down the Sikh lines and formed up in rear of Campbell and Mountain near the centre of the Sikh position.

The right wing, it will be remembered, was composed of Mountain's and Godby's Infantry Brigades (the latter on the right of the former); the flank protected by Pope's brigade of cavalry and three troops of horse artillery, under Colonel Grant.

Dawes' battery was stationed between Mountain and Godby. Major-General Gilbert, who was in charge of the infantry division, determined, unlike Sir Colin Campbell, to perform, in spite of the difficulties of the ground, his proper functions as a divisional commander. He kept both brigades, as far as possible, in line, and they advanced steadily on the enemy's position at Lullianee (a village between Kotlia and Tupai), 'under no ordinary difficulty and disadvantage of locality[1].' Dawes' Light Field Battery continued in touch throughout, and was able, when necessary, to cover the advance. In such difficult ground it was not possible to maintain perfect order, and during the movement through the jungle the 31st Native Infantry (on the left of Godby's Brigade) found themselves isolated, and were immediately ordered by a staff officer to attach themselves to Mountain's Brigade, which was on their left front. They did so, and remained with Mountain throughout the day. After they joined him, Mountain, who had taken the battery in his front, received orders from the Chief[2] to wheel to the left to reinforce Campbell's Brigade, which could now be seen advancing towards them through the smoke. Campbell attacked the Sikh right while Mountain acted upon their left. The enemy wavered and fled, and both brigades then wheeled outwards to their original front, and moved forward

[1] Gilbert's Report.

[2] Colonel Mountain's Memoirs, p. 262.

after the retiring Sikhs. It was at this point that White's Cavalry Brigade formed up in support.

The success of Godby's Brigade was not less decisive than that of Mountain's. In spite of the failure (cf. infra) of Pope's cavalry to guard the right, and of the necessity thereby imposed on Gilbert of protecting his flank during the advance, Godby's Brigade captured the battery on the Sikh left.

No sooner had the guns been taken by this brigade than it became evident to Gilbert that, in spite of his efforts, his flank had been turned, and the Sikhs were both on his flank and in the rear. Godby's Brigade was at once ordered to face about, and Dawes' battery moved to the right, while Gilbert himself asked the commanding officer of the 2nd Europeans[1] (Major Steele) to charge the Sikhs. With the 2nd Europeans in front, and covered by the fire of Dawes' battery, Godby's Brigade charged the Sikhs, and the hand-to-hand conflict which followed ended in a complete repulse of the enemy. Another brigade of British infantry took part in beating off this Sikh onslaught. When Lord Gough, who was in rear on the left of Gilbert's Division, heard of the repulse of Pennycuick's Brigade, he ordered the reserve, under Brigadier Penny, to advance to its assistance. Its failure to do so is best explained in Penny's own words: 'The jungle being very thick, and not knowing the position of the troops in front, I got in advance on the right of General Gilbert's

[1] Now the Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

Division' (i. e. crossed from the left centre to the right flank). Penny came up at the time when Godby had faced round, and the Sikhs on the right and rear 'rendered,' he says, 'my position difficult, until I was relieved by the able and timely assistance afforded by Captain Dawes of the Artillery, with the Guns of his Battery[1].' Dawes had now helped Gilbert and Penny in turn to repulse the Sikh attack, and the gallant conduct of the infantry on the right wing had redeemed the great error by which the right flank had been turned. All anxiety on this score was now over, for the right wing was joined by Campbell and by the cavalry of the left. The whole Sikh position had been taken, and the enemy driven off the field.

The disaster to the cavalry has yet to be related. Brigadier Pope had been entrusted with the support of the right wing; his brigade consisted of the 9th Lancers, the 14th Light Dragoons, and the 1st and 6th Regiments of Native Light Cavalry. Before the action began, Pope (for reasons afterwards to be explained) detached to the right a wing of each of his two native regiments and of the 9th Lancers. With the remainder of these regiments and the 14th Light Dragoons (nine squadrons in all) he rapidly advanced, and immediately masked the fire of the horse artillery, which was thus rendered powerless. One charge, in which Pope was wounded, met with some resistance. There was no one to give orders, and in some mysterious way

[1] Penny's Report.

the attack first slackened and then gradually passed into a retreat. 'We were watching,' wrote one of Lord Gough's staff, 'the Infantry attacks, when news came that the Ghoorchurras were on our right flank, and were overpowering our Cavalry and Horse Artillery (the three troops which had been rendered useless by Pope's advance). They had, in effect, come down, . . . turned and rode over the guns of the Troop (Christie's), upsetting some in their headlong course, and causing infinite confusion. The consequence was the Artillery were entirely paralysed, carried off the field in fact, and the Ghoorchurras captured the guns that had been upset. Some of these men continued their flight until they rode over our Field Hospital, and were rallied by our Chaplain. Eventually, two guns were opened, which sent the Ghoorchurras to the right about immediately[1].' Such unaccountable incidents are not infrequent in warfare. The only explanation current at the time was that the men were possessed with the idea that they were being led into a trap, as at Ramnuggur. It must, in fairness, be remembered that they were very badly led. Brigadier Pope was in bad health, and, in spite of great personal courage, was quite

[1] Sir Frederick Haines' diary. The chaplain was the Rev. W. Whiting. Others were rallied by the diarist himself, by the Adjutant-General, and by Colonel Gough, on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief. There is a tradition that the Commander-in-Chief expressed a desire to make Whiting a 'Brevet-Bishop' on the spot.

unfit for the responsible position to which his seniority entitled him. 'It would appear,' says Thackwell's report, 'that many faults were committed, such as having no reserve in the rear, to support and prevent the right flank being turned; secondly, that care had not been taken not to get before the Artillery on the left, the denseness of the jungle being no excuse for such a false step; and thirdly, that Commanding Officers, although they might have heard the word "Threes about," did not take upon themselves to charge any of the enemy's cavalry which were pressing upon the line. Could I have anticipated such an untoward circumstance I should have been on the spot to have given the benefit of my experience to an officer deemed fully competent to have the command of a Brigade of Cavalry, and I feel assured, from what I have heard of Brigadier Pope and the conduct of the cavalry of the right, that their retrograde movement originated more from mistake than a fear of encountering an insignificant enemy.' The distinguished reputation of the regiment adds weight to General Thackwell's plea, and there can be no doubt that Pope committed a serious mistake in ordering an advance in one line without support or reserve of any kind. To this error, and to the misfortune of Pope's wound, must be attributed the failure of the cavalry on the right[1].

[1] An officer who was in Christie's troop of horse artillery describes the retreat of the cavalry as, to some extent, deliberate, that is to say, it was not of the nature of a stampede.

The portion of the cavalry which was detached by Pope had been entrusted, along with eight horse artillery guns, to Lieut.-Colonel Lane, with instructions to watch some Sikh horse who had advanced in front of Russool and might have threatened our flank. Their progress was checked by a fire from Lane's guns, which they do not seem to have returned, and the only further service rendered by Lane consisted in his directing his fire upon a body of Sikhs flying from the positions captured by Mountain and Campbell. So little was he engaged that only one casualty appears in his report—a gunner slightly wounded. Lane was stationed on the right by Pope's orders, and without the cognizance of Lord Gough. After Pope's wound, no orders were sent to him. He had failed to keep in touch with the rest of the cavalry, and so made no attempt to retrieve the great disaster of the day, by preventing the turning of the British right.

Chillianwalla was an infantry battle, and it was due

Why they turned it is impossible to tell; but they rode slowly to the rear, pursued by the Sikh cavalry, who attacked them on the flank as they retired, and engaged some of them in single combat. The Sikhs, tall, black, with shining eyes and glistening teeth, and dressed in red coats, waving their tulwars in the air and chanting wild refrains, looked more like devils than men. It would have been impossible to rally the cavalry; some officers tried several times to do so, but were forced to desist. The officer to whom we owe this description, and who subsequently attained high rank, was instructed to recover the guns of Christie's troop, which had been abandoned. He succeeded, with much difficulty, in bringing two guns back to camp.

to the three Infantry Brigades of Hoggan, Mountain, and Godby that, when darkness fell, the British were in possession of the whole of the Sikh line, and the enemy had been driven back upon Tupai and the Jhelum. They were able to carry off the four British guns belonging to Christie and Huish, which were taken after the retreat of Pope's Brigade; but thirteen of their own guns had been actually captured, and many more had been spiked and were left useless on the field[1]. It was now that there occurred the only mistake the responsibility for which may be reasonably assigned to the Commander-in-Chief. When, after the action, he began to form the line on the position held by the Sikhs at midday, he found that Gilbert's Division had retired. There was no water on the field, and he was urged by his leading officers, and especially by Sir Colin Campbell, to retire to the village of Chillianwalla, whither he had ordered the baggage to be brought up. The first thing to be thought of was the condition of the wounded[2], and after they had been conveyed from the field the Commander-in-Chief decided to yield to the representa-

[1] Campbell explains that his brigade had no means of carrying off the captured guns, nor could he leave a detachment to protect them, 'so they were, with the exception of the three last taken, unavoidably left upon the field.'

[2] 'I'll be damned if I move till my wounded are all safe,' was the answer of the Chief to a request for leave to go back (*Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, p. 240). Lord Gough mentions in a private letter that only one wounded soldier was left on the field (in spite of the darkness), and he was brought in next morning.

tions made to him and to withdraw his forces. It was an error of judgement, for, under cover of night, the Sikhs sent a small party to the deserted battlefield and carried off the greater portion of the guns which had fallen to the bayonets of Campbell's and Gilbert's Divisions. The captured ammunition had been destroyed before the British retired. It was much to be regretted that the darkness prevented a pursuit, which would have turned the defeat into a complete rout; and still more that the moral effect of the repulse of the enemy was weakened by allowing them the opportunity of re-taking all but thirteen of their own guns. Lord Gough afterwards expressed his regret that he had allowed his own opinion to be overruled.

The loss at Chillianwalla amounted to 2,338 in killed and wounded. Of these, 22 British officers, and 16 native officers were killed, and 659 men were either dead or missing. The wounded included 67 British officers, 27 native officers, and 1,547 rank and file. The total force numbered just over 13,000 men. The proportion of casualties was, therefore, about seventeen per cent. of the whole force engaged; the proportion of killed, about five per cent. A considerable number of the wounded were only slightly injured; of 624 wounded Europeans, no fewer than 156 had returned to active duty by January 27, and out of the total wounded (European and native) only 72 were permanently disabled[1].

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, January 27 and February 14, 1849.

The Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General were alike prepared for a severe loss in a conflict with an enemy of this nature, but the total was larger than could be regarded as necessary or unavoidable. This was, in great measure, owing to the disaster to Pennycuick's Brigade, when no fewer than 520 officers and men were, in the course of a few minutes, rendered *hors de combat.* Of the 22 British officers who were killed, thirteen belonged to this brave but reckless brigade. The failure of the cavalry to protect the right flank added largely to the casualties in Gilbert's Division, and especially in Godby's Brigade. The large number of killed and wounded was the result of mistakes made in disregard of the injunctions of the Commander-in-Chief. The Sikh loss was never accurately estimated. There is no doubt that they suffered very heavily. 'In no action,' says Lord Gough's Dispatch, 'do I remember seeing so many of an enemy's slain upon the same space, Sobraon perhaps only excepted.' So great was the impression made by these infantry charges that the Sikhs, when next they met the British in the field, did not attempt to withstand an attack of the infantry. The lesson taught them at Chillianwalla rendered easier Lord Gough's task at Gujerat[1].

[1] If this view of the battle of Chillianwalla has not found its way into textbooks of history, the army of the Punjab, at all events, felt secure under the guidance of the Commander-in-Chief. Officers and men alike have borne frequent testimony to the love borne by the Indian Army for Lord

When the news of Chillianwalla reached home, it was received with a vehement popular outcry against Lord Gough. The British public learned with consternation the number of the killed and wounded, and they were horrified to hear that four British guns had been taken and that three standard-bearers had been shot down in the jungle and the colours of three regiments had been snatched from their nerveless grasp. That the Sikhs had been driven out of their whole position; that they had suffered heavily in killed and wounded; that they had left thirteen guns and a large quantity of ammunition in the hands of the victors; all this was forgotten in the panic into which the newspapers urged the public mind. Wild accusations of all sorts were hurled against the Commander-in-Chief, who was credited with no soldierly quality except that of brute courage. He was accused of having made no preparations, of having wasted too much time in preparations, of being hasty, of being tardy, of ignorance of the elementary principles of military science, of excitement amounting to mania, of folly and of inhumanity. The course of our narrative has, we hope, made clear the real facts of the case. It was impossible to encamp after the fire of the enemy had definitely revealed their position. Lord Gough was in sufficient force; he had marched with the full intention of fighting, should it seem ad-

Gough; and never was this affection more touchingly manifested than on the morrow of Chillianwalla, when he rode down the line after the battle.

visable; his plans were known to his leading officers, and they had received their instructions; the army had marched from Dinghi to Chillianwalla in the order in which it fought the battle. An attempt to penetrate the centre of the enemy's position was the only possible course; for Lord Gough was aware that the nature of the ground rendered impossible any attempt on the enemy's flanks[1]. The orders given by the Commander-in-Chief were disobeyed, and to this disobedience are due the calamities of the day. Campbell was instructed to take command of two brigades; he took command of one, and left the other to its fate. Pennycuick was ordered to advance in line with the artillery and to seize the guns by the aid of musketry and bayonet; he advanced without cover of the artillery, and his British regiment never fired a shot. Errors such as these the Commander-in-Chief could neither foresee nor prevent, and the successful accomplishment, by a single brigade, of the task allotted to the whole of Campbell's Division is an indication of the practicability of Lord Gough's scheme, had it been carried out. Had Campbell regulated the advance of the division and directed their attack in co-

[1] Sir Henry Durand says, in the *Calcutta Review*, that this was not so; the extant reports of the intelligence department give Lord Gough's reason for making the statement. Durand, it will be recollected, had been only a fortnight across the Chenab, and his failure to appreciate the strength of the Sikhs left at Russool or to understand the exact locality of their right at Moong, seems to indicate that he had not personally examined the ground.

operation, the Sikh right would have been carried with comparatively little loss. Still less could the Chief have anticipated the utter disregard, not only of his own instructions, but of all ordinary rules, with which Pope rendered ineffectual the fire of our horse artillery on the right, or the cavalry disaster which followed[1]. The scheme on which Lord Gough had decided proved successful in spite of these blunders on the part of his subordinates; but its success was marred by these blunders. Had his orders been carried out, the Sikhs would, in all probability, have left all their guns in the field and retreated, helpless, to the river[2]. 'Another sight

[1] Colonel Malleson asserts that 'the guns and re-formed cavalry were left in the position in which they had re-formed, as though they had been useless.' But the guns of the horse artillery were used to drive off the Sikhs who had pursued, and the cavalry was 'dispersed so as to cover the guns still in position.' (Report of Colonel Bradford, who took command of the brigade on hearing of Pope's wound, and in vain attempted to rally it.)

[2] This is no theory ingeniously made, long after the time, to explain away facts. Since these words were written, a contemporary letter, expressing the same view, has come into the writer's hands. It is dated Lahore, 6th April, 1849, and its author was a son of General Sir Archibald Galloway (cf. infra, pp. 264–5). 'It is so easy,' he says, 'to condemn in generalities. What will be thought of the battle of Chillianwalla is easily surmized from the abuse heaped upon Lord Gough for the affair of Cavalry before Ramnuggur. His Lordship had quite as much to say to what went wrong in the one as to the reckless bravery which alone caused the great loss we sustained in the other. . . . Until some proof is given (which has never yet been offered) that it was wrong to *attack* Shere



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been seen that morn; from Fate's dark book a leaf been torn.' That Chillianwalla was not Gujerat was not the fault of the Commander-in-Chief.

But all this was unknown to the English Press, and they proved, to their own satisfaction, that the retention of so reckless a savage in the chief command of the Indian Army must inevitably result in the loss of the Indian empire. Strong pressure was put upon the Government; they yielded to it, and forced the Directors of the East India Company to supersede Lord Gough and to appoint Sir Charles Napier to succeed him. It was a personal triumph for Sir Charles Napier, for he had been on the worst terms with the Directors. But he knew how much such popularity was worth and how fickle was the confidence of the press and the public. We quote a sentence from his biography to show how calm was his appreciation of the situation, and how little he was affected by the unintelligent abuse which was being showered upon Lord Gough. 'If he was proud of such testimony in his favour,' says his biographer, 'he was still more indignant that the call for himself should be coupled with an unjust and ignoble outcry against Lord Gough.

Sing at Chillianwalla, Lord G. is no more blameable for what occurred than I am.... But for two circumstances, over which the C.-in-C. had no control, and which he could not foresee, and scarcely could believe when he *did* see them,—but for these two circumstances, Chillianwalla in its results would have rivalled any Victory yet won against this brave and formidable Enemy we have now and for the second time conquered.' The writer was present at Chillianwalla.

"Lord Gough," said Sir W. Napier, echoing his brother's sentiments, "was a noble soldier of fifty years' service, and had always been victorious, whether obeying or commanding; no man heard, because no man dared to say, that personal comfort, or idleness, or fear, had induced him to shrink from danger, responsibility, or labour. What then was his crime? He had fought a drawn battle—the enemy was not crushed."' Napier—like so many servants of the State of that period, like Lord Wellesley, like the Duke of Wellington, like Lord Ellenborough, like Sir Harry Smith—had, in his turn, to taste the bitterness of what practically amounted to supersession and recall. To none of these was it given, as it was given to Lord Gough, to finish at one blow (while words of censure were still in men's mouths, and ere these words could reach his ears) the work in which he was engaged, and to leave to his successor a task completely performed.

XII

MULTAN AND THE IRREGULAR WARFARE

Before accompanying the Commander-in-Chief and the army of the Punjab to the successful completion of its labours at Gujerat, it is necessary to narrate briefly the course of events in other portions of the Punjab, and especially to refer to the fortunes of General Whish at Multan, of Herbert in the Hazara districts, and of George Lawrence at Peshawur and John Lawrence in the Jullundur Doab. The most important of these topics is the siege of Multan.

It will be remembered that, on September 14th, Shere Singh deserted the British camp and went over to Mulraj. His treachery at once caused Whish and Edwardes to desist from the attack and to entrench at some distance from the town. This decision aroused the indignation of Lord Dalhousie, whose eagerness to put an end to the rebellion contrasts curiously with his continued and persistent refusal to take the necessary precaution of restoring the army to its old numbers. Writing to Lord Gough, on September 26th, he stated his disapproval: 'The General has come to the resolution which seems to me inexplicable and almost incredible—to desist from the operations of the siege, to relinquish the advanced position he holds, and to

retire to his camp at Tibbee, there to wait for reinforcements. I am afraid to express what I think and feel on hearing this. That a British force of 6,000 men, with 30 guns, besides field artillery, and 20,000 native troops in support, should, on the very morrow of a brilliant success, restore the fallen spirits of their enemy and acknowledge a virtual defeat by relinquishing their advanced position and retiring to a defensive position, and an inactive one, for weeks, is surely an act unheard of in army orders until now. I declare, on my honour, I had almost as soon have heard that half their number had been cut in pieces.' Lord Gough did not approve of General Whish's plan of operations, and he censured his method of attack [1], but he defended him from the Governor-General's more severe criticism, and informed him that he did not consider 'the resolution adopted by the Major-General an improper one' in the circumstances [2]. Lord Dalhousie therefore refrained from any adverse criticism, and the army at Multan remained quiescent, even after the departure of Shere Singh, on October 9th, had greatly reduced the strength of the enemy. Their three months' repose was once broken by an attack of the enemy. On the 7th of November (when Whish was himself meditating an attempt to interfere with the progress of the enemy's outworks), the Sikhs attacked Herbert Edwardes, who was encamped on the left of the British position. Edwardes repulsed

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, October 8, 1848.

[2] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, September 30th, 1848.

the enemy, and Whish, turning their left flank, routed them and captured nearly all the guns which they had brought into action. Lord Gough took the opportunity of congratulating Whish and his men. 'Nothing,' he told the General, 'could have been better timed, better planned, or better executed,' and he issued a General Order to encourage the besieging force: 'Read this to the Troops, and assure them it is from the heart of their friend and Commander-in-Chief[1].'

The reader will recollect that the desertion of Mulraj by Shere Singh altered Lord Gough's whole plan of campaign by reducing the importance of the operations at Multan. It was decided that the Bombay column was a sufficient reinforcement in the new circumstances, and it was fully expected that the Bombay column would reach Multan by the middle of November. Its arrival was delayed by a ridiculous question of personal etiquette. The Bombay Government sent an officer of the rank of Major-General in command of the troops. Over this appointment Lord Gough had no control, and he disapproved of it, on the ground that it amounted to a supersession of Whish, who must surrender the command to his senior. On the 1st of November, he sent instructions to dispatch the force without delay, under Colonel Dundas, pending the decision of the Government with reference to the question of the command at Multan. At the same time he urged the Governor-General to

[1] Lord Gough to General Whish, November 11, 1848.

leave it to Whish. 'Do not,' he said, 'force me to dishonour a brave soldier, for brave he is. I do not, I cannot, approve of General Whish's proceedings, but I am in private communication with the best judging officers in that force, and they unanimously lament over the prospect of his supersession. The experience he has had will be of infinite use to him, and I conscientiously believe were I to order the Major-General on, or send a General from this, I would not promote the public good[1].' The Bombay Government, or the General in question, adopted an attitude which it is scarcely possible to conceive. While the Punjab was in open revolt, and the movements of Lord Gough's 'Grand Army' depended upon the speedy success of operations at Multan, this question of personal etiquette was permitted to involve a serious delay in the movement of troops. The indignation of the Governor-General knew no bounds, and the Commander-in-Chief (who, it must be remembered, had no control over the Bombay army) had no desire to mollify his wrath. Lord Gough could make allowances for brave soldiers, who, like General Whish, had failed to effect their main purpose, and he could also, as we shall see, find some excuse for the conduct of the cavalry at Chillianwalla. No man was more generous in his treatment of his subordinates, or took more freely all responsibility upon himself. But action like this was unintelligible to him, and his severity in dealing with the offending officer is

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, November 8, 1848.

characteristic of his conception of military duty. When he understood the cause of the delay, he wrote to the General to inform him that his explanation was so unsatisfactory that he felt himself compelled to recall his suggestion that he should take command of the Bombay column after the fall of Multan. 'I do not feel justified,' he said, 'in giving an opinion on the acts of officers not belonging to this Presidency; but I cannot say I should be glad to see an officer placed under my command, who in my mind, has failed to prove that an unnecessary delay has not occurred when the best interests of India required the most prompt measures[1].' Failure he could understand, but for the man who put his personal interest before so pressing a public duty he could find no extenuating circumstances. In an estimate of the course of the campaign, the effect of this officer's delinquency is frequently ignored. Yet his misconduct seriously modified the conditions of the struggle; if Whish had been reinforced in the middle of November, instead of a month later, Lord Gough would have had, at Chillianwalla, the army which finally assembled at Gujerat.

The whole of the Bombay column did not reach Multan till the 21st of December. They found the British forces ready for action, and the scheme of assault prepared. Major Napier, whose temporary optimism had helped to mislead Currie into the ill-considered movement of

[1] Lord Gough, December 19, 1848.

July, now found himself superseded by the arrival of his senior, Colonel Cheape, the chief engineer of the army (although Napier's plan of operations was, in the end, preferred to that which Cheape had suggested). It is not necessary, in the present work, to inflict on the reader the details of the siege. The attack was commenced on the 27th of December, when the Sikhs were driven back from the portion of the walls which it was resolved to assault. Almost a week was occupied in making the final preparations, and mainly in the erection of breaching-batteries. Attempts made by the garrison were easily repulsed, and on the 30th of December the enemy's magazine was blown up. The assault on the town was made on the 2nd of January, and was completely successful; but Mulraj succeeded in holding the fort with some 4,000 men. The fort was therefore invested, and the assault had been prepared, when, on the 22nd of January, Mulraj surrendered at discretion. Lord Gough had given instructions for the movements of the army after their victory, and, in accordance with his arrangements, a small garrison was left to hold Multan, and the rest of the army almost immediately marched up the Chenab to its junction with the Jhelum, and thence to Ramnuggur, where they assembled in time to take part in the battle of Gujerat.

To this brief sketch of the siege of Multan, it is necessary to add some words as to the course of other operations not directly under the charge of the Commander-in-Chief. The story of the rising

in the Hazara and the rebellion at Peshawur may best be told together, but the merest outline must serve our purpose[1]. We have seen that, in the beginning of August, George Lawrence, who was Resident at Peshawur, was informed of the difficulties which beset Major Abbott in the Hazara, and sent John Nicholson to hold the fort of Attok, at the junction of the Kabul river with the Indus. Nicholson carried on a gallant (and a largely successful) guerilla warfare, using the irregulars, and especially the Pathans, to coerce the mutinous Sikh soldiery into submission. He had already gained over the Pathans that marvellous influence which he subsequently exercised over the native army, and which was of no small consequence in the Mutiny. Both Lawrence and Nicholson were of opinion that small reinforcements entrusted to their own command would have brought about the end of the rebellion and left the siege of Multan an isolated operation. Lord Gough, aware of the real condition of affairs in the Punjab, and conscious that a second Sikh War was inevitable, refused to comply with their requests, and they were left to carry on their struggle unaided. Ignorant of the reasons which forbade the action they desired, and regarding themselves as unjustly treated by the Government, they nevertheless continued to do their best for the honour of the British arms. On the news of the

[1] The reader must be referred for details to George Lawrence's *Forty-three Years in India*, and the *Life of John Nicholson* by Captain L. J. Trotter.

defection of Shere Singh, the command of Attok was entrusted to Lieutenant Herbert, and John Nicholson was set free to act on a larger scale. Finally, he exercised the wise discretion of conducting his Pathans to Ramnuggur, where they awaited the arrival of Lord Gough (cf. p. 197). Herbert proved himself a most efficient substitute, but the course of events at Peshawur soon rendered his position untenable[1]. George Lawrence, aided by Lieutenant Bowie, held out in the Residency against the rebellious troops of Chutter Singh until the Sikhs, towards the end of October, entered into an agreement with our former ally, Dost Mohammed, Ameer of Kabul. The Afghans were promised the district across the Jhelum, and they

[1] A letter from Major Abbott to the Adjutant-General of Lord Gough's army, dated December 5, 1848, may be quoted as one of the curiosities of warfare. It runs: 'Sir, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief that a note from λιευτεναντ ηρβερτ οφ θη 2nd instant reports ἰσ ποσιτιον το βη θη μοστ κριτικαλ—μανι οφ ἰσ γαρρισον αωινγ δεσερτεδ αυδ σιμπτομσ οφ ινσυβορδινατιον αππεαρινγ αμονγστ θη ρεστ. He has begged me to solicit σπηδι αιδ ασ νεσέσσαρι το σαωε θη φορτ. I most respectfully join in the request, if indeed it be not now too late. θη λοσσ οφ ατοκ ωουλδ ἀωε α μοστ μαλιγν εφεκτ υπον ουρ καυσε. Chutter S. has not returned from Peshawur. Some say that he has purchased the co-operation of Dost M. by the offer of all the Punjab westward of the Jelum, others that Dost M. has seized him. About 4 Corps and 10 guns are left for the blockade of Attok. The rest have marched to aid Shere S.' The employment of Greek letters was a frequent device in the Mutiny. The idea itself is as old as Julius Caesar, who used it in dealing with the Gauls (*De Bello Gallico*, Bk. v. c. 48).

began to send men to the aid of Shere Singh. There is no evidence that the number of Afghans who 'poured themselves through the Khyber Pass' was very large; it has been estimated that from 1,500 to 2,000 Afghan horsemen were on the field at Gujerat. But the Afghan alliance soon placed George Lawrence in an impossible position. He had, on hearing of the defection of Shere Singh, sent his wife and children from Peshawur, under the guidance of an Afghan escort, who gave them up to the Sikhs. He then made an attempt to escape from the Residency, but was betrayed to Chutter Singh by an Afghan. The whole Sikh force now marched on Attok, and after holding out for a month, the Mussulman garrison refused to continue the resistance, and, on the 2nd of January, Attok fell. Herbert, like Lawrence, was captured while attempting to escape. Lawrence and Bowie, who was also captured, were treated most courteously by Chutter Singh; but Herbert, whose defence of Attok had given the Sikhs much trouble, was used most brutally until Bowie interposed in his favour. Bowie's influence with the Sikhs was very great, and on the 26th of January he was allowed to visit Lord Gough's camp, on parole, for twenty-four hours.

Although Peshawur and Attok had fallen, one post in the Hazara continued to maintain its loyalty. Abbott, whom we have already mentioned as holding the chief command in the Hazara (cf. p. 150), threw himself into the fort of Srikote, with a body of

irregulars, and succeeded in holding it till the end of the war. In the Derajat also, although Bunnoo had fallen, Reynell Taylor, who had been left behind by Edwardes, was able, in spite of many obstacles, to reduce the small Sikh fortress of Lukki, which was garrisoned with two regiments and ten guns. More notable still were the services of John Lawrence in the Jullundur Doab. He had already repressed a rebellion in August, and, in the course of an almost bloodless campaign in November, he assisted Brigadier Wheeler to remove the danger of any further rising.

It must not be inferred, from the few lines devoted to these exploits—deeds worthy of an honoured place in the annals of British rule in India—that the services of Herbert Edwardes, or John Nicholson, or the Lawrences are undervalued. Their story has been well told by themselves and by others, and we are concerned with it only as far as it affects the policy of the Commander-in-Chief. Events were to prove that Lord Gough was right in declining to act upon the advice which, one after another, they tendered to him. But the ultimate success of his policy of striking one great blow, and one only, would have been more dubious if he had been unable to rely upon the support of these brave men in their lonely outposts, nor was he unmindful either of their services or of their needs. His great blow was not struck in time to save George Lawrence or Herbert, but it did save Abbott and Reynell Taylor, and, at different times, he

prevented both Sir Frederick Currie and Lord Dalhousie from weakening Wheeler's force in the Jullundur Doab. Had his advice been accepted by the Governor-General, he might have been successful in relieving all. It has been said that 'November the 1st had been fixed, six months beforehand, as the day on which our campaign was to begin, and the rapid spread of the rebellion was no reason, in the opinion of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, for changing their plan[1]!' It was no fault of Lord Gough that the army did not move in the end of September, and, had it then entered the Punjab, it is probable that neither Lawrence nor Herbert would have found himself a prisoner in the hands of Chutter Singh. As it was, vengeance, though it had been delayed by the false economy of the Indian Government, was on its way, and the positions of the Sikh chief and his prisoners were soon to be reversed.

[1] Bosworth-Smith's *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. i. pp. 229-30.

XIII

GUJERAT

We return to the army of the Punjab, encamped at Chillianwalla. The day after the battle found Lord Gough on the field at dawn, ready to pursue the advantage gained and to despoil the enemy alike of his camp and of his guns. But the morning was dull and cloudy, and, ere any arrangements could be made, the rain commenced to fall. For three days it fell incessantly, turning the loamy soil of Chillianwalla into a species of mud[1] through which it was impossible for cavalry, and still more so for artillery, to advance. Nothing could be done but to arrange for the comfort of the wounded, and to pay the last tribute to the brave dead. Under the mound from which the Sikh piquet had been dislodged on the morning of the battle, lie the bones of those who fell. Perhaps the most pathetic incident of the day was the interment of Brigadier Pennycuick and his son in one grave:—

'For the son is brought with the father;
In the foremost ranks of the fierce assault they fell.'

More pleasant memories attach themselves to the 18th, a day rendered notable by an act of courtesy

[1] Eye-witnesses describe this mud as spreading like butter, and as rendering it quite impossible for camels to move.

on the part of Shere Singh[1]. 'This evening,' says the Diary of Sir Frederick Haines, 'two of the 9th Lancers were sent in by Shere Singh with a letter. These men had strayed beyond our Videttes, unarmed. Some horsemen surrounded them, and one of our men, making some resistance, was slightly cut in the arm. They were taken before Shere Singh, who immediately ordered [for punishment] the man who had struck an unarmed man. They were well treated for two days, and then taken round the camp by Shere Singh, shown whatever they wished to see, given a champagne breakfast, and this night sent in to us; Shere Singh boastfully declaring the two men had been captured by one Sikh.'

Fortune had favoured the Sikhs since the battle-day, and they had good cause for merry-making. The weather had not only prevented our attacking them at Tupai before they could reach their strong position at Russool, but it had also interfered with Lord Gough's hopes of destroying Shere Singh's force before its junction with the army of Chutter Singh. It is certain that the action of Chillianwalla had gravely shaken the morale of the Sikh army: on the 19th, Elahi Buksh, a commandant of the Sikh artillery, came, along with an infantry commandant, into the British camp, and surrendered to Lord Gough. These men were both Mohammedans, and had been attached to the Pèshawur contingent of the Sikh forces. The information obtained from

[1] Sir Charles Gough relates a similar act of mercy after Moodkee. (*The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, p. 79.)

them and from the Intelligence Department convinced Lord Gough that the position at Russool was too strong to attack, at all events until the arrival of the Multan force. 'I do not feel justified,' he told Lord Dalhousie, 'in attacking him in a position, to carry which, however shaken as he undoubtedly is, would cause a loss far greater than we can afford with our present list of wounded[1].' He therefore contented himself with placing Lieutenant Hodson in command of two regiments of light cavalry at Wazirabad, to resist any possible attempt of the enemy to cross the Chenab, while he himself watched the entrenched position of Russool. The ground near the Jhelum was so difficult that Lord Gough came to the conclusion that, since an action in the end of November had been forbidden, it would have been wiser to resist the Governor-General's desire for an action in the middle of January, and to remain in the plains till reinforcements arrived. It was a mistake which, with reasonably good fortune, would have had no evil results, but accident after accident had been injurious to our success. The Commander-in-Chief decided that there must be no chance of the repetition of a similar error, and therefore no attack till the Multan troops came up. To this decision he adhered, in spite of the efforts of Major Mackeson, Lord Dalhousie's political agent[2], who urged upon

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, January 19, 1849.

[2] Major Mackeson had been sent at Lord Gough's own request, as he thought he might be of use to him. He was

him a policy of immediate action. News of the surrender of the fort at Multan reached the army on January 26, so that assistance could not fail to arrive within about three weeks' time. Holding a position in which he could at once render difficult a march down the left bank of the Jhelum, and intercept an advance upon the Chenab, Lord Gough could afford to wait and to watch, employing the interval in preparing schemes for the conclusion of the campaign and in attempting to calm the perturbed feelings of the Governor-General. Lord Dalhousie had lost at once his patience and his temper, and he sent to the home authorities a long series of letters attacking Lord Gough's military capacity[1]. During this period his communications with the Commander-in-Chief became more and more strained, and a letter in which he criticized his military arrangements nearly provoked an open rupture. Yet, even in this not always cordial correspondence, the nobler nature of the Governor-General finds a place. He was furious at the conduct of Pope's cavalry brigade at Chillianwalla, and there is no doubt that he had reason to be angry. But when he carried his indignation so far as to threaten to put a petty indignity upon the British regiments concerned, unless their character was cleared up, or they retrieved their reputation, and Lord Gough, in

in constant communication with the Governor-General, and, although not an intimate friend, may be regarded as having been informed of Lord Dalhousie's wishes.

[1] With regard to these letters cf. infra, pp. 290–94.

protesting against the suggestion, sent fresh evidence on the point, the Governor-General gave way, and the frank and tactful words in which he withdrew his suggestion are worthy of being recorded: 'If you, whom the unanimous voice of all your countrymen has long since pronounced to be brave among the brave, shall tell me that you think I had better not put the slight I have threatened on these four regiments, I shall readily submit to your judgment on this point[1].'

The Governor-General was considerably alarmed by the position of affairs in the Punjab, and his alarm led to a curious reversal of the situation of the preceding year: Lord Dalhousie suggesting reinforcements, which Lord Gough, who never lost his coolness or his confidence, considered unnecessary. The speedy arrival of the detachment from Multan was held by the Commander-in-Chief as absolutely essential, because only when thus reinforced would his artillery be equal to that of the enemy, and because the presence of more British infantry regiments would remedy a grave defect of his army at Chillianwalla, where only four were in the field. Beyond this, he desired, as an additional force, merely some companies of the 53rd Regiment at Ramnuggur and a corps of irregular cavalry from Lahore, and he urged on the Governor-General the inexpediency of weakening our hill stations, Sirhind, or Ferozepore (where the Governor-General now was). 'I am very anxious,' he said, 'to see an European regiment

[1] Lord Dalhousie to Lord Gough, February 19, 1849.

collected in the Sirhind Division—indeed two would be better, for there is assuredly a large body of men who served in the Seik Army within the protected states.' On these grounds he besought the Governor-General not to send the Sirmoor battalion or the 98th Regiment from Ferozepore.

The Commander-in-Chief employed the period of enforced inaction for the further purpose of arranging with Lord Dalhousie the measures to be taken to finish the campaign, after the united Sikh force should once more have suffered a complete defeat at the hands of the British general. He roused Lord Dalhousie's indignation by suggesting that the Sikhs might be able to withdraw some of their guns over the Jhelum; the Governor-General failed to understand the impossibility, in existing circumstances, of preventing this. In any case, an expedition of some sort across the Jhelum could not be avoided, and Lord Gough did not propose to undertake its command in person, unless this should be Lord Dalhousie's desire. He recommended for this service Major-General Gilbert, as the officer in whom he had most confidence, and the Governor-General cordially sanctioned the nomination.

For some time the enemy remained within his entrenchments at Russool, carefully watched by Lord Gough's Intelligence Department and by the Politicals. Many of the statements of spies (not always reliable) have been preserved, and among the documents sent to the Commander-in-Chief is a careful account of the fort of Gujerat, addressed

to Major Mackeson. It is dated the 25th of January, and it would seem that, as early as this, the intention of the enemy to occupy that fortress was suspected. There was, however, every reason for the enemy's remaining in his position at Russool, a natural fortress of great strength, and the fact that the Sikhs did not await there the British attack is a tribute to the wisdom of Lord Gough's policy of crossing the Chenab. Shere Singh, driven out of the rich land on the right bank of the Chenab, failed to find provision for man or beast. So barren was the territory on the Jhelum that Lord Gough had to send twenty-two miles for forage. The Sikhs could not obtain either forage or provisions, for they were cut off from the Chenab, and the result was the gradual abandonment of the stronghold at Russool. Shere Singh was unwilling to withdraw even part of his force from Russool while Lord Gough held his present position, and he threatened an attack, in the hope, apparently, that the British would retire rather than fight without reinforcements. On the 31st of January, the Commander-in-Chief, with the purpose of indicating that he regarded with equanimity the attack which the Sikhs were known to be meditating, threw up an outwork just beyond range of the Sikh guns, and, on the 2nd of February, Shere Singh left the Bunnoo troops as a garrison at Russool, and marched out towards the Khoree Pass.

For three days the ultimate destination of the Sikhs remained uncertain, but, on February 5, they

pushed through the Pass and encamped in rear of the village of Khoree. Lord Gough estimated their artillery at forty guns, and the garrison at Russool as consisting of from 10,000 to 12,000 men with twenty-seven guns. 'I had all their movements,' he says, 'closely watched from the mound of Mugnawalla, within a mile of Khoree, having a good view of the Pass and country; but they pushed forward so large a force of infantry and cavalry yesterday, that my pickets were obliged to fall back. I am biding my time, and be assured, I will not lose any opportunity of striking a blow when I can do it with effect[1].'

During these days, Lord Gough had no lack of advice. Some thought that he ought to have attacked while the Sikhs were in the Khoree Pass, others that he should retire at once in order to prevent them from making their way to the Chenab. All kinds of calamities were prophesied, and every sort of story was invented to explain the Chief's refusal to move. He was blind and obstinate, and did not see that the Sikhs were outwitting him; he had been unnerved by Chillianwalla; his old blood was cool, and he dared not seize his opportunity. Meanwhile, the object of all this suspicion and obloquy remained calm and unmoved; he knew that an immediate attack was what the Sikhs most desired, and that his own best plan was neither to attack nor to retire, but to wait. Only by waiting could he achieve his object—to

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, February 7, 1849.

force the enemy into the open plain near the Chenab. The division of the Sikhs between Russool and Khoree was in itself a confession of weakness, the result of lack of provisions, and it gave Lord Gough the key of the situation.

Those who were in the confidence of the Commander-in-Chief had no doubt as to the course which it was wisest to pursue. It may be useful to insert here some sentences written by a soldier who was in Lord Gough's army, and who had unusual opportunities of observing the course of events. Writing to his father, Sir Archibald Galloway[1], about the position at Chillianwalla, he said:—

We cut off the communication by the front between his two wings, the communication to the rear was long and difficult, and to concentrate his Troops at either Korie or Russool was to leave us, by whichever of the two he drew his Forces from, the road to the Jhelum in his rear[2]. The judgement and the prudence of Lord Gough in holding that position in the face of so much opposition as was raised against the sanity of staying where he was,

[1] Major-General Sir Archibald Galloway was a soldier who had seen much service in India, and whose close connexion with the East India Company gave him a special interest in this war. He was also a military historian and the author of a book on *Sieges in India*. This letter was written by his son, from Lahore, on 6th of April, 1849, and a copy was afterwards sent, by Sir Archibald, to the Hon. G. Gough, who had asked him for his opinion. We have quoted from it, ante, pp. 242–3.

[2] Cf. the map, 'Theatre of the Punjab Campaign.'

not only led to the result of Gujerat, but must have been a good homethrust to those who sat in judgement on his Lordship, and whose advice, if followed, would have protracted the campaign for an indefinite number of years. Had we been obliged to fight our way across the Korie Pass or by Russool, our loss would have been so severe that we could not immediately have followed up our victory, and consequently another Battle would have taken place at Jhelum, from which again the Enemy could have retreated to the more difficult country in his rear. Every Battle would have diminished our numbers, while every advance would have taken us further from our own Provinces. Our Force decreasing; the difficulties of the country on the increase; a wide tract of country (if not openly hostile, at all events quite ready to become so on the least reverse) intervening between us and our frontier; the vast territory for the protection of which our army is kept up, left far from that protection; such is the state of things from which the stubborn right-doing of Lord Gough saved us. I do not speak at hazard. From being every day employed in reconnoitring, and therefore knowing all about the neighbourhood of both our own Camp and the Enemy's, I was often sent for to give information at the time our position was discussed, and I therefore know the sentiments which all the grave men held, and I felt deeply at the time how much depended on the wisdom of the C.-in-C. It was the question on which *all* depended; it was urged daily and most strenuously on Lord Gough to retire, and I often felt in great alarm lest the sophistry employed, the age and rank of those employing it, should prevail.

While his own advisers were urging Lord Gough to retire, Shere Singh was tempting him to attack. On the 11th of February, he made his great effort

to entice the British into an action before the arrival of the Multan troops. He hoped to be able to precipitate a collision between the British troops and his own forces, supported as they were by the Russool garrison, and possibly to draw Lord Gough on to an attack upon the strong entrenched position which had been prepared with so much care. An action fought under such conditions would enable him to inflict upon the British troops, if not a defeat, at all events a blow sufficiently severe to necessitate their withdrawal, leaving the right bank of the Chenab accessible for supplies and enabling the Sikhs to retain their strong position at Russool. But Lord Gough again displayed the calm patience with which he had bided his time at Sobraon, and which had characterized his entire policy since the outbreak at Multan. 'The enemy,' he told Lord Dalhousie, 'yesterday (Feb. 11th) came forward, apparently with the whole of the force he had at, and in the neighbourhood of Khoree, with the evident view of drawing me out of this encampment, in order that a strong force he had concealed amongst the jungle towards Mong might have an opportunity of attacking my camp. My Cavalry Patrols, consisting of only four squadrons, kept the whole of the enemy's cavalry at bay. This proved that they had no intention of bringing on an action at the point they advanced to, but to draw me on to attack them in the thick jungle in their rear, in which they were ready to fall back. Although well able to punish them, I felt . . . that it would be more

desirable to do so powerfully (which with God's blessing I trust to do) than partially[1].'

Shere Singh's last hope had failed him, and he at once withdrew his garrison from Russool and concentrated his badly fed army at Khoree. Next day Lord Gough rode over the vacated entrenchments, and was greatly impressed with their strength[2]. The fears which he had expressed to Lord Dalhousie about the conveyance of artillery over the Jhelum were now at an end, for he was assured that, wherever the final struggle might be fought, the Sikh guns were his certain prey. 'They have left a wonderfully strong position for one in which, when they are routed, they must of necessity lose the greater part of their artillery[3].' The prophecy was not long of fulfilment. On the night of the 13th of February, the intelligence department reported that a small force of Sikhs (about 4,000 men) had that day appeared before Gujerat, and that the commandant, Ram Singh, had given them admission. It was therefore no surprise when, early on the morning of the 14th, Shere Singh's whole army marched to Gujerat, and took up a position between the fortress and a ford on the Chenab above Wazirabad. They had thus carried out, to a nicety, Lord Gough's wishes[4]. The old Chief

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, February 12, 1849.

[2] Cf. supra, pp. 211–13.

[3] Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, February 12, 1849.

[4] An attempt has been made to show that the Sikhs outwitted Lord Gough by marching on Gujerat, while, in

was now urged to make his attack, but he had no intention of abandoning his own scheme when on the eve of its victorious accomplishment. The Multan force was approaching Ramnuggur, and the Commander-in-Chief, declining all suggestions of following the direct road from Dinghi to Gujerat, without any delay ordered a march to Lassoorie. On the evening of the 14th, the army encamped there. By this swift and immediate movement the Commander-in-Chief had secured his communications with General Whish, and so removed the only element of danger in his position. He did not believe that the Sikhs would attempt to cross the Chenab, but he ordered reinforcements to be sent to Hodson at Wazirabad. This was ac-

fact, they were carrying out his plans. 'The enemy moved from Koree,' wrote one of his staff (Sir Frederick Haines) on the 14th of February, 'it is supposed to Gujerat, which ought to make short work of the business in our favour.' Sir Frederick Haines was present at a conversation between Mackeson and the Commander-in-Chief when the Sikhs first showed an inclination to move. Mackeson advocated an active policy, which Lord Gough refused to consider. 'But they may go to Dinghi,' said Mackeson. 'Why shouldn't they go to Dinghi?' was the reply. 'But they may go to Gujerat,' persisted the Political Agent. 'That is exactly where I hope to find them,' said the Commander-in-Chief. The short marches which followed were ordered by Lord Gough in spite of the advice of the political officers. 'Moved to Koonjah,' wrote Sir Colin Campbell in his diary (February 19, 1849), 'whither the political officers wanted to move some days ago, and which, most likely, would have brought on a general action before the Mooltan force had joined us' (*Life*, vol. i. p. 218).

complished by sending Colonel Byrne with six companies of the 53rd to watch the fords, supported by Markham's Brigade between Wazirabad and Ramnuggur. The wounded and baggage were already at Ramnuggur. On the 16th began the series of short marches which contrast so curiously with the popular view of Lord Gough's character. He spent the night of the 16th near the scene of the action of Sadulapore; on the 17th he encamped at Ishera, and on the 18th at Tricca. These marches were very short (the two latter only four miles each), and the army invariably moved in battle array, ready to commence an action at any moment, and rendering the Sikhs uncertain from what point the attack was to be made. Reconnaissances of the enemy's position were in progress, and Lord Gough again utilized the services of the 'Sobraon boy[1],' who once more distinguished himself by securing accurate information as to the position and preparations of the enemy. Meanwhile, the Multan forces arrived at head quarters. General Whish made his appearance on the 18th of February, and Brigadier-General Dundas marched with the Bombay Division from Ramnuggur to Kunjah, on Lord Gough's left, which he reached on February 19th. The British General had thus succeeded in both his objects. The Sikhs had not been allowed to cross the Chenab, and his series of short marches had prevented their

[1] Cf. footnote on p. 55. The boy had been sent by Lord Gough to Multan to help the intelligence department there, and had only now returned.

precipitating the final conflict before the arrival of reinforcements. He was now ready to strike a decisive blow. 'The Commander-in-Chief,' says the biographer of Lord Lawrence, 'whilst he was the object of such unsparing sarcasm and animadversion, was preparing the way, by a careful exploration of the ground and by a series of masterly movements, for as crowning a victory as ever smiled upon our arms in India.'

It remains for us to tell the story of what Lord Gough himself described as his last and best battle.

The army under Lord Gough's command now amounted to almost exactly the numbers that he had, in the month of May, stated to Lord Dalhousie as the force requisite for the conquest of the Punjab. In addition to the forces at Lahore, at Multan, in the Jullundur Doab, and elsewhere, about 24,000 men were concentrated in the camp of the Commander-in-Chief. Of these, about 20,000 could be placed in the field, for, besides the baggage guards of individual corps, two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry, along with a light field battery, were required to guard the general baggage of the camp. The composition of the army was similar to the arrangement at Chillianwalla, except for the additional troops. Campbell and Gilbert continued to hold divisional commands, but some changes were necessitated among the Brigadiers. In Gilbert's Division, a vacancy had been created by the appointment of Godby to the command at Lahore, and Penny was transferred, from Campbell's Division,

THEATRE OF THE PUNJAB CAMPAIGN, 1848–9.



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to take his place. Penny's own successor was Brigadier Carnegie, and Brigadier McLeod had been appointed to the command of Pennycuick's Brigade. The infantry division from Multan [1] remained under General Whish. It consisted of the two Multan brigades, under Markham and Hervey [2]; Dundas [3] also continued in command of the Bombay column. Thackwell's Cavalry Division was reinforced by the Sindh Horse and four regiments of irregular cavalry, and the artillery by the siege-guns. The total force of artillery was now eighty-eight guns, including eighteen heavy guns. The number of heavy guns placed on the field at Chillianwalla was thus nearly doubled. Brigadier Tennant was again in charge of the artillery, and the direction of the engineers and sappers was entrusted to General Cheape.

The Sikhs had taken up a position in front of the town of Gujerat. It was, as usual, chosen with considerable skill. The bed of the river Dwara passes round two sides of the town, running southwards for a considerable distance. There was no water in this nullah or river-bed, and the Sikhs chose it as the basis of their preparations. The right wing of

[1] This is known as the First Infantry Division of the Army of the Punjab, Gilbert's as the Second, and Campbell's as the Third.

[2] Markham's Brigade: H.M.'s 32nd Foot, and 49th and 51st Native Infantry. Hervey's Brigade: H.M.'s 10th Foot, and 8th and 72nd Native Infantry.

[3] Dundas's Bombay Column: 60th Rifles, 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, Bombay Fusiliers, and 19th Native Infantry.

the Sikh infantry was placed within the nullah, thus obtaining cover. A division of cavalry, on the other side of the nullah, protected the flank. The line extended from this dry nullah to a smaller water-course or wet nullah flowing on the other side of the town, southwards into the Chenab, and cover was thus obtained for the left wing of the infantry, which was also protected by a cavalry division on the other side of the nullah. Between the two nullahs were the villages of Burra (Great) Kalra and Chota (Little) Kalra, giving the Sikhs the opportunity of employing their skill in rendering defensible the villages in their position. In front of the villages were cultivated fields with patches of green corn, the scene of next day's fighting. It will be remembered that the Sikh strength had been considerably augmented since Chillianwalla; the most important reinforcements were the army of Chutter Singh and the bands of Afghan horsemen, stationed on the right and left flanks, who possessed greater courage in attacking than the Ghorchurras or Sikh cavalry.

The large or dry nullah almost bisected the position of the British camp on the morning of the 21st of February. On the left, extending westwards from the nullah, were Campbell's Division and the Bombay column, under Dundas, protected by a body of cavalry under Thackwell[1]. Gilbert's Division extended eastwards from the nullah, and

[1] The Sindh Horse, 9th Lancers, 8th Light Cavalry, and the 3rd Dragoons.

Whish, with the Multan column, was on his right; the flank protected by Lockwood's and Hearsey's Cavalry Brigades[1]. The reserve was composed of the 5th and 6th Light Cavalry, and the 45th and 69th Native Infantry. The artillery was dispersed along the whole line. The heavy guns were, as usual, in the centre (between Campbell and Gilbert). The right wing was supported by three troops of horse artillery, with two further troops and Dawes' field battery in reserve; on the left, Ludlow's and Robertson's field batteries supported Campbell, and the Bombay Horse Artillery (under Major Blood) accompanied Dundas. Troops of horse artillery were stationed on each flank to support the cavalry (Warner on the right and Duncan and Huish on the left).

The morning dawned calm and fair, and the natural beauty of the scene could not fail to impress even those who had much else to think of. 'As the enemy's masses had very early taken up their positions,' says Durand, 'there was no dust of moving columns to cloud the purity of the air and sky. The snowy ranges of the Himalayah, forming a truly magnificent background to Guzerat and the village-dotted plain, seemed on that beautiful morning, to have drawn nearer, as if like a calm spectator, to gaze on the military spectacle.' The British army was rejoicing in the confidence of victory, and as the leader whom they trusted rode down the

[1] Lockwood's Brigade: 14th Dragoons and 1st Light Cavalry. Hearsey's Brigade: 3rd, 9th, and 11th Irregulars and the 11th Light Cavalry.

lines in his white 'fighting-coat,' helmet in hand, their enthusiasm was unrestrained.

While we were waiting (wrote an officer who was present) our attention was drawn to a curious sound in the far distance on the Right. The noise grew louder and nearer, and we saw the Regiments, one after another, in a most excited state, cheering like mad. It was Lord Gough, at the head of his Staff, riding along the front. When he passed us, our men were not behindhand with their acclamations. He soon passed out of sight, but we heard the cheering till it died away in the distance. It was the same the day after Chillianwalla. It was the most fervid demonstration of affection I ever saw in my life, and it made a great impression on me.

At half-past seven o'clock in the morning the British advanced. The Sikhs, with less than their usual wisdom, at once opened fire and exposed to Lord Gough the situation of their guns. The advance was therefore continued until the infantry were just beyond the Sikh range, when (about nine o'clock) the line halted and the British artillery proceeded to the front. 'The cannonade now opened upon the enemy,' says the dispatch of the Commander-in-Chief, 'was the most terrible I ever witnessed, and as terrible in its effect. The Sikh guns were served with their accustomed rapidity, and the enemy well and resolutely maintained his position; but the terrific force of our fire obliged them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back.' The result of this artillery duel somewhat surprised the Sikhs, who thought that the British did not sufficiently understand the use of their guns. They

had formed this opinion partly in ignorance of the weakness of the British ordnance, but it was partly the natural effect of the wild rush of Pennycuick's Brigade at Chillianwalla. Our weakness in artillery had long been deplored by Lord Gough, and when, for the only time throughout the Sikh wars, he excelled in that important arm, he made full use of the opportunity[1]. 'We stood two hours in hell,'

[1] There is a legend that, at Gujerat, Lord Gough was imprisoned by his staff on the top of a windmill. The ladder was missing, and could not be found till the artillery had been allowed full play, and so Lord Gough was prevented from ordering a premature infantry advance. That the story is absolute fiction, without any foundation whatsoever, has been placed on record by Field-Marshal Sir Frederick Haines and the late Field-Marshal Sir Patrick Grant, of whom the former was Military Secretary, and the latter Adjutant-General, throughout the Punjab campaign. Colonel Malleson mentions that the story is without foundation, but adds, '*Se non è vero, è ben trovato.*' No one who was acquainted with the character of Lord Gough could describe the legend as '*ben trovato.*' Apart altogether from the question of the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of artillery, no member of his staff would have dared to act in such a way. It is necessary to state this clearly, because not only does the legend reappear from time to time (e. g. in Marshman's *History of India*), but numerous writers indulge in insinuations about the 'secret history' of the battle, with the view of depriving Lord Gough of any credit. Besides the windmill story, there are two other forms of this statement. The praise is sometimes given to Lord Dalhousie (and, in fact, in writing to the home authorities, he actually claimed it) on the ground of having, in writing to the Commander-in-Chief, pressed upon him the use of his artillery. The letters in which he did so were deeply resented by Lord Gough, who felt that the Governor-

was a Sikh's description of the battle; 'and, after that, we saw six miles of infantry.'

For two and a half hours the merciless fire of the British artillery was continued. The Sikh reply

General had given credence to the gossip about Chillianwalla. He was conscious of having made full use of such guns as he then possessed, and he made precisely the same arrangements for Gujerat as he had done for Chillianwalla, the difference being in the number and capacity of the guns. The fact that Lord Gough had at Gujerat eighteen heavy guns and at Chillianwalla ten, and that his field-guns were also much more numerous, is sufficient explanation of the different effects of the two artillery duels.

Lastly, the victory is sometimes attributed to George Lawrence on the strength of a conversation with the Chief. Lawrence, who was a prisoner in the hands of the Sikhs, was permitted, a few days before Gujerat, to visit Lord Gough's camp. He called upon the Commander-in-Chief, who questioned him about the Sikh view of Chillianwalla. Lawrence replied that the enemy thought that sufficient use had not been made of our artillery; an impression due partly to their ignorance of its weakness, and partly to the effect of Pennycuick's Brigade and Pope's cavalry getting in front of the guns. This was not news to Lord Gough: Elahi Buksh had given him the same information some weeks before; but it is alleged that he remarked to Lawrence, 'The bayonet is the proper weapon for the British soldier.' This sentence is the origin of the rumour that the plan for Gujerat was drawn up by Lawrence. The context is entirely unknown to us, and the words themselves would seem to imply rather a contrast between the musket and the bayonet than between the artillery and the bayonet. But, in any case, an *obiter dictum* (possibly uttered in a moment of temper) is no basis for the theory that George Lawrence was responsible for the plan of Gujerat, and the idea is the more incredible when it is remembered that George Lawrence was not an artillery but a cavalry officer.

had not been without effect, but the result was overwhelmingly in favour of the British. It was now nearly noon, and Lord Gough ordered a general advance, still covered by the artillery. Gilbert was ordered to push forward his light troops to force the enemy to show their position. 'I immediately advanced,' he says, 'the troop of Horse Artillery and Dawes' light field-battery, which instantly drew a very heavy and well-directed fire from two large batteries which the enemy had established on either side of the village of Kalerah [Burra Kalra], by which they were nearly screened from the fire of our guns, which, with the light companies, were then still further pushed forward, followed by the division, which had deployed into line; the heavy guns in our centre at this time opening a very destructive cannonade. Up to this time the village above named seemed to be unoccupied, and I directed a party of infantry to take possession of it. Upon the approach of this party a tremendous fire of musketry was opened from the walls, which were

In his *Forty-three Years in India*, George Lawrence does not mention the conversation with the Commander-in-Chief.

These attempts to give the honour of a victory to any one but the general who won it, based as they are on camp gossip, are unworthy of serious history. Perhaps in no other instance have they been made so frequently and unscrupulously. We are sorry to devote so much space to them, but it would not be right to conclude this footnote without chronicling the important fact that Sir Frederick Haines, as the last surviving member of Lord Gough's Staff, bears witness to the fact that the battle of Gujerat was fought precisely as Lord Gough designed that it should be fought.

loopholed in every direction; the 2nd European Regiment was then ordered up in support, under the command of Major Steele, and soon carried it, after a most obstinate resistance, in which that most gallant regiment suffered rather severely, as well as upon its emerging from the village, soon after which the enemy left many of their guns, and fled in the greatest confusion[1].'

[1] We have quoted these sentences from Sir Walter Gilbert's own report, because Colonel Malleson, failing to find any other reason for attacking Lord Gough, has used this incident for that purpose. 'Gough,' he says, 'had been anxiously waiting for the moment when he could use his infantry. That moment seemed to him now to have arrived, and though it would have been far wiser, and, as it turned out, would have saved much expenditure of blood, had he held them back for another quarter of an hour, he could restrain himself no longer, but ordered Gilbert and Whish to storm the villages in front of them' (*Decisive Battles of India*, pp. 461–2). This accusation he bases on a statement made by Sir Henry Durand in the *Calcutta Review*: 'Had Shakespear been permitted to expend a few minutes' attention and a few rounds upon Burra Kalra and its supporting batteries, the loss would have been less or altogether avoided.' To this sentence, which he quotes in a footnote, Colonel Malleson adds 'Shakespear commanded the heavy guns.' Durand's assertion applies to the conduct of the right wing (not, as Colonel Malleson's narrative implies, to the whole advance), and Durand makes no attempt to distribute the blame. Colonel Malleson has no hesitation in severely censuring the Commander-in-Chief, in spite of Gilbert's published dispatch, in which the Divisional Commander acknowledges full responsibility. Malleson has misunderstood the whole situation. Shakespear did not 'command the heavy guns,' of which there were eighteen in all. Major Sir Richmond Shakespear was in charge of four

The infantry which Gilbert had directed to seize the village of Burra Kalra consisted of the 2nd European Light Infantry, one of the regiments of Penny's Brigade. In addition to its commanding officer (Major Steele) the Brigadier himself accompanied the attack. The capture of Burra Kalra was the first onslaught upon the enemy's positions, and it may be convenient to follow, in the first place, the fortunes of the right wing, on which fell the main stress of the fighting. The right, it will be

heavy guns and Captain J. Shakespear of two heavy guns; both were under the immediate direction of Major Horsford, and formed part of Huthwaite's Brigade. Both of Horsford's batteries were instructed to cover Gilbert's advance, and they did, as Gilbert says, 'open a very destructive cannonade' on the batteries beside Burra Kalra. The infantry were ordered to charge the village by Gilbert himself, and in consequence of his believing it to have been deserted. The error was a natural one, and the sole responsibility rests with Gilbert, who, in his honest and soldierly narrative, makes no attempt to evade it. Horsford was there to carry out Gilbert's orders, and, had the Divisional Commander thought it necessary, one or other of the Shakespears would have been told to 'expend a few rounds upon' the village. That Colonel Malleson imagined that Brevet-Major Shakespear 'commanded the heavy guns' shows how inadequate was his information on a subject on which he pronounces most emphatic opinions. Here we take leave of the *Decisive Battles of India*. We feel that an apology is due to the reader for the amount of space we have devoted to an exposure of Colonel Malleson's series of errors. A writer so little restrained by the bounds of fact might seem to require a less elaborate refutation; but his misstatements have become commonplaces of military criticism, and, in justice to Lord Gough, we have been compelled to refer to them in detail.

remembered, was composed of Gilbert's and Whish's Divisions. Mountain's Brigade was next to the dry nullah, with Penny on its right. Only one brigade of Whish's Division was in the front line (Hervey's); the other, under Markham, was placed in reserve. The cavalry was under Lockwood and Hearsey. After Penny had effected the capture of Burra Kalra, the line continued its advance till they approached the village of Chota Kalra, where a large force of Sikh infantry and cavalry impeded the progress of Hervey's Brigade. It was necessary for Hervey to make a short flank movement to the right, thus creating a gap between himself and Penny. The enemy threatened to take advantage of this opportunity, but Whish immediately ordered his reserve, under Markham, to move into line. The whole right wing now steadily advanced towards Gujerat, meeting with but slight resistance and driving the enemy before them. The two infantry divisions were ably supported by the artillery and cavalry. The horse artillery kept in line with the infantry and shared the losses in the attacks upon the two villages, and the cavalry was successful in protecting the flanks from charges of the Afghan horsemen. These attacks were not so serious as on the left, but to one of them some incidental interest attaches. A small body of Afghans made their way to the right and swept round to the British rear, close to the position occupied by Lord Gough in person. One of his staff rode up to survey them and mistook them for

some of Nicholson's Pathans. They made no attempt to harm him. When their real nature became apparent, they were charged and routed by a troop of the 5th Light Cavalry, which formed the escort of the Commander-in-Chief.

The action on the left was considerably less severe. We saw that Campbell's Division occupied the left centre, Carnegie's Brigade was next to the dry nullah, and separated by it from Mountain. McLeod's Brigade was stationed on Carnegie's left, with Hoggan in reserve. The left flank was entrusted to Dundas and the Bombay column, with Thackwell and White to protect it. It advanced under the protection of the artillery, and the infantry never had an opportunity of firing a shot. Only once was Campbell able to take any share in the battle. After the artillery duel was over, and while the wing was pushing forward and driving the Sikhs from their positions on the British left, 'an attempt was made,' says Campbell, 'by many, apparently of the principal chiefs, to bring forward a large body of their cavalry, which was followed in a tumultuous manner by the infantry, which had taken shelter in the nullah, to attack the centre of the Bombay division. This attack was taken in flank by No. 5 field battery (Ludlow's), and caused great loss to the enemy, both in his short advance and subsequent retreat.' The significance of this incident has sometimes been exaggerated; the Sikhs were by this time driven out of their strong positions on their left, and their retreat, both right

and left, was being cut off. More important than the infantry advance were the cavalry charges under White and Thackwell. The most notable of these was made by the Scinde Horse and a squadron of the 9th Lancers, which repelled an attempt to turn the British left. Thackwell followed up this advantage by a retort in kind, and, by a cavalry charge, turned the enemy's right.

The advance of Gilbert's infantry had not begun before half-past eleven. By one o'clock not only were the British in possession of the town of Gujerat, of the Sikh camp, and of the enemy's artillery and baggage, but the cavalry were in full pursuit upon both flanks. Thackwell and White followed the enemy along the roads to the Jhelum and Beembur, and cut off large bodies of them, capturing baggage and forcing them to abandon guns. Hearsey and Lockwood met with similar success, until, about half-past four, near the village of Sainthul, they met Thackwell and both forces returned. 'We did not get to the camp of the Irregulars, near the Baraduree of Goojerat,' says Hearsey, 'until ten o'clock at night, and had thus been fifteen hours on horseback.'

The most obvious comment on the battle of Gujerat is the similarity of its plan to that of the action of Chillianwalla. The enemy occupied an unentrenched position of much the same kind. The formation of the British line was precisely similar; the same orders were issued to Divisional Commanders and Brigadiers; the disposition of the artillery at

Sikh Infantry
" Cavalry
" Guns
British " "
" Cavalry
" Infantry
BATTLE OF
GUJERAT
Feb. 21st 1849.
1 Inch = 2000 Yards.
GUJERAT
Stream of Wet Nullah
Chota Kalra
Ford
Dry Nullah
Kalra
Wet Nullah
Thackwell & White
Dundas
Reggan
Mountain
Penny
Harvey
Markham
Lockwood & Havelock
Advance
Feb, 21.
Camp, Feb, 20.
R. CHENAB
Shadiwal
Kunjah
Thackwell
Campbell
Dundas
Mc Leod
Carnegie
Gilbert
Mountain
Penny
Whish
Harvey
Lockwood
Tricca
Markham
Ford
WAZIRABAD
N
E
W
S

Gujerat was a reproduction of the arrangements made at Chillianwalla. The difference, according to Lord Gough himself, lay in this: 'When I knew the error committed in one [battle], I gave positive directions that the whole should touch the centre, and upon no account separate—to soldiers such a prohibition should never be considered necessary. At Goojerat, I saw it fulfilled myself, at Chillianwallah I could not; but I scout the idea of the jungle being so formidable; in many parts it was sufficiently open for all arms to act, in none was it as dense as that in which I was attacked on the 27th [June] at Talavera[1].' It was characteristic of Lord Gough that, knowing the partial failure of Chillianwalla to be the result of faults committed by his subordinates, he persisted in adopting precisely the same scheme for the final struggle at Gujerat. About the propriety of his own arrangements he had no hesitation, and he saw to it that his subordinates carried out his orders.

The result was a complete triumph, and it was won at comparatively small cost. The total casualties amounted to 96 of all ranks killed and less than 700 wounded. Five European officers were among the killed. The most serious losses had been incurred in the attacks on the Kalra villages, and especially in the charge of the 2nd European Light Infantry upon Burra Kalra. The loss of the enemy it was impossible to discover. They had been completely routed, and had lost camp, baggage, artillery,

[1] Lord Gough to his son, May 11, 1849.

and ammunition. A list of the captured guns, dated the day after the battle, shows that fifty-three pieces of ordnance were then in the hands of the British, in addition to several thousands of stands of arms. The result of the battle was a complete vindication of Lord Gough's military policy, and especially of the much-abused crossing of the Chenab and the delay after Chillianwalla. 'It was madness in the enemy,' says Mr. Edward Thackwell, 'to have joined battle with us in the open field. Their only chance of success consisted in awaiting our attack in an entrenched position like that of Russool[1].' We have seen how unwillingly the Sikhs abandoned Russool; they were driven out of it by want of provisions, and they were scarce of provisions because Lord Gough had forced them from the fertile banks of the Chenab to the barren soil of the Jhelum. Not only did scarcity of food force them to enter the open country near the Chenab, and so render possible the capture of their artillery; it prevented them from making any effort to rally after their defeat, and dispersed them in all directions towards the Jhelum. The original conception of the campaign was masterly, and even though it proved impossible to carry it out in its entirety, Lord Gough achieved all his main objects. He did not prevent the junction of Chutter Singh with his son, nor did he succeed (owing to the accidents of warfare at Chillianwalla) in destroying Shere Singh's force before the junction. But within

[1] *Narrative of the First Seikh War*, p. 236.

about three months from his leaving Lahore, the Commander-in-Chief had annihilated the Khalsa as a military power, and had destroyed the dangerous combination between Sikh and Afghan.

In like manner the almost immediate collapse of all resistance is a tribute to the wisdom of the policy advocated by Lord Gough since the outbreak of the rebellion at Multan. The extent of the defeat became only gradually apparent. On the 23rd of February, nine more guns were brought in, and on the 24th, other nine were discovered by Nicholson. Gujerat had ended the war. On the 22nd of February, the morning after the victory, Sir Walter Gilbert was sent to pursue the enemy beyond the Jhelum. They made no effort to continue the struggle, and sought to make terms. The Governor-General would hear nothing of terms, and the Sikhs, who, on the 6th of March, had given up their prisoners, surrendered at discretion six days later, when a striking and memorable scene was enacted at Rawal Pindi. Among the prisoners was George Lawrence; he had been permitted to enter the British camp on parole, but had, of course, returned to the Sikhs before the battle of Gujerat, and was carried off by them in their flight. Chutter Singh and Shere Singh were now, by a strange reversal of fortune, sent to Lahore as prisoners, under the charge of Lawrence. Almost immediately afterwards Peshawur surrendered, and the Afghans were driven back to their own country, Dost Mohammed making his escape. There was no Hazara campaign, no Afghan campaign,

no prolongation of hostilities in the Jullundur Doab. The policy of one great campaign, and one only, had triumphed over the difficulties of race, distance, and climate, over the precipitancy of local officers, and over the dilatoriness of the Indian Government. 'I will have no small wars,' had been the motto of the Commander-in-Chief, and he had saved his army from the tedious and dangerous task of suppressing revolts all over the Punjab and its frontier districts, a task which would have proved to be only a preliminary to the inevitable conflict with the Khalsa.

XIV

AFTER GUJERAT

Lord Gough's last and greatest victory had added the Punjab to British India, and it had, unknown (at the time) to himself, saved the old soldier who gained it from falling a victim to a popular outcry of a kind which is fortunately rare in our annals. We have already referred to the outburst of alarm and excitement when the news of Chillianwalla reached London, in the beginning of March, 1849, and to the effect, upon the Government, of this misinformed and unreasoning shout of fear and revenge. During the weeks which elapsed before the arrival of the dispatches from the battlefield of Gujerat, this newspaper assault continued without intermission. The probability of accuracy in newspaper statements may be gathered from the information possessed by men in high places themselves. Lord Hardinge, at the banquet given to Sir Charles Napier before his departure, stated that Lord Gough had an army of over 60,000 men in the Punjab—nearly five times the number present at Chillianwalla. The popular clamour becomes more intelligible if this was generally believed. Even in the end of April, the President of the Board of Control stated in the House of Commons that Lord Gough's force at Chillianwalla numbered

18,000 men of all arms. It was actually 13,070. As copies of Indian journals began to circulate in this country, as camp gossip was being conveyed in private letters, the popular wrath grew fiercer and the accusations became more bitter. Any irresponsible statement which came from India appeared at once in the London papers 'upon highest authority.' Lord Gough had consistently denounced the Press as the curse of India, and during these weeks the Indian Press could enjoy its revenge.

The letters which appeared in the Indian newspapers (wrote one who was assuredly no friend[1] to the Commander-in-Chief) during the progress of the campaign, containing animadversions on Lord Gough, were often based on false statements, and dictated by the most paltry malice. Men, who had been unsuccessful in their application for staff appointments, vented their spite in elaborate articles, casting the most unwarrantable aspersions on the character of that illustrious soldier. Thus they were able to gratify their vindictive feelings without any fear of detection, for the papers to which their dastardly libels were sent did not previously insist on their authentication.

If, as Sir Henry Durand asserted in the *Calcutta Review*, the writer of these words had peculiar opportunities of knowing the *modus operandi* of the Indian Press, this statement may be the more readily accepted. The English newspapers, draw-

[1] Mr. E. J. Thackwell, in his *Narrative of the Second Seikh War*.

ing upon such sources, were little likely, in their 'private advices from India' to help the populace to a calmer and more rational state of mind. An example of the gossip which is to be found in their columns may be quoted from the *Morning Herald*:— 'Lord Gough, in spite of the protest of wiser men than himself, in spite of his own promise, threw himself upon the enemy's position [at Chillianwalla] without a thought of reconnoitring it.' Papers of less distinguished reputation, and an army of private letter-writers to the *Times*, varied these charges with different degrees of circumstantiality and assurance. The old General, while he admitted the right of his critics to express freely their opinion upon his capacity as a soldier, deeply resented these insinuations as to the circumstances and motives of his actions, and taking the *Morning Herald* statement as the most concise and not the most abusive form of this newspaper gossip, he placed upon record a signed statement that the assertions in the sentence we have quoted 'are all gratuitous falsehoods, without a shadow of truth in any one of them.' Enough has been said about Chillianwalla from a purely military standpoint, but these misstatements of its 'secret history' have received so much credence, and have found their way into so many textbooks, that it is necessary to give prominence to this denial on the part of the Commander-in-Chief. The device of destroying a General's reputation by unproved and unprovable assertions about the 'secret history'

of his battles, assertions made with the utmost assurance and sometimes with wealth of detail, has little to commend it beyond the temporary success which it may very easily achieve.

The result of this popular clamour was, as we have seen, the supersession of Lord Gough; but, in justice to the Government, it must be said that they were not guided by popular clamour alone. Since the Broughton MSS.[1], in the British Museum, have been rendered accessible to the public, there can be no breach of confidence in stating clearly the attitude of the Governor-General towards his Commander-in-Chief; and Lord Dalhousie, more than any other man, was responsible for the action taken by the Government. He had been President of the Board of Trade in Sir Robert Peel's Government when the Hardinge letter had arrived after the battle of Ferozeshah, and had taken his part in the deliberations which followed the receipt of that communication. The Governor-General, therefore, commenced his career in India with a prejudice against Lord Gough, a prejudice which he believed to be known to the Government of Lord John Russell; but his naturally chivalrous and open-minded temperament, and his uniform agreement with Lord Gough's measures, combined, during the summer of 1848, to prevent him from urging that the latter's term of office should not be extended. In writing home, he had distinctly contemplated

[1] Letters addressed to Lord Broughton (then Sir John Hobhouse), President of the Board of Control.

such an extension as a possibility, and had left the question entirely to the discretion of the Government, and he had expressed an opinion adverse to a proposal that Sir Charles Napier should be sent to India before the commencement of the campaign. Up to the actual outbreak of the war, his references to the Commander-in-Chief are, if never enthusiastic, uniformly kindly and commendatory.

After hostilities had commenced on a large scale, the Governor-General naturally felt himself in a position of extreme anxiety, and as events progressed, the absence of any definite and final victory reawakened his old distrust in the Commander-in-Chief. Harassed with many anxieties, and stationed at Ferozepore, within the reach of the numberless rumours that accompany Indian warfare, he became convinced that Lord Gough was doomed to mismanage the campaign, and to bring discredit, and possibly even defeat, upon the Government. The news of Chillianwalla confirmed him in this impression. He did not deny that it was a victory, but he accepted and transmitted to his superiors every accusation[1] against Lord Gough, retailing occasionally even camp gossip. These letters were written immediately after the

[1] We do not deal with these accusations in detail, as they have already been discussed in our account of the battle itself, and no fresh aspect is given to them by their transmission through the Governor-General to the President of the Board of Control.

battle was fought, and before there was time for any inquiry into the truth of the charges against the generalship. Considerations of chivalry vanished before the reflection that his own reputation was at stake, and he warned the home authorities that if they chose to conceal the fact that the failure was due, not to the Government of India, but to the incapable instrument by which its designs were carried out, he would himself reveal the truth. During the weeks before the victory of Gujerat, there is no cessation of the Governor-General's excitement and alarm. He completely misunderstood the long delay and the refusal to move which were the real cause of the final collapse of the Khalsa, and he bitterly complained of a general who was devoid of mind or plan and had nothing but an obstinate and jealous will. On February 21, while Lord Gough was winning so complete a victory over the enemy, Lord Dalhousie was writing home threatening, on his own responsibility, to remove him at once from his command, unless the approaching contest should prove decisive.

Within less than two months after writing the last of these letters, Lord Dalhousie, in a private letter to Colonel Mountain[1], stated that he had never entertained any unfriendly feeling to Lord Gough, and added:—'If I had made any suggestion to the

[1] Colonel Mountain was the friend of both the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, and he was attempting to smooth the relations between them. He sent Lord Gough an extract from Lord Dalhousie's letter.

people at home unfavourable to him [Gough], he should have been himself the first person informed of it.' The Governor-General was an honourable man, and absolutely incapable either of a deliberate falsehood or of such obvious equivocations as would be involved in the suggestions that these letters were not formal minutes but private letters to the President of the Board of Control, or that he had nowhere, in set terms, demanded Lord Gough's recall. It is scarcely necessary to disclaim any imputation upon the veracity of a distinguished man, whose honour has never been seriously questioned. This quotation from a private letter has been introduced because it shows the excited state of mind of the Governor-General during this painful and anxious time, and the question of Lord Dalhousie's state of mind has a very important bearing upon the weight to be attached to his charges against his Commander-in-Chief, charges which are now open to any reader in the British Museum, and which will doubtless receive the currency of print when the Governor-General's papers are published. Dalhousie was a man of emotional and passionate nature, and, in these moments of intense anxiety, he wrote in a manner which, a few weeks later, seemed incredible to himself. To such letters, written at such a time, but little weight can fairly be attached. Lord Dalhousie was unquestionably wrong in thinking that the steps by which Lord Gough prepared the way for Gujerat were indications of obstinacy

and jealousy and of the absence of brain power; he may have been equally wrong in other expressions employed during these moments of passion.

For this view of the subject, we do not wholly depend upon Lord Dalhousie's private letter to Colonel Mountain, explicit as that is. During these anxious weeks, he persuaded himself that Lord Gough's term of office had been extended in spite of protests from himself; and the President of the Board of Control found it necessary to send him a series of quotations from his own letters to convince him of the facts, which it was not easy to do. Finally, if any further proof of his veracity and his excitement alike is necessary, it will be found in the fact that he was quite unconscious that Gough's supersession was the result of his own advice; in his communications with Sir John Hobhouse, as in his letter to Colonel Mountain, he seems to be unaware that he had himself passed upon the Commander-in-Chief the severest censure that can be inflicted upon a brave man, in conveying to the home authorities suggestions of feebleness of intellect and military incompetence.

No fair-minded reader of Lord Dalhousie's letters can throw on the Government the responsibility for Lord Gough's recall. The Governor-General left ministers no option. To those of the general public who sympathized with Lord Gough, it seemed as if the Duke of Wellington had taken advantage of a moment of popular excitement in order to force Sir Charles Napier upon the Directors

of the East India Company. That distinguished soldier was more obnoxious to them than any other living man, and it must be admitted that the Directors' appeal to Sir Charles Napier, to save India, was a personal triumph for the Duke, as well as for Napier himself. But the most important fact before Lord John Russell and his colleagues was that the Governor-General considered the Commander-in-Chief in India incompetent to conclude the war; and the plain deduction was that it was necessary to send out some one to supersede him. Events were to show that it was not necessary; but it is scarcely fair to blame either the Prime Minister or the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army for thinking it so. Nothing, however, can be said in defence of the method which was adopted alike by Lord John Russell and by the Duke of Wellington. The pain which such a measure must inevitably bring to the old general whose abilities they distrusted, was greatly increased by a half-hearted and maladroit effort to conceal a fact which was patent to all the world. The announcement of Sir Charles Napier's appointment was made in answer to a question asked in the House of Commons, and question and answer could not be misunderstood by any sane person. The popular call for Napier and his hurried departure were in themselves sufficient indication of the unpleasant duty he was intended to perform. Yet, at the banquet given by the Directors to Sir Charles Napier on March 17, imme-

diately before he sailed for Calcutta, the Duke of Wellington expressed the view that there was no extraordinary emergency:—

If we are to fight great battles (he said), if great risks are to be run, we must expect to incur losses in the attainment of great ends. . . . As the period of service of the noble Lord who now commands in India will soon expire, and he will be desirous of returning to this country, it is desirable that an officer of such distinguished services and abilities as my honourable and gallant friend should be on the spot to take command of the army.

Five weeks later, Lord John Russell, when challenged with having sent out Sir Charles Napier without sufficient cause, used similar language in addressing the House of Commons:—

We are of opinion that sending Sir Charles Napier to India was a step calculated to maintain the credit of the British Army. Everybody knows that Lord Gough's usual service had expired, and that we might at any moment expect to receive . . . an announcement from him . . . begging that a successor might be appointed in his place.

Had language of this kind been confined to dinner-tables and the House of Commons, it would have been harmless, for it could deceive no one in this country. But, unfortunately, the Duke of Wellington, in informing Lord Gough of the decision of the Government, was sufficiently injudicious to use expressions of a similar kind. The letter was a strange mixture of firmness and hesitation. A laconic congratulation upon Chillianwalla

could not be said to commit the Duke to any approval of that action, so far as he understood it; nor did he conceal the vehemence with which Lord Gough was assailed by public opinion. But when he came to inform Lord Gough that Sir Charles Napier had been sent to India to wrest his command from him, the old Duke's courage seemed to fail him. Public opinion, he said, had been so strongly manifested, that the Government had been compelled to nominate a successor. But as to the all-important question whether Sir Charles Napier was at once to supersede Lord Gough in his command or to succeed him in ordinary course, the sole indications afforded in the Duke's letter were unfortunately ambiguous. Two expressions, 'when you shall come away,' and 'on your resigning the command or leaving India,' led Lord Gough to believe that his old Chief intended to spare him the last indignity, and the Duke's speech at the Napier banquet is sufficient to explain his reading of the letter.

In the beginning of March, after Gilbert had announced the surrender of the Khalsa, Lord Gough, feeling that the war was now completely over, resolved to comply with the desire of his family that he should be released from the cares of his high office, and took the ordinary course of applying to be relieved of his command. He intended to continue to perform his functions as Commander-in-Chief until the arrival of his successor, which, in the normal course of events, would not occur

until about the date of the completion of his sixth year of office, in the month of August. Had the Duke's letter been in any way explicit in its terms, he would have made immediate arrangements to leave India before the end of the cold season; as it was, he was startled to find that the East India Company's commission to Sir Charles Napier, proved, when it reached the Governor-General, to contemplate his immediate accession to office. Lord Dalhousie, whose behaviour to Lord Gough (after the close of a controversy which arose out of the circumstances of the campaign, and into which it is needless to enter) was as considerate as possible, informed him of the wording of the commission, and so gave him some warning of the blow which was about to fall. When Sir Charles Napier landed at Calcutta, it was found that the Queen's commission which he bore, ordered him to take command of the army 'without loss of time.' Both Lord Dalhousie and Sir Charles Napier felt that Lord Gough had been unfairly treated, and that he had been placed in a false position, as he himself said, by his dependence on the Duke's intimations. It was impossible for two old people to face the discomfort of a hurried departure and a long journey in the warm season, and the deposed Chief had no alternative but to remain in retirement until the winter.

You will have heard (wrote the new Commander-in-Chief, who had received, without a sign of jealousy, the news that there was no work for

him to do) that the war is over in India, and Lord Gough has come off with flying colours. Both these things rejoice me much . . . I like that noble old fellow Gough more than ever. I told him that my wish was that he would order me home; it would be a kindness, and so saying I told him the truth. . . . Again let me express my delight with old Gough; he is so good, so honest, so noble-minded[1].

Lord Gough, needless to say, did not order Sir Charles Napier home; he at once laid down his office. But in his sorrow, he derived no small comfort from the gentle and considerate kindness which he received from his successor and from the Governor-General. With Lord Dalhousie, anger never degenerated into malice, and the past had left on his mind no trace of bitterness, and no consciousness of injury received or done. He ordered that during Lord Gough's stay in India he should receive all the honour that had been his due as Commander-in-Chief, and he was unremitting in his efforts to show him all possible deference. Lord Gough received these attentions with gratitude, and never ceased to appreciate the tact and courtesy which lightened the burden of his last months in India.

The date of Sir Charles Napier's arrival at Calcutta (May 6) marks the darkest hour of our chronicle of Lord Gough's life, for English comments on Gujerat could not yet reach India, and every mail brought new attacks and fresh calumnies.

[1] Hon. W. N. Bruce's *Life of Sir Charles Napier*, p. 364.

Two supports sustained the old hero in his hour of need—domestic affection and the approbation of a good conscience.

Every public man (he wrote at this time) must expect in a long course of public service unjust animadversions and, not unfrequently, unfeeling treatment. But when a man knows that every act —every thought—his whole soul—is set upon one object, the good of his Country, and the honour of his Profession, a consolation is imparted, which blunts the shafts of malice, and makes harmless the acts of those led astray by false impressions. Unsolicited, I was sent to this country from a happy home. I shall now return to retirement unregrettingly.

Other consolations were not long delayed. The mails soon brought tidings of the reception at home of the 'crowning mercy' of Lord Gough's career, and the tone of the newspapers rapidly changed. The substitution of applause for the abuse to which he had become accustomed gave him but little pleasure; the one seemed to him as unintelligent as the other. The newspaper writers, in fact, were in something of a dilemma, for in the excitement of the moment, they had committed themselves to opinions which neither popular sentiment nor the logic of facts permitted them to retain. The situation was summed up with great candour by *Punch*, in whose pages the skilful pen of Thackeray had lauded Napier at the expense of Gough:—

Punch hereby begs to present his thanks to Lord Gough, and the officers and soldiers of the

British Army in India for the brilliant victory which they had the good fortune to gain the other day at Goojerat; and *Punch* by these presents, extols his Lordship and his troops to the skies. A few weeks ago *Punch* sent Lord Gough his dismissal, which *Mr. Punch* is now glad did not arrive in time to prevent the triumph for which he is thus thankful. Having violently abused Lord Gough for losing the day at Chillianwallah, *Punch* outrageously glorifies him for winning the fight at Goojerat. When Lord Gough met with a reverse, *Punch* set him down for an incompetent octogenarian; now that he has been fortunate, *Punch* believes him to be a gallant veteran; for *Mr. Punch*, like many other people, of course looks merely to results; and takes as his only criterion of merit, success.

What applied to the press applied equally to the House of Commons and to the Government. In due course, there reached India the votes of thanks passed by the Houses of Parliament on April 24, and an intimation that the Premier had advised Her Majesty to confer upon Lord Gough the dignity of a Viscounty of the United Kingdom. It was difficult to feel grateful to the ministry which had superseded him, or to the members of Parliament who had applauded their action:—

When the same Houses of Parliament (he wrote to Lord Dalhousie) a few weeks previously vociferously cheered the appointment of an Officer to supersede me, . . . at a time when such supersession might have brought my grey hairs with sorrow to the grave, and plunged my family into irremediable grief, I can hardly be expected to feel either pride or pleasure in the approval of what they were as

little capable of estimating as they were of judging faithfully of my military arrangements for Chillianwalla.

It was only after considerable hesitation that Lord Gough decided to accept the honour conferred upon him, and his reply to Lord John Russell evinces no sense of gratitude to the Government:—

SIMLA,
July 23rd, 1849.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's letter of the 7th June, acquainting me that Her Majesty, on your recommendation, has been pleased to grant me a step in the Peerage, by creating me a Viscount.

Under the circumstances of my recent supersession, it cannot but be gratifying to me to find that my late Services, in having signally overthrown in successive actions, the most powerful and warlike nation in India, and in having thereby enabled the Governor-General to annex to the British Dominions the finest portion of this vast Hemisphere, are recognized by Her Majesty.

I have the Honor to be,
Your Lordship's obedient humble servant,
GOUGH.

The Parliamentary speeches, on the occasion of the Vote of Thanks, proved interesting reading. The Duke of Wellington paid but a slight tribute to the Commander-in-Chief. 'Lord Gough,' he said, 'put himself at the head of the covering army, and had to fight those actions to which the noble Marquess [of Landsowne] has adverted, and which he did with uniform success in each of them,

though, no doubt, loss was sustained in some of those actions.' To Gujerat, he referred merely as 'the battle which was fought on the 21st of February.' In a private letter[1] to Lord Gough, he had been somewhat more cordial, and the tone of his speech in the House of Lords was, therefore, a surprise which tended to create a fresh feeling of injustice. Lord Hardinge was more generous in his personal praise, and it came the more graciously because Lord Gough knew that his old comrade-in-arms had been consulted before his supersession, and had urged the Government not to take that step. At the Napier banquet, Lord Hardinge had even ventured to say some words in defence of the veteran of whom all men were speaking evil, and to express the belief that he would accomplish his task.

[1] The letter ran thus:—

LONDON, *April 20th*, 1849.

MY DEAR LORD,

I have received your letter of the 5th March and by the same occasion the Government has received the detailed Reports of the glorious Victory atchieved on the 21st Febry. Your Lordship will have observed, from the contents of my letter addressed to you on the 5th March, that the Government had anticipated your wishes of retiring from your Command when you should have brought to a close the important operations which you were in the course of carrying on.

I sincerely congratulate you upon this last glorious Victory. It must ever be considered as a fine termination of your glorious Career in the East.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
Ever yours most sincerely,
WELLINGTON.

His Excellency,
General Lord Gough, G.C.B.

The speeches in the House of Commons gave Lord Gough more pleasure. Several representatives of Ireland expressed the pride of their country in her distinguished son and in the work he had accomplished. Sir Robert Peel also seized the opportunity of saying some generous words. We have seen that the effect of Hardinge's letter, after Ferozeshah, had been largely discounted by subsequent investigation into the circumstances, and the ex-Premier must have felt that Lord Gough had been hardly treated by the Government of 1846 as well as by the Government of 1849.

It was with the utmost satisfaction (he said) that I heard that that noble soldier had closed a long career of victory and of glory by an achievement worthy of his former exploits. He has now, I believe, for fifty-four years served the Crown as a soldier. If at the earlier period of the recent campaign in the Punjab, doubts were entertained by some as to the ultimate results of that campaign, in those doubts I never shared. I felt the utmost confidence that the final issue of it would redound to the honour of Lord Gough, and would give new security to the British dominion in India.

Shortly after these words were spoken, there arrived in England a private letter from Lord Gough to his son, from which we have already quoted some important statements explaining the course of events at Ramnuggur and Chillianwalla. Captain Gough addressed a copy of this letter to Sir Robert Peel, and thanked him for his defence of his father :—

Without a friend to defend him in England, without a supporter where he would most have looked for support, and unable, by his absence in his country's service, to defend himself, his name has been traduced, and a service of fifty-five years forgotten, and, had it not been for Sir Robert Peel's noble and generous speech in the House of Commons, Lord Gough's services would only have been acknowledged *pro forma.*

To this letter Sir Robert Peel replied:—

WHITEHALL, *May 5th*, 1849.

I return with many thanks the letter from your father which you have been good enough to send me. I have read it with great interest, and with feelings of increased Respect for the proud and gallant spirit which dictated the Sentiments to which it gives expression. Great victories cannot be achieved without encountering great Risks, and without occasional interruptions to the career of success. But the people of this Country ought to know that such Risks are most likely to be diminished and such interruptions of success most likely to be repaired, when the Commander of an Army sets a brilliant example of moral and personal courage and infuses into those who obey and follow him, his own heroic spirit and devotion to public Duty. I can hardly lament the temporary Injustice which has been done to Lord Gough, because the certain effect of it will be to ensure him on his return to his native Country, a welcome, possibly yet more gratifying and cordial than that which would otherwise have awaited him.

We close this whole discussion with a letter[1] in which Lord Gough, writing in the month of August, when he could take a more dispassionate

[1] Lord Gough to Sir John Macdonald, August 19, 1849.

view of the whole question of his treatment by press and public alike, expressed his feelings freely and frankly:—

It would be impossible not to be pleased with the recognition of my services by my Sovereign, and the congratulation of such numerous friends. You may well say, that I 'stand in an enviable position' —thanks to a gracious God for not only covering my head in the day of battle, but for granting to me that of which the machinations of man attempted, tho' vainly, to deprive me, a victory, not only over my Enemies, but over my Country! The Press, apparently my greatest foe, has proved my greatest friend, as it called forth the sympathies of the good, and the research of those who felt that it was as unjust as it was un-English to condemn a man unheard. I have the satisfaction of knowing that I have commanded in 15 General Actions without ever having experienced Defeat, that I have conquered the Chinese, the Mahrattas, and the Sikhs, without such Conquests having cost my Country a Rupee, and that I go home with the proud consciousness that, however I may have screened others, because I felt the honor of my Profession and my Country's good required the sacrifice—with temporary injury to myself—no man in this Army can say that for personal aggrandizement, for fame, or for comfort, I ever neglected looking after that of the meanest soldier in the Army. I am not usually given to self-laudation, but the line of conduct pursued towards me, innocuous tho', under Divine Providence, it has been, calls not for wrath, which would be unbecoming, but for acknowledgement and praise where it is due, to the Great Giver of all good things—the best of which, humanly speaking, is the praise and good opinion of good men.

The closing months of Lord Gough's Indian career were, naturally, almost devoid of public interest. His work was done, and, in the discussions which preceded the annexation of the Punjab or in the arrangements which followed, he had no share. His farewell Order[1] to the Army of the Punjab was issued on March 31, and, although he continued to hold office for some weeks later, no business of importance was transacted. He rejoined Lady Gough at Simla on April 19, and remained at his house there, Bentinck Castle, or in the neighbourhood (occupying a cottage near Simla in the warm weather) till November 10, when, one week after celebrating his seventieth birthday, he bade farewell to his Indian home. Domestic anxiety and domestic joy had occupied much of his thoughts during the summer. On May 31, Lady Gough had a serious accident, falling backwards over the verandah, a height of some ten or twelve feet. Fortunately, no bone was broken, but she was considerably bruised, and, at her age, the shock to the system was in itself a serious consequence of the fall. In the end of July, the young wife of Colonel J. B. Gough (Lord Gough's nephew) died at Simla after an illness of some weeks. She was the daughter of Brigadier McCaskill, who had fallen at Moodkee, and the old General was greatly attached to her. Brighter news reached Simla towards the end of October, when the heart of the old chief was rejoiced by the announcement of the

[1] Printed in Appendix.

birth of his grandson, afterwards the third Viscount Gough.

Lord Gough's public letters during this period are largely occupied with the endeavour to obtain a just and fair award of honours among those who had served him through the campaign, and the spirit of the old lion flashed as of yore if it seemed to him that the authorities were unmindful of the desert of his soldiers. It is for this purpose only that he emerged from the strict retirement in which he lived. Dinners, receptions, testimonials of all sorts he declined; there is no trace of even a murmur in his correspondence when it was decided that the Koh-i-nur, which the army under his command had won for the British Crown, should be conveyed to the Queen by other hands than those of the Commander-in-Chief. But when a resolution was adopted, in opposition to the advice of the Governor-General, that the medal granted for the Punjab campaign should bear no clasp for Chillianwalla, his wrath blazed forth.

By this injudicious arrangement (he wrote to the Chairman of the East India Company) men covered with scars will be placed upon a footing with those who never heard the whiz of a ball or saw the gleam of a sabre in the battlefield. Are such things to be endured?

His last letter from India bears witness to similar endeavours to secure what he believed to be right. It is written from Allahabad, on November 30, and is addressed to Sir Charles Napier:—

My dear Napier,

Here is my last speech and dying words! I should not have time to write at Calcutta; indeed, were I to wait until I arrived there, my last efforts would not reach England until after I had done so myself, and I should wish to follow up the attack rather than have to commence operations. Will you do me the favor, if you see no objection, to place upon record in the Office of the Adjutant-General of the Army, copies of the accompanying letters containing my sentiments, in order that, whatever may be the fate of my exertions at Home, they may at some future time benefit those who have served me, as I have no doubt they will serve you—well!

Wishing you once more health, success, and happiness. Believe me always,

Yours very sincerely,

Gough.

The Government did not give effect to all Lord Gough's recommendations, but it is pleasant to record that, on the main question, the grant of a clasp for Chillianwalla, his protest was successful.

The journey from Simla to Calcutta was performed leisurely and proved very pleasant. The Governor-General renewed his orders that all military honours were to be paid to Lord Gough, and sent his own steamer to convey him down the river. At Allahabad he had the great pleasure of finding the 87th Regiment in garrison, and he broke the rule he had made for himself and attended a dinner which the regiment gave in his honour. As they had cheered him on his way to India, so now they wished him 'God-speed' as he passed out of

public life. He reached Calcutta on December 29, where he was enthusiastically received, and where he attended a ball given at Government House in his honour. On January 8, he sailed for England in the *Haddington*, calling at Madras, where he received an address, as he had done after his return from China seven years before. Visits to Cairo, Malta, and Gibraltar pleasantly varied the tedium of the journey home, and, on the afternoon of Sunday, February 24, he set foot on English soil at Southampton. 'Landed under gratifying circumstances that will never be forgotten. God be praised!' is the entry in his diary for the day.

The welcome he received in England was, as Sir Robert Peel had foretold, more than enthusiastic. There was a general feeling that he had been wronged, and a general desire to atone for an undeserved slight. The silent dignity with which he had borne ill repute impressed the public mind, and men came to believe that if he had declined to defend himself, it was because his actions required no defence. For Lord Gough himself, the year that had passed had not been without its softening influence; the wound had healed; and he was prepared to receive such atonement as those who had inflicted it might now wish to make. The revulsion of popular feeling was, as usual, complete, and the warmth of his reception would have satisfied a mind more greedy of applause than his. The presentation of an address at Southampton, and the cheers which greeted his disembarkation

and his departure for London were a fitting prelude to the rejoicing of the next few weeks. He reached London on Monday, February 25, and paid a visit to his son, then residing in Upper Brook Street. Within the next day or two, he had the pleasure of receiving visits from Sir Robert Peel, Viscount Hardinge, Lord John Russell, and numbers of other distinguished politicians and soldiers, and he himself called upon the Chairman and Court of Directors. On March 1 Prince Albert received him at Buckingham Palace, and, on the same evening, he dined with Her Majesty. The City of London and the Goldsmiths' Company enrolled him among their freemen, and the University of Oxford conferred upon him the degree of D.C.L. The Senior United Service Club entertained him to dinner on March 20, when the Duke of Wellington was present and spoke; three days later, he attended a dinner given in his honour by the Court of Directors, and had the pleasure of hearing Sir Robert Peel pay a tribute to the services he had rendered. In the beginning of April, he went to stay with his eldest daughter, Mrs. Supple, at Bath and the people of Bath spared no effort to receive him worthily. From a banquet in the Guildhall at Bath he returned to London to dine with the Oriental Club, the Junior United Service Club, and the Goldsmiths. On the 26th he left London for Dublin, and found a further series of welcomes and entertainments awaiting him in Ireland. To all these addresses of welcome and complimentary speeches, he replied in straight-

forward soldierly fashion, accepting the praise in the spirit in which it was offered, and making no reference to any controversy. Self-laudation and self-defence are alike absent from his speeches; but it should be mentioned that in the most important of them he found opportunities of eulogizing the help received from Lord Hardinge in the first Sikh War and the services of Sir William Parker in China.

It would be useless to burden these pages with a recital of all to which Lord Gough listened or even of all that he said, and worse than useless to chronicle the entertainments he attended as the 'lion' of London society in the season of 1850. But we may fitly close this chapter with the speech which gave the returned hero perhaps his highest gratification, the words[1] in which the Duke of Wellington, speaking at the United Service Club, expressed his final verdict on the career and the work of Lord Gough. A year had passed since the date of his speech in the House of Lords, and he had had opportunities of making a fresh and unbiassed judgement, with the evidence before him. It is not unfair to conjecture that the tone of his speech was affected by that subsequent examination, for to the old Duke the phrase 'the highest qualities of the British soldier' was no mere form of words:—

I am exceedingly happy to be with you on this interesting occasion. Equally with every member

[1] From *The Times*, March 21, 1850.

of the United Service Club, I was most anxious to pay my respects to Lord Gough on his triumphant return to this country. Gentlemen, a strong sense was entertained in this country, and I believe participated in by every member of this Club, of the arduous difficulties with which our noble and gallant friend had to contend. We all recollect the anxiety with which we contemplated his operations—the eagerness with which accounts of his proceedings were read, and the joy and exultation occasioned by the knowledge of the glorious successes achieved under his command. My noble friend [Lord Gough] has adverted most honourably to the assistance he received from another noble friend of mine at this table during the time he was Governor-General of that country which is under the control of the East India Company. Gentlemen, the United Service are sensible of the services of Lord Hardinge, and they must now be sensible of the honourable conduct of the Commander-in-Chief in giving him credit for that assistance which, both as Governor-General and in his military capacity, he gave to his operations. We have seen that, throughout the services carried on under the direction of my noble friend, Lord Gough, he has himself afforded the brightest example of the highest qualities of the British soldier in the attainment of the glorious successes which have attended the British army under his command. Gentlemen, having now had the honour of receiving Lord Gough in our own hall, and giving him the handsomest reception in our power, I am sure you will all join with me in hoping that he may long live to enjoy the favour of a gracious Sovereign, the affectionate regard of his fellow subjects in general, and of the members of this Club especially, for his great and noble services in the cause of his country.

BOOK V

CLOSING YEARS

1. Domestic Life
2. The Mission to the Crimea
3. Conclusion

I

DOMESTIC LIFE

When Viscount Gough bade farewell to India, he had already entered upon the 'borrowed years' which the proverb allows to those who have passed the Psalmist's landmark of threescore and ten. The long evening of his busy life was tranquil, but not inactive. The nineteen years which elapsed between his arrival in England in the end of February, 1850, and his death in the beginning of March, 1869, were disturbed by no echoes of military controversy and distracted by no personal recrimination. He lived to stand by the bier of Lord Hardinge, and to mourn the premature death of Lord Dalhousie. Of the men who had been associated with him in India, many of the most distinguished preceded him to the grave. Lord Clyde, Sir Charles Napier, Sir Henry Lawrence, Sir Herbert Edwardes —the two latter still in their prime—were among the number of those whose task was ended, while the old Chief still survived, rendering service to Queen and country as opportunity offered. The love of wife and child, which had always been so potent an influence in his life, continued to brighten many years of rest and leisure. He was received as an honoured guest and friend by the Sovereign

whom he revered, and in England and Scotland, as well as in his beloved Ireland, he could not but feel that his countrymen were proud of his achievements, and that they entertained for him a real affection. Evening, said the ancient poet, bringeth all good things.

The pen would linger over these closing years, but there is little to record. The excitement of the home-coming over, it remained to find a roof-tree for old age. No immediate step was taken, and it was decided to spend the first autumn in visiting some of the famous scenery of Scotland and England, while the question of a permanent settlement remained in abeyance. The first visit was paid in July (1850) to Devonshire, where the welcome to Lord Gough was renewed. 'Crowds awaited us,' wrote Lady Gough to her daughter, from Barnstaple, 'and a man on horseback came out to ask, in the name of the Mayor, if Lord Gough would accept an address already prepared. A long way from this, the horses were taken out of both carriages and we were brought in by men, through a vast concourse, and under seven or eight arches, really beautifully adorned by the ladies here, with worked flags, whilst the decoration with quantities of flowers and laurels was *overseen* by the gentlemen. A band came from Torrington, and it was really pretty to see the people and children dancing on the green behind the house until twelve o'clock.' The warmth of the reception in Devonshire was rivalled in Scotland, where Lord Gough spent some

months. On August 5, he was presented with the freedom of the City of Edinburgh, and, later in his tour, the example of Edinburgh was followed by Inverness, while, all through the Highlands, the people were enthusiastic in greeting the veteran who had led so many of their sons to victory. The tour in Scotland commenced with the Trossachs, whence the party proceeded to the Kyles of Bute, and then by Loch Fyne and the Crinan Canal to Oban. Lord Gough's Diary records a strange accident in the Canal: 'By a lady's clothes getting in the rudder, the steamer got on shore and was very badly managed by the captain. We had a narrow escape . . . and were obliged to exchange our steamer at Oban.' From Oban, Lord and Lady Gough went to Inverness by Fort William and the Caledonian Canal. They paid some long visits in the neighbourhood of Inverness, where a large number of their family gradually gathered round them, and it was not till the middle of November that they began to retrace their steps southwards. So successful was this visit, that the purchase of a place in Scotland was for some time seriously contemplated. But the old soldier's love of Ireland, which had previously withstood the temptations of a beautiful English home in Warwickshire, was proof also against this fresh inducement to settle out of his native country, and he returned to London determined to find a dwelling-place on Irish soil.

Many memories and associations clung round the

old home at Rathronan, which had been let during Lord Gough's absence in India, but which was now available if he desired to return to it. After considerable hesitation, he decided to make over Rathronan to his son, and he entered into negotiations for the purchase of the estate of Killymoon in the North of Ireland. These negotiations had almost been brought to a successful conclusion, when an unexpected difficulty occurred, and the idea was abandoned. About the same time, the failure of a bank involved Lord Gough in the loss of a very considerable proportion of his fortune, and he contented himself, meanwhile, with the purchase of a large house in the vicinity of Dublin. This house, known as St. Helen's (Booterstown), came into his possession in the autumn of 1851, and it continued to be his home until his death. In 1854, Lord Gough purchased an estate in County Galway, including a beautiful inland lake studded with islands. Lough Cutra Castle, situated on the shore of this lake, had attracted Lord Gough's admiration before his departure for India, but it had been, for a few years, used as a school by the Religious Order of Loretto, Dublin, and it was in a condition which necessitated complete renovation and considerable additions, and Lady Gough, now comfortably settled at St. Helen's, did not feel herself able to undertake the task. Lord Gough paid occasional visits to it, but, ere long, he placed it at the disposal of his son, who was able to transfer the lease of Rathronan to a cousin. To Lough Cutra were brought two of

the beautifully chased Sikh guns[1] which had been captured at Ferozeshah and Sobraon, and some other trophies of Chinese and Indian warfare, but the old General never lived on his new property for any length of time.

The next important event in Lord Gough's life was his mission to the Crimea in the summer of 1856, but it will be convenient to reserve an account of it for a separate chapter, and to attempt here to furnish some illustrations of the domestic life whose affections had survived the years of high responsibility in China and in India to sweeten the eventless days spent at St. Helen's or in visits to London or to Scotland. More than five decades of wedded life served only to deepen the affection which had united Hugh Gough and Frances Stephens in the early years of the nineteenth century. It was the ruling passion of his life. The outpourings of emotion which characterize the letters of the husband who had left behind his young wife and her babe, while he did his endeavour against the great enemy of Europe, pale before the outbursts of love and tenderness which adorn those of the white-haired old soldier who was fighting his last battles against the most dangerous foe to British rule in India; the language of affection which fills his

[1] Other guns had been presented to Queen Victoria and to Lord Dalhousie. Of five which fell to the Commander-in-Chief, two were, as we have said, retained as family heirlooms, and three (one from Maharajpore and two from Gujerat) were presented to the Museum at Dublin.

Peninsular correspondence is heightened and ennobled in that which is dated from the Sutlej or the Jhelum. It was no mere reliance on wifely duty and womanly devotion. His confidence in her tact and wisdom was as absolute as his faith in her love and loyalty. He felt himself, above all else, a soldier, with all the defects of a soldier's qualities, and in the difficulties of ordinary life he looked to her for guidance and for help. No man ever fought for his native land with more real love of country or single-minded zeal in her service; but love of country was second to one other source of inspiration in moments of difficulty and danger. All his successes were tried by the test of his wife's approbation; if he had satisfied her, he had found a satisfaction against which the resources of calumny were powerless. Over and over again, he had been brave to 'fear not slander, censure rash,' strong in a mind conscious of rectitude and in a perfect love that was also a perfect trust. At the feet of 'my Beloved' he laid all the honours which the years brought to him; without her, they seemed to him meaningless and void. His letters abound in the sentiment of Byron's apostrophe to Fame:—

'There chiefly I sought thee, there only I found thee;
Her glance was the best of the rays that surround thee;
When it sparkled o'er aught that was bright in my story,
I knew it was love and I felt it was glory.'

FRANCES VISCOUNTESS GOUGH

The noble and gracious lady upon whom all this wealth of love was lavished proved herself worthy of such a husband. She met his confidence in her judgement with a whole-hearted devotion which contained no thought of self, and which knew the limitations of its own usefulness. While no part of her husband's mind was unknown to her, she never allowed even her passionate desire to be of use to him to lead her to interfere in a province where womanly tact could avail nothing. It was characteristic of their perfect union of heart and soul that each recognized where the other was the best judge of circumstance and the only guide of action. In all questions of social life, in the drudgery of official correspondence, in the controversies which forced her husband to fight with the pen instead of the sword, she was ever by his side, calming his ardent temper, or suggesting a few tactful words; but their large and intimate correspondence bears no trace of the slightest effort to influence the Commander-in-Chief in deciding upon any question—personal or other—of military importance.

For the rest, her life was devoted to his welfare, and she deemed no sacrifice too great if it contributed to his comfort. Throughout a large proportion of her married life, and during all her time in India, she suffered from a most painful affection of the throat, of the nature of tic-douloureux. But she was determined that the Commander-in-Chief should not fail in any portion of his duty through the misfortune of possessing an invalid wife, and, accordingly,

she nerved herself to the performance of the social tasks which fell to her lot, often suffering agonies throughout a ball or a dinner-party, and concealing her pain lest it should cause him discomfort. The fullness of her sacrifice was never known to her husband, although he appreciated it to some extent: but, occasionally, in writing to her daughters she gives some indication of what it cost her. 'I am sure I should suffer far less,' she says, 'leading a quiet regular life, but this cannot be done without leaving your Father, which remedy I consider far worse than the disease. I wish, however, some of us could persuade him not to like fixing his camp for the length of time he does, in those horrid large stations, where he invites so many that we are never alone even with our own large Staff. . . . I do wish he would take us away, but he is so delighted reviewing troops and inspecting hospitals and barracks, and looking at new marching inventions, that we are in the greatest fear he will remain a month. . . . I see very little of your dear Father, except when we are both working officially, up to the eyes, but I often flatter myself (perhaps it is vanity) that I can be useful to him, and my little help enables him to get out an hour sooner than he otherwise could, which hour is invaluable to his health.' Now and then, human nature could no longer stand the strain. 'This has been a very bad attack indeed. . . . For the pain, I can bear it, but it interferes so much with him and his pleasures. The last two dinners, for instance, this week, I could not

go in. I was obliged to make Fanny [Mrs. Grant] take my place. If I got 1,000 guineas, I could not speak sometimes, so how could I sit silent? I know he does not like my being absent.'

Two long periods of separation had constituted one of the chief trials of their wedded life: the years spent in the Peninsula, and those occupied by the campaign in China. The two Sikh Wars were, of course, the times of acutest anxiety, for Lady Gough was within reach of the baseless rumours which alarmed British India, and she had, in both instances, the task of cheering her daughter, Mrs. Grant, whose husband was, it will be remembered, Adjutant-General of the Army. 'The last few months,' she wrote, after the conclusion of the first Sikh War, 'have committed great havoc, and no wonder, for amidst all my trials of the Peninsula, China, or Captain Rock, I never knew so fully the depth of misery and anxiety these months occasioned. . . . As to anxiety, never can you have any idea of the intensity of Fanny's and mine the twelve days before the 31st December. Never, never shall I forget it. In anxiety to keep her up, on account of her babe, I strove to disguise a part of mine, but the cord had nearly cracked, and I was getting nearly crazed when on the 31st we had the blessing of seeing his handwriting once more. Daily, twice a day, we heard different reports. One day we heard they were defeated and the Sikhs were coming down in force to these lower stations. Another day that Ferozepore and Loodianah were taken—in

short, we got up but to be miserable, and lay down but for sleep disturbed and full of dreadful dreams.' But, terrible as her own anxiety was, Lady Gough was never too engrossed to find time to sympathize with 'some poor bleeding widowed heart' to whom the news from the front had brought grief and despair, or to send the glad tidings of a dear one's safety to some more fortunate waiting wife or mother.

It had been with a real regret—hidden, of course, from Lord Gough—that the wife of the Commander-in-Chief heard of his reappointment in the summer of 1848. 'The last mail,' she told her daughter, Mrs. Arbuthnot, 'was of great importance to me. I had hoped it would have brought out the appointment of a successor to your dear Father.... Putting myself out of the question, I really thought the dear Father had been long enough in India. However, as everything has been, all my life, through the goodness of God, "for the best," I am sure this is too. This itself pleased him, but the delight expressed by all the General Staff at having "Got your Lordship for another year at all events" has greatly gratified him. The ten weeks of the Punjab Campaign were again a period of terrible anxiety for the devoted wife of the Commander on whom everything depended. The days of misrepresentation and calumny which followed Chillianwalla she faced with unflinching determination to prevent Lord Gough from attributing undue importance to these attacks, and to convince him that justice would yet

be done him by his countrymen. When the news of Sir Charles Napier's appointment came, her womanly tact attempted to bring about an arrangement by which he should delay for a few days the assumption of the command, until Lord Gough should hand it over to him at Simla: 'In this case,' she said, 'it would be a relief, not a supersession.' Even when the terms of Napier's commission rendered this little device impracticable, Lady Gough encouraged her husband to maintain the dignified attitude which had won all men's respect. When Sir Charles reached Simla, Lady Gough at once invited him to dinner, along with his daughter, Mrs. McMurdo, to meet the Governor-General and Lady Dalhousie. 'Lord Dalhousie,' she says, 'and Sir Charles and nice Sir Harry Elliot were in great spirits, and we had a remarkably pleasant day—was not that nice, as it was our last dinner?' This little incident occurred, and these cheerful sentences were written, before one single alleviating sign or token had reached India from England. It was well for the old hero that, at such a moment, he had such a companion by his side.

These were some of the memories which Lord Gough and his wife brought with them to their new home at St. Helen's. Lady Gough's days of pain were as numerous as before, but her anxiety had passed away for ever, and she rejoiced in the almost boisterous good health of her husband. 'I have never enjoyed better health for many years,' he writes, day after day, in his journal at St. Helen's.

It was a life which Lord Gough was peculiarly fitted to enjoy. He was as active and as hospitable as ever, and he delighted to ride the favourite charger which had carried him at Gujerat, and to entertain old friends and comrades as they passed through Dublin. He enjoyed occasional journeys across the channel, and, after the purchase of Lough Cutra, made expeditions to County Galway. Lady Gough was not able to accompany him on all these excursions; but she paid, at all events, one visit to Lough Cutra, which was the occasion of a little incident, trivial in itself, but throwing so much light on the domestic life of the old General in his later years, that we venture to quote some sentences. Writing from Lough Cutra, Lady Gough tells her daughter: 'The father came in for a downright scold—such a thing I don't think I ever ventured upon before, long as we have been married. I was in great pain after walking to the Limerick Gate to look at the Castle from that road, so that I could not venture again, in such damp, to go with or for him to the new Garden. Well, six came, half-past six—dinner hour—then seven struck before my messengers, one after the other, could get him in. He came at a quarter-past seven, laughing away, declaring he was not the least cold, tho' shivering, and his trowsers so wet. . . . I could not resist, and, I did downright scold, and ended by saying: "It is quite wicked of you. When God has blessed you with such a constitution as you have—that you will trifle with it as you do, by remaining in the damp night air twice since you came here. Be

assured you are shortening your life by such repeated coughs; but for the draught I made you take last night you would have been in a pretty state to-day." —He never said one word, just fancy!... The white draught which he hates so cordially I made him take, and certainly it stopped the cough for he slept pretty well, and is all right this morning, thank God.' The little extract requires no apology for finding a place in these memorials of Lord Gough's life: every line is so womanly, and the note of feeling sounds so true.

During these years, while Lady Gough still lived, the home at St. Helen's was brightened by the presence of numerous grandchildren. The Arbuthnot family and the Grant family were both at home, and there was no anxiety about distant relatives (except when Sir Patrick was in India during the Mutiny). The children of Colonel Haines were also much with their grandparents, and Captain George Gough and his children were close at hand. The only break in the family circle was caused by the death of Mrs. Supple, in November, 1853. Lord Gough was devotedly attached to all his children and grandchildren, and he liked to have the young ones about him. When the seventh Earl of Carlisle came to Ireland as Lord-Lieutenant, he became an intimate friend of the old General, whose grandchildren found a new playmate in Her Majesty's representative. A tradition has long survived of a game of 'musical chairs' at a children's party at St. Helen's, at which, after a spirited contest, for the last

remaining chair, between Lord Carlisle and Lord Gough, the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland found himself seatless, and subject to all the penalties of failure.

Gradually, changes were brought about in the pleasant circle. The children, as they grew up, could be less frequently under their grandfather's roof; but the greatest change of all was the death of Lady Gough, which occurred, suddenly, on Sunday, March 15, 1863. She had seen fresh laurels added to her husband's wreath; he had become a full General in 1854 and Colonel-in-Chief of the 60th Rifles in the same year. On the death of Lord Raglan in the Crimea, in June, 1855, he was made Colonel of the Royal Horse Guards, and Gold-Stick-in-Waiting to the Queen. His devotion to his sovereign, and the gracious kindness she invariably extended to him, made him value highly an appointment which brought him into contact with her. In 1857, he was made a Knight of the Most Illustrious Order of St. Patrick [1] and a member of the Privy Council, and when, in 1861, Queen Victoria instituted the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, he was one of the original Knights Grand Commanders. Finally, in November, 1862, he attained the dignity which pleased him most, by his elevation to the rank of Field-Marshal of the British Army. These distinctions all came to him during the lifetime of his wife, and she was able to rejoice with him in them all.

[1] He is said to have been the first to receive this honour without holding a title in the Peerage of Ireland.

Lady Gough's health had been gradually declining and had frequently given cause for grave anxiety, but in the beginning of 1863, she became much better, and the suddenness of her death added to the intensity of her husband's sorrow. The sympathy of numerous friends was freely accorded to him, and it was gratefully received, but it was natural that the loss of her who had been so beloved for nigh sixty years changed everything for the short time that remained to her husband. Among the letters sent him in those days of sorrow was one from Queen Victoria, which we print, along with Lord Gough's reply:—

WINDSOR CASTLE, *March 23rd*, 1863.

THE QUEEN has heard with much concern of the sad affliction which has befallen Lord Gough, and is anxious to express personally her sincere sympathy with him. She recollects having met his lamented wife at the Phœnix Park, ten years ago, and how kind and amiable she was.

Irreparable as his loss is, how blessed to have lived on together till the evening of their lives, with the comfort and hope of the separation being but a short one. To the poor Queen, this blessing, so needful to her, has been denied, and she can only hope never to live to see old age, but to be allowed to rejoin her beloved great and good husband, ere many years elapse. The Queen sincerely hopes that Lord Gough's health may not have suffered, and asks him to express her sincere sympathy to his family.

ST. HELEN'S, NEAR DUBLIN, *27th March*, 1863.

MADAM,—Your Majesty's most gracious sympathy is a solace to a wounded heart. May the God of

Mercy and Grace bless Your Majesty and restore you to that peace which He reserves for, and freely bestows on, all who love and serve Him.

Your Majesty's sympathy is a balm to the stricken of this family. They bless Your Majesty for this sympathy, and devotedly pray that the God of all Mercy and Grace may vouchsafe to our honoured Sovereign His choicest Blessings here below, and when re-united to one so deservedly beloved, pronounce that joyful summons: 'Come, ye beloved Children of My Father, receive the Kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world.' I have the honour to be,

Your Majesty's most devoted humble and grateful servant,

GOUGH.

To The Queen.

II

THE MISSION TO THE CRIMEA

THE even tenor of Lord Gough's life, between his return from India and the death of Lady Gough, was interrupted only by an expedition to the Crimea[1] to invest the generals of the allied armies

[1] It is interesting to note that the first speech of Lord Gough in the House of Lords was made on Friday, December 15, 1854, on a motion that the thanks of the House be given to Lord Raglan and the Crimean army. 'I rise,' he said, 'with a considerable degree of difficulty to address your lordships on this occasion, for the first time since I have had the honour of a seat in this House; but I could not feel myself justified in giving a silent vote upon a motion such as that now before your lordships. I am proud, my lords, to say that the position I now hold is attributable, and wholly attributable, to the deeds of the British army. I cannot, therefore, my lords, content myself with giving a mere silent assent to a motion for passing a vote of thanks to that army—especially when I recollect that many of those gallant men who are now serving in the Crimea assisted me nobly in another sphere. My lords, no one of your lordships can join more cordially than I do in according the thanks of this House to the noble lord who now so ably commands the army of the Crimea, and to the officers and soldiers of all ranks composing it. My lords, it has also been my good fortune to have been associated with the sister service, and I therefore the more cordially beg to join in the vote of thanks to the officers and sailors of the naval force employed in these operations, and who are included in the motion

with the distinctions which Queen Victoria had decided to confer upon them after the successful conclusion of the war with Russia. In the beginning of May, 1856, Lord Panmure, then Secretary of State for War, intimated to Lord Gough the desire of Her Majesty that he should undertake this duty. The old General was now in his seventy-seventh year, and although his health was good, there were obvious risks in undertaking so long a journey with so large an amount of ceremonial as was involved in the mission. But the announcement that Her Majesty would regard, as a personal gratification, Lord Gough's acquiescence in her desire, was decisive in the matter, and Lady Gough, though unable to accompany her husband, agreed with him that he must obey the expressed wish of his Sovereign. Lord Panmure was, accordingly, informed 'that he had but to give the word "march," and Lord Gough would start in an hour.'

The departure was not quite so sudden, but, within a week of receiving the first intimation,

submitted by the noble Duke [of Newcastle]. And I beg further to be allowed to observe that, having recently returned from the Continent, where I had the pleasure of passing some time in association with officers of the French army, and with some of the officers who are now in command of that portion of that army which is serving with our own troops in the Crimea—I most cordially join in the vote of thanks to their gallant and distinguished commander, and to the noble and brave soldiers, who, under his distinguished command, have fought so valiantly side by side with our own troops.'

Lord Gough was at Paris, on his way to Marseilles. Some pleasant days were spent at Malta and in Constantinople, and, on June 4, Lord Gough landed at Sebastopol, where he was received by General Sir William Coddrington, and conducted to head quarters, inspecting, on his way, the scene of the still recent military operations. Next day, he received calls from Marshal Pélissier (afterwards the Duc de Malakof) and from General Sir Hugh Rose (afterwards Lord Strathnairn), and he took the first opportunity of paying his respects to Miss Florence Nightingale. On Friday, June 6, the investiture took place, with all the ceremonial proper to the occasion. A throne was prepared upon a daïs at the foot of a flight of steps leading down to a garden in rear of the British head quarters. On either side of the approach to this platform, a guard of honour was drawn up. Four divisions of the British Army were massed in quarter-distance columns in front, forming three sides of a square. The officers of the allied armies and navies were invited to attend, and were present in large numbers.

At eleven o'clock, Lord Gough, as representing Her Majesty the Queen, took his seat on the throne, wearing full dress uniform as Colonel of the Royal Horse Guards. To his right stood the Commanders-in-Chief of the British Army and Navy in the Crimea; on his left, the general officers of both armies, with their staffs. A salute from a French battery announced the approach of Marshal Pélissier,

accompanied by his staff, and followed by the other officers who were to receive investiture. A salute of nineteen guns was fired from a British battery, and returned by the French artillery, and the bands commenced to play the French National Anthem. The French officers dismounted, and Her Majesty's warrant was read by Colonel Bates, the senior officer on Lord Gough's staff. A royal salute followed, and Lord Gough rose, and read an address which he had composed for the occasion:—

'Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, my gracious Sovereign, being most anxious to confer the highest honours upon the officers of the British and French Armies in the Crimea as a recognition of Her Majesty's high approval and as a mark of her warmest admiration for distinguished services in the Battlefield, and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French having graciously acquiesced in her Majesty's wishes, I have been directed by my august Sovereign and empowered by the warrant of H.R.H. the Prince Albert the Grand Master of the Order, in Her Majesty's name and behalf, to proceed to this spot, the great theatre of your exploits, the very scene of your Glories, and in the presence as it were of both armies, to confer on his Excellency Marshal Pélissier Colonel-in-Chief of the French forces, Generals de Salles and de Macmahon the dignities and insignia of Grand Crosses of the most Honourable Military Order of the Bath. The absence from this army of General Morris deprives me of the gratification of investing that distinguished officer with a similar mark of Her Majesty's consideration. It is equally my pleasing duty in conformity with my Sovereign's commands and equally as a proof of Her Majesty's royal approval to invest

with the Insignia of Knights Commander of her most honourable order of the Bath Generals of Division Thiry, Paté, Horbillon, Bonat, and d'Aurelles. The absence of Generals Camon, d'Autmarre, and d'Attonville deprives me of the gratification of conferring similar honours upon them.

Need I tell you, Brother soldiers of her Majesty's army, of the pride and pleasure I feel in being the honoured medium of conferring upon you Lieut.-General Dacres, Dr. Hale, Inspector General of Hospitals, Lieut.-General Barnard and Lieut.-General Lord Rokeby the insignia as Knight-Commanders of the Bath, honours so well merited and so graciously bestowed by our august Sovereign and Mistress. May you long live to enjoy this just meed of gallantry and devotion. Gratified as I must feel at the gracious selection of my Sovereign, I cannot but be aware that the pleasing duty I am now about to perform would, had it pleased God to have spared this country that noble and honoured soldier who successfully led the British Armies in these fields, I say this duty would have been more appropriately fulfilled by him, under whom you gained these honours, than by myself. As however I have commanded large portions of the British Army, and well know the anxieties and responsibilities attending such commands, I may be permitted to form a just estimate of and duly to appreciate gallant and distinguished services such as yours.

I will not attempt to eulogise the glorious services, the brilliant achievements of the armies of England and France, in the great struggle now happily terminated by their heroic exertions against a foe worthy of such competitors. The Army will have the proud satisfaction of knowing that to their exertions and self-devotion Europe is indebted for

a peace honourable to all parties and therefore the more likely to be durable. The soldiers of England and France have fought side by side in this great contest, only emulous as to who should best fulfil his duty to his Sovereign and to his country. May the union and good fellowship which a reciprocal admiration of great military daring must engender and which has been cemented by a prodigal sacrifice of the best and noblest blood of the two nations, be long cherished by the two greatest military powers upon earth.

A French translation of this speech had been prepared and it was read out by Sir William Coddrington, who then, along with Admiral Sir Houston Stewart, conducted Marshal Pélissier to the foot of the throne, where he received from Lord Gough, with a few words of congratulation and encomium, the Insignia of a Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath. Marshal Pélissier replied in a few words:—

My Lord, I pray you to convey to the Queen of England my own heartfelt and grateful acknowledgements as well as those of my Brother Officers, for the high honour her Majesty has conferred upon us by nominating us to the several classes of the honourable order of the Bath. It is most pleasing and gratifying to us to receive these honours at the hands of one of the veteran soldiers of the British Army, the Conqueror of the Punjaub.

The other officers, French and British, were then invested with the Insignia of their respective ranks, and the ceremony concluded with an inspection of

the troops by Lord Gough, Marshal Pélissier, and Sir William Coddrington. When they reached the centre of the square formed by the troops, a general salute was given, while the band played 'God save the Queen.' The Artillery then fired a royal salute, and three cheers were given for Lord Gough, to the music of St. Patrick's Day. Lord Gough, in reply, addressed the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in a characteristic speech:—

Having just now fulfilled the orders of my Sovereign by the Ceremony of Investiture, I am again called upon to perform a most pleasing duty,—to express to you the gratification I must, as a soldier, feel in witnessing the noble display before me, a British Army of which my Sovereign and my Country may well be proud, whose achievements history will record, as exhibiting deeds of self devotion, patient endurance, and noble daring, forming altogether a brilliant example for others to imitate, to surpass which would be impossible: Never have I witnessed a display more cheering to a soldier's heart,—the bronzed and ruddy countenances of the men bespeaking the judicious arrangements for their health and efficiency. Upon their return to their native land, they will, I am persuaded be received by an honoured Queen and grateful Country with that heartfelt warmth to which their noble deeds justly entitle them.

To you, General, I am endebted for being able to perform with the dignity due to the occasion, the pleasing task confided to me, and I pray you to convey to your noble Comrades and to accept for yourself my warmest thanks for the cheers which have greeted me and honoured my name, and which I accept as an assurance of good will towards me

and as a proof of my having during a long career earnestly and faithfully performed my duty to my Sovereign and to my Country.

The visit to the Crimea was very brief. Lord Gough remained a few days longer, in order to accept the hospitality of Marshal Pélissier, who gave a dinner in his honour, and on June 12 he took his departure. His dignity and his courtesy had deeply impressed both armies. 'I never saw Lord Gough looking better,' wrote a spectator of the scene, 'he sat so upright on horseback, and looked so well.' The night before he left the Crimea, he dined with Admiral Sir Houston Stewart, who, in proposing his health, said: 'Before we get up from this table, I must take the opportunity of telling your Lordship that we have had here as visitors to the Crimea many men of all nations, of great rank and high reputation, but I can assure your Lordship that we have not seen one who has made himself more respected, more esteemed, and who from his kind and courteous bearing to all has commanded a warmer welcome than your Lordship.' Not less was the impression left on the French Marshal, who arranged to pay Lord Gough a visit in Dublin, and expressed the hope that the ceremony of investiture might be the commencement of a real friendship. Circumstances prevented the Duc de Malakof (as he immediately became) from going to St. Helen's, and the few years of life that remained to him were amply filled with work and left him no time to renew the memories of the Crimea. On returning to Paris,

the Duke addressed to Lord Gough a short letter conveying his sentiments of gratitude and esteem :—

77, Rue de Lille, 29 *Août*, 1856.

Cher Général et respectable parrain,

Je regarde comme un pieux devoir, à ma rentrée en France, de venir vous chercher, au moins par une lettre, avant que je puisse accomplir, et je l'accomplirai, la promesse que je vous ai faite de vous visiter.

Croyez, my Lord, que ce sera, de ma part, avec une satisfaction bien sentie, que ce sera avec bonheur que je presserai cette main qui a assuré mon premier pas dans le noble Chapitre du Bain.

Je prie votre Seigneurie de croire à tous mes sentiments de haute considération et d'affection sincère.

Mrl. Duc de Malakof,
G.C.B.

On his way home, Lord Gough was compelled to remain for some time in Paris, in order to invest some French officers who had left the Crimea before his arrival there. He was impatient to escape from the July heat, and to rejoin Lady Gough at St. Helen's, but he had the satisfaction of learning from the French Minister of War how completely he had succeeded in the performance of his mission. 'You have made,' he said, 'a common friend of the whole Army, and I can assure you the Emperor thinks so highly of your address to the French Officers, that he has ordered me to have it printed and published as a public record.' The Emperor happened to be leaving Paris, but he personally

received Lord Gough and expressed his regret at being unable to remain for the ceremony which was still to take place. A misunderstanding about the Insignia still further protracted Lord Gough's stay in Paris, and it was with great relief that he found himself, at last, free from the fatigue of public life and public duty, and once more at home at St. Helen's, surrounded by children and grandchildren who assembled to welcome him back.


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III

CONCLUSION

THE seven years which intervened between the death of Lady Gough and the end of the Field-Marshal's life, yield little material for the pen of the biographer. The healing influences of time brought, gradually but surely, their own comfort and consolation, and the life of the old soldier settled down into a peaceful routine. Those who were near him in those days record that, while his vigorous nature reasserted itself and gave him a real pleasure in living, he never recovered, after the loss of his wife, the spontaneous humour and almost youthful gleefulness which had been one of his marked characteristics. He was never left alone, for, from 1862 to 1867, Sir Patrick and Lady Grant were constantly by his side, and when, in 1867, Sir Patrick Grant was appointed to the Governorship of Malta, another daughter, Mrs. Haines, took Lady Grant's place at St. Helen's. The years were varied by visits to Lough Cutra, or by an occasional journey to the Continent, and some months were spent every year in Inverness-shire or Aberdeenshire, where Sir Patrick Grant took a place for the autumn. One of these visits to Scotland was prolonged till past midwinter, and it became memorable for a calamity the effects of which were less disastrous than might

have been feared. In January, 1865, Sir Patrick's house was burned to the ground, and Lord Gough, at the age of eighty-five, had to make his escape in the dark hours of a winter morning. Fortunately, the effect on his health was scarcely perceptible, and he felt more acutely than the shock to himself, the loss of Sir Patrick's manuscripts and papers of all sorts, a loss which his biographer must also deplore, for the records of the Adjutant-General would have thrown considerable light on the history of the Sikh Wars.

Lord Gough's correspondence, during these closing years, is almost entirely concerned with applications from officers and men who had served under him; applications often unreasonable, and sometimes ridiculous, but always receiving courteous and patient answers. In many instances he was able to do something to help the son of a former colleague, who was entering upon a military career, or to support an application for a pension for a widow; and occasionally (but only after some investigation) he gave pecuniary aid to a veteran of Chillianwalla or of Gujerat. It was inevitable that his influence should be over-estimated by anxious applicants, and each instance in which he was able to help, produced a crowd of supplicants for whom he could do nothing.

For some years before the end, Lord Gough's health became gradually more feeble, and he was rarely able to leave St. Helen's, although he still made an effort to perform his functions as Gold-

Stick-in-Waiting. In the end of 1868 he was completely prostrated by an attack of illness, and his health continued to be precarious during the month of January. About the middle of February, it became evident that his strength was fast waning, and that the end was at hand. On Tuesday, March 2, 1869, he peacefully breathed his last, in the ninetieth year of his age, surrounded by children and grandchildren, and a week later he was laid to rest in the churchyard of Stillorgan, by the side of his wife. The years which had elapsed since the country rejoiced over his greatest Indian conquest had brought with them many events, and memories of the Crimea and of the Mutiny had to some extent effaced those of the Punjab, while a second China War had dimmed men's recollection of the first campaign in an unknown land. Although the veteran's mind had been active to the last, yet, as his eye became dim, and his natural strength abated, he had, of necessity, passed from the thoughts of a younger generation. But the announcement of his death called forth fresh tributes of admiration for the hero who had already passed into history. 'There is high feasting and revelry to-night in the halls of Valhalla,' said a newspaper writer in commenting on his death, and the remark served to illustrate the manner in which he had, in his later years, come to be regarded as a 'Paladin of a noble noble tale,' as a hero who might have fought for King Arthur. The blows he had struck in the pass of Roncesvalles might have been for Charlemagne and

not for Wellington—so had his countrymen come to use his name as a symbol for heroic valour and knightly daring. The voice of controversy had long been hushed, and the verdict of his own generation, as they stood round his grave, while it ignored many of his qualities as a soldier and a leader of soldiers, was, at all events, generous in its recognition of his dauntless courage and his purity of motive.

His beloved Ireland had never been unmindful of her great son. On his return from the Peninsula, the Corporation of Dublin had conferred on Colonel Gough the freedom of the city, and presented him with a sword of honour, and his native city of Limerick had admitted him among her freemen. In more recent years, the Irish representatives in the House of Commons had defended the honour and the reputation of the Irish general who was, for the time, misjudged and misunderstood, and had added a laurel wreath to the brow of the victor of Gujerat. On his return from India, he was presented with the freedom of Clonmel and of Londonderry; and the cities of Dublin and Limerick, which could not repeat an honour paid forty years before, met him with addresses of welcome. It was, therefore, natural that steps should be taken, immediately on his death, to perpetuate his memory in the capital of his native land. At a public meeting, convened by the Lord Mayor of Dublin, on May 21, 1869, it was agreed to erect a memorial. Mr. J. H. Foley was entrusted with the task of

preparing an equestrian statue; he, unfortunately, died before the work was completed, and it was not till February, 1880, that the statue was placed in position, in the main road of the Phoenix Park, where it cannot fail to arrest the eye of the traveller from Dublin. Lord Gough is represented[1] on horseback, wearing his uniform as Colonel of the Blues, and holding in his right hand the baton of a Field-Marshal. The bronze from which the statue was cast, consisted of fifteen tons of gun-metal from cannon captured by Lord Gough in China and in India, and given, for this purpose, by the Government. The statue was unveiled by the seventh Duke of Marlborough, then Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. The thirty-first anniversary of Gujerat (February 21, 1880) was selected for the purpose, and eulogies to the memory of Lord Gough were paid by the Lord-Lieutenant and by General Sir John Michel, commanding the forces in Ireland. The closing words of Sir John Michel's speech should be placed on record here:—

Honoured I have been (he said) by the temporary deposit in my hands of this memorial of glory. I now surrender it to the safeguard of Ire-

[1] The inscription on the pedestal runs:—'In Honour of Field-Marshal Viscount Gough, K.P., G.C.B., K.G., an Illustrious Irishman, whose achievements in the Peninsular War, in China and India, have added to the lustre of the military glory of the country which he faithfully served for 75 years, this Statue, cast from cannon taken by Troops under his command, and granted by Parliament for the purpose, was erected by his Friends and Admirers.'

land's sons. Keep it, Irishmen, as an everlasting memento of your glory. Treasure it as a sacred deposit. Glory in it as the statue of one who was an honour to your country, one whose whole life, whether civil or military, was one continued career of kindness, honour, honesty of purpose, nobility of heart, combined with the purest loyalty, and the most enthusiastic patriotism. He was loved and honoured by his countrymen. He was *par excellence* our Irish chevalier, *sans peur et sans reproche*, and to wind up all, he was heart and soul an Irishman.

The common verdict upon Lord Gough's military career has continued to be based upon the estimate of his powers which had been generally accepted by the public at the time of his death. It is a judgement which was originally formed on inadequate information, and which does full justice to one aspect of his character, at the expense of another. Had his countrymen been less generous in their admiration of the qualities they knew him to possess, Lord Gough himself might have attempted to secure a juster appreciation of the qualities of which he knew them to be ignorant. Had his personal courage been doubted, had his personal honour been impugned, he could not have remained silent. As it was, he was well aware that his military policy had been misunderstood, and his character as a soldier entirely misconceived, and he deliberately chose to await the calmer verdict of posterity rather than to provoke a controversy, which, while it could not but throw an entirely new light upon his Indian career, would

not less surely result, on one side or the other, in indiscreet revelation and in the saying of many things that were better unsaid. The verdict of posterity has been long delayed, and it is only the publication of the new material available in *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, and in the present volume, that places the reader in a position to modify the traditional estimate of a great soldier.

Adverse critics of Lord Gough have, almost invariably, attacked him either on the ground of extreme rashness, or on the assumption that his only method of meeting an enemy was by a frontal attack. The full story of his Chinese and his Indian campaigns seems to answer both objections. The General who pressed precaution after precaution upon Lord Hardinge and Lord Dalhousie alike, whose army was, on the showing of a hostile Governor-General himself, in so advanced a state of preparation that, on the sudden inroad of the Sikhs in December, 1845, every available man was present at Ferozeshah within a fortnight of the invasion, who waited six weeks before Sobraon, who resisted all persuasion to attack prematurely before Gujerat, corresponds very imperfectly to the portrait of Lord Gough drawn by Colonel Malleson. It is true that he did not consider the postponement of active operations to be an unalterable rule of military policy, and that there were occasions on which he decided that to take an immediate risk was the safest course open to him. Long and

careful preparation, followed by swift movements in the field, was the general characteristic of his campaigns. It must always be remembered that the heat of an Indian summer was even more dangerous to British troops fifty years ago than it is to-day, and, in both the Sikh Wars, one of the main considerations which the Commander-in-Chief kept before him was the prevention of a prolongation of hostilities into the hot weather. This all-important motive guided him alike in his decision to attack at Sobraon, and in his decision to defer an attack upon Multan; he never lost sight of it during his five years of command in India, and, in every instance, he was successful in achieving his object. The Maharajpore campaign lasted a few days, the first Sikh War about nine weeks, and the conquest of the Punjab occupied less than four months; and, if the casualties at Ferozeshah and at Chillianwalla were heavy, it is not less certain that numberless lives were saved by confining operations to the winter months, and the conquest of the Mahrattas and the Sikhs was completed with comparatively little loss of life. A scheme of operations of which this can be said, cannot be unreservedly condemned for rashness and impetuosity.

The charge of recklessness is sometimes confined to Lord Gough's conduct in action, and the source of this impression may be traced, partly to the heroic personal courage of the Commander-in-Chief, and partly to his invariable rule that, once an action had been commenced, there must be no suggestion

of withdrawal. The saying commonly attributed to him and always quoted in his Irish brogue, 'I never was bate, and I never will be bate,' represents an unvarying principle of action. It was always wise, he held, to persevere, at whatever immediate cost, rather than to afford the enemy the satisfaction of even a temporary withdrawal. He never entered upon an action without thoroughly appreciating the risk he had undertaken, and he never doubted that his resources were sufficient to accomplish his end. His own lofty courage and his refusal to admit even the possibility of disaster or defeat, inspired the army to great deeds. His magnetic personality and his enthusiasm were worth, it has been said, the addition of another division to his troops, and he succeeded in communicating to the men his own appreciation of the joy of battle. The passionate welcomes which he received on the evening of Chillianwalla[1] and on

[1] A description of the scene at Gujerat has been given supra (p. 274), and we quote here a few sentences regarding that at Chillianwalla. They occur in a letter written home by Sergeant P. Keay, of the Bengal Artillery, from Peshawur, in November, 1850, and sent by his relatives to Lord Gough. Another quotation from the same letter is given in the text. 'I can never forget the reception he [Lord Gough] got from the troops as he rode along the front of our line just after we had been withdrawn out of the jungle on the evening of the Battle of Chillianwalla. I happened also to be at the General Hospital where the wounded and dying were lying in hundreds, and as soon as they caught sight of his venerable white head, there was such a cheer burst forth that the dullest observer could not have misunderstood for

the morning of Gujerat, left an indelible impression upon all who witnessed them.

There are numerous pieces of evidence of this magnetic power. 'With such a leader as Sir Hugh,' wrote Colonel Mountain, from China, 'I should have no hesitation in marching anywhere through the country with a small force of infantry [1], so long as we could be provisioned.' In congratulating Lord Gough's son upon his father's peerage, Sir Harry Smith said: 'I only obeyed his orders. He stripped himself of troops to place them under my command. He never "funked" when evil rumours got abroad. For *him* I won the battle of Aliwal.' The surviving officers who were attached to the Chief's person bear emphatic witness to this, but the feeling was common to all ranks, European and native. There is an interesting letter from a sergeant of the Bengal Artillery [2], who had been reading, eighteen months after the battle of Gujerat, some newspaper attacks on Lord Gough. 'There was,' he says, 'no danger, no matter how great, nor any undertaking, however desperate it might be, but they [the troops] would have attempted it under him; indeed, when he was present, they looked upon success as being certain.' When Sir Patrick Grant was in India, at the time

a moment; ay, and that from many a poor fellow who had scarcely a head left upon his shoulders to shout with—it said, as plainly as ever cheer could say, "You will never find us wanting when you require us."'

[1] Mountain's *Memoirs*, p. 197.

[2] See footnote on preceding page.

of the Mutiny, he wrote home to his father-in-law an account of an incident which occurred to an officer who took part in the siege of Delhi:—'He was always assailed [by the Goorkhas] with the same question: "When is the Lord Sahib coming?" and he always used to answer, "He is coming very soon now." But one day it occurred to him to ask, "What Lord Sahib do you mean?" when there was an instantaneous shout in reply, "Lord Gough Sahib to be sure—if he comes he will win victory immediately, and no one but him can take that place. Why is he not sent for?"'

Supported by such a confidence as this, a man may dare and do much that might otherwise be justly described as reckless, and when Lord Gough estimated the forces at his command and the task before him, this was an element he could not ignore. 'I believe,' he said, 'that my confidence in my army saved India.'

The student of the first China War will find it difficult to believe that the General who was in command has been frequently denied credit for even the simplest knowledge of strategy and tactics. 'It was perhaps fortunate for his own reputation,' says a not unsympathetic critic, 'that he was never placed in command of any army in European warfare, when his favourite tactics would have brought disaster on his country.' The remark, *mutatis mutandis*, might be paralleled by several passages in Lord Gough's own letters. He never forgot that his enemy was Indian, not European,

and he frequently impresses on his son the fact that the methods he adopted were those which he judged best suited to the particular enemy he had to face. In India he had to meet a nation of fighting-men, and he often alludes to the impossibility of employing against them the strategy and tactics which had been so successful in China, or the methods of fighting which would be adopted in Europe. It was no ignorance of the principles of strategy that led Lord Gough to make direct attacks upon the Sikhs. He was dealing with an enemy much more mobile than the Indian Army, which could, and would, always await an attack in an entrenched position. Any attempt, with the limited forces at his command, to divide his own army, would have led, at best, only to the separation of the Sikhs into small bodies and the indefinite prolongation of hostilities. He was convinced that the Sikhs would never feel themselves subdued until they had been thoroughly beaten in an action of the kind which alone they understood and acknowledged. It was, therefore, his chief object to beat them completely in a general action fought in such a situation as would ensure the capture of their artillery. Hence the encouragement he gave them to cross the Sutlej at Sobraon, and hence the patient manœuvres which forced them into the open at Gujerat. Enough has been said about the battles themselves, and it would be useless to burden these closing pages with further details. It is sufficient to point out that it is no small part of Lord Gough's claim to be a great

soldier, that he deliberately adapted his methods to those of the enemy.

Before leaving the purely military side of his character, it is necessary to place on record his great care about the health of his troops, an aspect of his military policy which impressed many observers. It was characteristic of him throughout his whole career, in the Peninsula, at home, in China, and in India that the moral and physical welfare of those entrusted to his charge was always a matter for anxious care. The correspondence quoted in the present work affords evidence of this, and it was universally recognized and appreciated by the army. A naval visitor who was present during the concluding operations of the China War, gave expression to the general feeling when he remarked that 'although so prodigal of his own strength, Sir Hugh Gough was anxiously careful of that of the soldiers,' and he mentions that 'every sentry he passed was directed to keep in the shade, and cautioned if found exposing himself unnecessarily to the sun [1].' In no department of military business was his freedom from 'red tape' formalities more remarkable than in any matter that concerned the health of his men. In China, during the cold winter of 1841–2, he declined to await the arrival of military stores which, as so often happens, had been delayed, and he purchased for each man in garrison at Ningpo a wadded cotton quilt. 'It is,' he reported to the

[1] *The Closing Events of the Campaign in China*, by Captain Granville Loch, R.N., p. 40 (Murray, 1843).

Indian authorities, 'certainly expensive—1½ dollars [each]—but were I to wait for the *Nerbudda*, I might expect half my men in hospital. . . . I keep the whole force on sea rations, . . . this is some expense to Government, but I have very heavy duties both for men and officers. . . . The labourer is worthy of his hire.' His official letters are full of minute details relating to the health and comfort of his soldiers, who, on their part, were thoroughly grateful. An illustration of this feeling may be quoted from the letter of the non-commissioned officer to which reference has already been made :— 'It was not as a commander alone that he was respected, but as a kind-feeling and good-hearted old man, who took a lively interest in the welfare of all those who were under him, and who took a pleasure in seeing every one as comfortable as circumstances would permit. For the officers and native troops I cannot speak, although I have every reason to think that they and us were alike in that respect. But as for the European soldiers, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, I don't think that men ever could have been more attached to any commander than to old Gough, and considering his kind and humane disposition, there is little wonder that he was looked upon as a father more than as a military superior. . . . His attentions to the wounded and sick was such as to gain the esteem and affection of every one. I used to see him in hospital [at Chillianwalla] daily, kindly inquiring after those who were recovering, and cheering up and consoling those who were bad;

and, believe me, those who think that soldiers are incapable of appreciating these attentions on the part of a commander are woefully out in their calculations.'

A careful study of Lord Gough's voluminous correspondence cannot but impress the reader that this soldier, to whom the epithets 'rash' and 'impetuous' are so frequently applied, was in reality a man of great sagacity and foresight, political as well as military. The alertness with which he grasped each problem that was presented to him, appreciated new conditions, and decided upon the methods to be employed for the attainment of his ends is conspicuous in all the varied scenes of his activity. Illustrations of this have occurred in the course of our story: the most important relate, naturally, to China and to India. The reader may recollect that Sir Hugh Gough held very strongly that the swiftest method of ending the first China War consisted in the adoption of a policy of conciliation, and not of severity, towards the Chinese people. He was opposed by Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary, who imagined that it was possible to exert pressure upon the Government through the sufferings of the population. It was the Commander-in-Chief alone who realized how completely those who held such a view misunderstood the situation in China, and events proved that he was right. The other instances which occur most naturally to the mind are Lord Gough's successful measures in dealing with the Indian army, his firm conviction

that the first Sikh War could not be ended by a siege of Lahore or by any other method than the annihilation of the Khalsa, the real rulers of the state, and his impression, which never wavered throughout the summer of 1848, that the revolt of Mulraj meant a second Sikh campaign and the annexation of the Punjab.

This political wisdom was closely connected with an insight into character and a power of discerning ability in younger men. It was not merely that he recognized the claims of men who had already earned distinction, and chose for positions of great responsibility men like Sir John Littler, Sir Colin Campbell, Sir Walter Gilbert, and Sir Harry Smith, but he gave to men who were beginning their careers opportunities of which he knew they would make good use. The close relationship in which Sir Patrick Grant stood to Lord Gough is no reason for omitting that distinguished name in this connexion, and he soon appreciated the soldierly gifts which ultimately raised Sir Frederick Haines to the command in India and a Field-Marshal's baton. If a general is to be judged by the men he selects for appointments under him, Lord Gough may meet such a criticism with absolute confidence. The instances we have quoted are, naturally, military, but he entertained a very high sense of the capabilities for political work of the Lawrences and their supporters in the North-East, and it was the Commander-in-Chief who first discovered the gifts which fitted Sir Herbert Edwardes for the work he

was to accomplish as a political officer, and who recommended him to the Governor-General for this kind of employment. This generous appreciation of the powers of other men never led Lord Gough to be guided by any judgement but his own. 'I hold no Councils of War,' he said, and he accepted the sole responsibility for his campaigns. No man was more generous in acknowledging services rendered, or in taking upon himself the burden of errors made by his subordinates: and none would have resented more any attempt to interfere with the duties and the responsibilities that were proper to himself.

It is, however, to the narrative of Lord Gough's life that those who revere his memory must trust for the justification of his career, and no words need be added to what has already been said in these pages; the ultimate decision must be determined by an appeal to fact. In the record of his deeds, and in the extracts from his personal correspondence will also be found the best description of his character and disposition. Physically, he was not tall, nor, in youth, was he remarkably handsome: as he grew older and his red hair turned to a silvery white, he became a much more striking figure, and impressed even so acute an observer as Mr. Meredith with the feeling that he was a tall man. The dignity of his presence and the penetration of his eye added to the effect of the silvery locks which made him so venerable. His great physical strength remained unimpaired until late in life. Observers of his campaign in China remarked that 'few young officers

in his army can support what he frequently endures.' Before the outbreak of the first Sikh War, Sir Patrick Grant wrote home how, one June day, at Simla, Sir Hugh 'walked upwards of twenty miles before breakfast, over rocks and crags, where there was barely footing for a goat. It almost killed his nephew and an A.D.C. and I must own to having had quite enough, though I have been reputed no mean pedestrian. Is it not a great performance for a man of sixty-four, with a ball now in the bone of his leg, and riddled with wounds in other parts of his body.' In the pleasures of tiger-shooting he took his full share, and, even after the strain of the campaign in the Sutlej, Sir Patrick Grant records an expedition which lasted from early morning till halfpast ten at night, and from which they brought home four huge bears. 'All were fairly knocked up,' he says, 'except the game old Chief who never felt a bit overcome, and got up at daybreak the following day, as fresh as a lark.' His physical vigour he attributed, in part, to his power of sleeping regularly and well at even the most anxious times. Only once in his career, did he suffer from sleeplessness, and that was due to the incessant watching of the Sikh encampment at Sobraon, when Sir Hugh went down every night to satisfy himself that his prey were not recrossing the Sutlej and so escaping him.

The dominant features of his moral character were his deep religious feeling and his passionate domestic affection; throughout his whole career he retained

a complete and childlike confidence in an over-ruling Providence, and an unfeigned thankfulness for the goodness and mercy that had followed him all the days of his life. A page of the Diary he kept during the Sikh Wars contains a sentence which stands out alone among a large number of calculations as to the number of the enemy he had just defeated. The words are, 'Thou hast covered my head in the day of battle.' His devotion to his wife and children was remarkable alike for its intensity and for its unselfishness, and the memory of his own stern up-bringing made him the more anxious that his relations with his children should be marked by a mutual trust and confidence. His love was repaid with an affection which was a strength and stay in many an anxious hour, and which united his whole family in loyal admiration of 'the dear noble Father.'

Within the limits afforded by religious devotion and family love, his other emotions had free play. He was ambitious of fame and fortune, deeming it an honourable thing to be a distinguished man; but for neither did he ever stoop to do anything mean or unworthy, and he was ready to sacrifice any emolument or position if it seemed to him that such a sacrifice was necessary for his own self-respect. His patriotism was real and strong, and he was ready to waive any personal claim which seemed to be counter to the interests of the public service; his love of Ireland was especially vehement, and not only did he make his home on Irish soil,

but he invested his fortune in Irish securities. His generosity of word and deed was ever characteristic; his more intimate letters reveal numberless kind actions unknown to the world, and no man served him without public acknowledgement of his gratitude. He was, at all times, hospitable, and loved to collect round his table those with whom he had acted in the field; to the end, it was a great joy when any of those who had been with him in India came to stay with him at St. Helen's. He was naturally hot-tempered, and there are records of his being furious, 'as only Sir Hugh Gough could be furious'; but anything like malice or permanent ill-will was unknown to him, nor did he ever bring a public quarrel into private life. Where he gave his confidence he gave it completely, and no man ever carried out more loyally the spirit of the injunction: 'Thine own and thy father's friend forsake not.' His sense of humour was keen, as was natural in an Irishman, and he retained, till late in life, a zest for amusement and an appreciation of fun and frolic. To the very end he loved the society of children, as, all through life, he had kept unspotted the simplicity of his own character, the spirit and the purity of a little child. His epitaph was written long ago in the familiar words of the Roman poet—'Integer vitae scelerisque purus'; the blessing which hallowed a life of ninety happy years was that of the Hebrew: 'Thou hast the dew of thy youth.'

APPENDICES

A. FEROZESHAH:

Sir Harry Smith's Report

B. CHILLIANWALLA:

General Gilbert's Report

Sir Colin Campbell's Report

General Thackwell's Report

C. Lord Gough's Farewell Orders to the Army of the Punjab



APPENDIX A

FEROZESHAH: SIR HARRY SMITH'S REPORT

HEAD QUARTERS CAMP,

December 23, 1845.

SIR,

I have the honor to record for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the operations of the 1st Dn. of Infantry under my Command, on the Brilliant Victory obtained over the Sikh Army on the afternoon of the 21st Instant. The Commander-in-Chief placed this Division in reserve during the Advance upon the Enemy's entrenched position. The 1st Brigade to the immediate right of our Mass of Artillery. The 2nd Brigade in a similar manner to its left at a distance of 350 yards—My Division thus disposed of—The Army advanced, and I gave orders to Brigr. Hicks of the 1st Brigade to continue to move until he received further orders from the C. in Chief, and I joined the 2nd Brigade; by this time, General Littler's Division was well in Action and the fire upon the left of the Main Attack very heavy. When Lt. Genl. Sir H. Hardinge ordered the 2nd Brigade to move up rapidly into the front line, which at the moment reeled under the Enemy's galling fire—from behind his entrenchments and numerous cannon—in establishing this Brigade in its regular advance in Line on the front some confusion occurred by other Corps falling back upon it, and impeding its advance—the front once clear the steadiness and rectitude of its advance could not be exceeded, when Major Broadfoot, C.B., galloped to me to say four battalions of Avitabile's Corps were about to turn my left flank, and precipitate themselves between my left and Littler's right. I therefore changed the direction of my

advance, as far as practicable, during which these four Battalions made a furious onslaught upon us with a storm of Musketry aided by Cannon and Grape etc. I have rarely seen surpassed. The Brigade opened its fire in return, the weight of the Attack was upon H.M. 50th Regiment which literally staggered under the storm. Major Somerset, Military Secretary to the Governor General was struck down by two bullets, my A.D.C was wounded, his horse killed under him, Officers and Soldiers falling fast, when I ordered the Brigade to charge, which was gallantly obeyed, and Lt. Col. Petit headed the 50th Regm. into the Enemy's Entrenchments fighting hand to hand, this fierce attack of the Enemy being thus nobly repulsed. I continued to advance in line in perfect order until impeded by the Enemy's Tents, when the whole broke and in a Mass of undaunted British Soldiers Pall Mall rushed forward, bore every thing before them, until we reached the mud walled village of Ferozeshuhur, where the Enemy attempted to rally and compelled me to collect my Troops. I speedily seized this Village filled with Infantry, Cavalry and Horses richly caparisoned. Many of the Enemy were slain and many surrendered themselves Prisoners, and the Colors of H.M. 50th Regmnt. gallantly borne forward by Br. Captn. Lovell & Ensign de Montmorency were planted on the Walls of the Hd. Qrs. village of the Enemy's Army and well to his rear of the strength of his Entrenchments and numerous cannon—by this time many Detachments of Regiments belonging to the Regiments composing the left of the Main Attack had joined me—some of H.M. 9th Regmnt. of the 1st Europeans; and many Officers and Soldiers of Native Corps had joined me on the right of the Village. It was now dark and I ordered every one to halt and to form—but such was the excitement and exultation for the moment it was totally impossible to establish anything bordering on regularity—this I disregarded at the time feeling convinced the Victory was pushed equally forward upon my Right and Left. As this excitement subsided, I endeavoured with some success to collect the Troops and form in Line in a semi-circle

around the front of the Village. I could hear nothing but the shouts of the Enemy, his Drums, especially of his Cavalry, and it became evident that the success I anticipated on my right and left had not been pushed forward, so as to afford any support, and that the scattered Troops with me amounting to 2000 or 3000 men were of different Regts. besides the 2nd Brigade and that I occupied an isolated position in the very centre of the Sikh Army. It was evident to me that the attack on the Enemy's left and main position in the Centre had been successful tho' not pushed forward, and it was equally evident that the Attack upon his right had failed, as from his Entrenchments and Cannon a continued fire was kept up during the dark. Scarcely had I succeeded in a formation in front of Ferozeshuhur when rather a sharp attack was made on my right, and that part of my position shamefully abandoned—the Enemy most fortunately was prevented in the darkness from pushing the advantage gained, or all was lost. I contracted my position and re-occupied my right. The Enemy continued to approach on all sides, and kept up a continued fire of Cannon, Camel Pieces, and Musketry, most destructive in its effect. My position was critical—my communications cut off. I had no intimation of the position of the Army whatever, only hope of reinforcements. The Enemy had brought a Gun to bear upon my immediate Rear, from which he kept up a continued fire of Grape—he was firing and shouting and beating the French 'Pas de Charge' all round us. Major Griffin of the 24th N.I. was killed. Major Hull a most noble officer of the 10th Grenadiers mortally wounded. My Asst. Qr. Mstr. Genl.—Lieut. A. S. Galloway wounded in two places, as well as many other Officers—almost every Officer's horse was killed —the Troops much excited and unsteady. H.M. 50th Regmnt. and a small detachment of H.M. 9th Regmnt. under Major Barnwell alone well in hand and to be depended on—having therefore maintained this isolated Post until between 2 and 3 o'ck in the morning and having occupied the attention of the Enemy all night:—unless I at once withdrew, the Troops were compromised—I therefore in perfect silence com-

menced my march which the Enemy from the noise of his own fire did not discover, and I moved on the Line by which we attacked, and in about 2 miles fell in with the wounded men of the 62nd Regmnt. and others collected, whom I brought off they knew nothing of the Army—and I continued my march in the same direction until large Bivouac fires guided me to a Brigade of Cavalry and numerous stragglers of the Army and then at day light I commenced my March guided by Christie's Horse—re-established my communication with Head-Quarters, and received orders from the Commr-in-Chief rapidly to move up in support of the Attack about to commence on that part of the Enemy's position from which he had not been dislodged the previous evening, and which I knew his Excellency would make, and which increased my anxiety to join him.

The operations of the 1st Brigade of my Division having been conducted under Brigadier Hicks, his Report I herewith enclose and His Excellency witnessed the gallant charge of H.M. 31st Regmnt. on the Enemy's Entrenchments on the morning of the 22nd inst. and which so mainly contributed to the complete rout of the Enemy, and the achievements of the most glorious Battle ever fought in the East, adding additional lustre to H.M. and the Honble. Company's Arms, and to the already acquired glory of the C. in Chief.

It would not be just if I were not here to mention those individuals whom I observed most active and intrepid—Brigadier Ryan and his Major of Brigade Captn. O'Hanton. The intrepidity, cool, and gallant bearing of Lt. Col. Petit surpassed all praise, while the conduct of the Officers and Soldiers of the gallant 50th Regmnt. bore down every obstacle, and their Colors were planted on the walls of the Hd. Quarters Village of the Enemy's Army, Ferozeshuhur. Two of his Standards add immortal trophies of this Victory and the prowess of the 50th Regmnt. Another Standard was also taken by H.M. 31st Regmnt. and the number of Cannon we passed in advance showed well the weightiness of the Victory achieved. Many of the Native Troops gallantly and most emulously contended for the advance with H.M.

Troops and when we regard the paucity of Officers in the Native Corps—one Regmnt. in the Division having only *two*, we are led to the conclusion that innate bravery alone conducts them to the front. The 48th Regmnt. N.I. under Captain Palmer distinguished itself. I also observed detachments of the 16th Grenadiers under Major Hull whose assistance and gallantry before he received his Mortal Wound I must ever appreciate. Of the 26th Lt. Infty. under Captain Taylor and several others whose names I have not succeeded in obtaining. Lt. Mainwaring who joined and attached himself to the Troops under my command is a gallant fellow. To Captn. Lugard my Asst. Adjt. Genrl. the Service is deeply indebted, he received two wounds without quitting the field, and is now in the performance of his duty. Lieut. A. S. Galloway my D. Asst. Qr. Mr. Genl. is an officer of no ordinary promise—cool, intrepid, and active—and I beg His Excellency's attention may be drawn to the merits of these two highly distinguished Officers. To my A.D.C. Lieut. Holditch of H.M. 80th Regmt. I am much indebted, and the gallant exertions of Ensign Hardinge—son & A.D.C. to the Governor General at the moment of the attack of Avitabile's Battalions were as conspicuous, as gallant, and undaunted.

In Brigadier Hicks the Service has a very able and most obedient Officer and to his Major of Brigade Captain Garvock, H.M. 31st Regmnt. he is much indebted. Major Spence Commdn. H.M. 31st Regmnt. is an Officer of great promise and the gallant manner in which he in three successive Victories led this gallant Corps to their achievements merits His Excellency's favorable consideration. Captain Pott Commdg. the 47th N.I. ably did his duty.

When every Officer and Soldier gallantly and fearlessly contributed to such Victories, those only can be more particularly named, whom accidents bring under my notice. I conclude therefore by observing, and expressing the grateful sense I can entertain of His Excellency having placed me in the Command of such a Division, which I trust may in the estimation of the Commr.-in-Chief be firmly established, and

regarded by His Excellency as having contributed to the late brilliant Victories—to the glory of our Country—and the immortal honor of Sir Hugh Gough.

In the course of these operations I have been much associated with the Artillery of this Army, and I should be wanting did I not venture to record my most unqualified opinion of its Bravery—Merits—Zeal and desire to contribute its utmost to that success which has recently attended our Arms, especially Bt. Major Brind.

I annex a return of the killed and wounded, as also a list of the Officers and the second in Command of Corps.

It has occurred to me Lt. Col. Byrne who commanded H.M. 31st Regmnt. in the Action of the 18th inst., in which he was severely wounded, has not been mentioned by me in any previous report. I beg therefore to draw His Excellency's attention to the Merits and Bravery of this Officer.

I have the honor to be,
Sir,
Your obedient and humble Servant,
H. G. Smith, M.G.
Commanding 1st Division of Infantry.
Army of the Sutledge.

APPENDIX B

CHILLIANWALLA: GENERAL GILBERT'S REPORT

HEAD QUARTERS. 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION,
ARMY OF THE PUNJAUB.

CAMP. CHILLIANWALLA. *January* 15, 1849.

SIR,

In obedience to G. O. of yesterday's date, I have the honor to report for the information of the Rt. Honble. the C. in C. the proceedings of the 2nd Infantry Division under my command in the Action of the 13th Instant, likewise to enclose returns of the killed and wounded, etc. therein called for.

My Division, consisting of the Troops noted in the margin, moved from the Camp at Dingee at half past 7 a.m. in contiguous columns of Brigades, Right in front. No. 17 Lt. Field Battery in the centre, having 3 troops of Horse Artillery on the right, and the heavy guns on the left.

3rd Brigade.
2nd Europn. Regmnt.
70th Regmnt. N.I.
31st Regmnt. N.I.

4th Brigade.
H.M. 29th Foot
56th Regmnt. N.I.
30th Regmnt. N.I.

Both of my Brigades were deployed on reaching the height about a mile in front of the village of Chillianwalla, and advanced steadily in line on the Enemy's position of Lullian, where the 4th Brigade led by Brigadier A. S. Mountain, C.B., charged a large Battery, in its front, driving out the Enemy at the point of the Bayonet, and almost immediately afterwards, the 3rd Brigade led by Brigadier C. Godby, C.B., carried the guns on the extreme left of the Seikh position.

The flank and rear of both my Brigades were, at different times, endeavoured to be turned by the Seikhs, and each time was obliged to change its front, by which movement the Enemy were not only out-manœuvred but their very severe attacks were successfully repulsed.

It affords me the highest satisfaction to record the valuable

services of those distinguished Officers Brigadier A. S. Mountain, C.B., and Brigadier C. Godby, C.B., as well as those of the General and personal Staff.—Major C. Chester, Asst. Adjt.-Genl., Lieut. A. S. Galloway, Dpy. Asst. Q. M. Genrl., Lieut. C. R. Colt, A.D.C., Captain Sherwell, and Lieut. Macdonnell, Majors of Brigade, and Captain Glasford and Lieut. W. E. Morton of the Engineers.—

To Lieut.-Col. Congreve, C.B., H.M.'s 29th Foot, and Lt.-Col. Jack, 30th N.I., and Majors J. Steel, 2nd Europn. Regmnt., W. R. Corfield, 31 N.I., D. Bamfield, 56th N.I., and J. K. McCausland, 70th N.I., my warmest thanks are due, for the exemplary manner in which they led their regiments to attack the Enemy, and I have much pleasure in noticing likewise the conduct of Majors Smith and Way, H.M.'s 29th Foot, and Major J. R. Talbot of the 2nd Europn. Regmnt., whose exertions in aid of their gallant Commanding Officers were conspicuous throughout the Action; nor can I omit the name of Captain J. F. Nembhard of the 56th Native Infantry who brought his corps out of Action, on Major Bamfield being severely wounded. H.M.'s 29th Foot nobly sustained its character for steadiness and undaunted bravery on this occasion, under that distinguished Officer Lt.-Col. Congreve, C.B., and the 2nd Europn. Regmnt. (which is a new Corps) has, under its able and gallant Commandant Major Steel, achieved for itself in the action of the 13th a lasting reputation for steadiness and intrepidity.

I have likewise every reason to speak highly of the several Native Infantry Regiments, under my command, who behaved much to my satisfaction, under no ordinary difficulty and disadvantage of locality, and have thus sustained the Character of the Native Army, for devotion and gallantry.

I cannot speak too warmly of the gallant Artillery attached to No. 17 Light Field Battery who did real good service in this action, and I feel more than ordinarily indebted to Captain Dawes and his Officers and men for their incessant exertions, and the assistance they afforded, in repelling the impetuous attacks of the Seikhs during the whole operation.

I cannot close this dispatch without adding that I received

considerable aid from Lt.-Col. Brind of the Horse Artillery, whose guns greatly tended to prevent my flanks being turned.

I trust I may be permitted to bring to H. E.'s notice, the name of Captain W. P. Robbins, of the 15th Native Infantry, who attached himself to my person, during the action, and afforded me much assistance.

It is with extreme regret I lay before H. E. a very heavy list of casualties, but it could hardly be otherwise, considering the obstinate and vigorous resistance of the Enemy, with all the advantages, which they as Irregular Troops, possessed over ours, fighting in a jungle.

I have the honor to be,
Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,
W. R. GILBERT, M. Genl.
Commanding 2nd Infantry Division,
Army of the Punjaub.

To Lt.-Col. GRANT, C.B.,
Adjt. Gen. of the Army.

CHILLIANWALLA: SIR COLIN CAMPBELL'S REPORT

CAMP CHILLIANWALLAH,

15th Janry., 1849.

SIR,

I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Honble. the Commander in Chief, that the portion of the Division of the Army of the Punjaub under my immediate command, as noted in the margin, formed in line to the left of the village of Chillianwallah fronting a part of the position occupied by the Enemy, and that between the hours of one and two p.m. on the 13th inst. in obedience to instructions received from His Excellency, the Line moved forward to the attack.

5th Brigade of Infantry.
7th do. do.

The Right Brigade moved under the immediate command of Brigadier Pennywick, C.B., and was accompanied by the Asst. Adjt. General of the Division, while the left or that of Brigadier Hoggan advanced under my own personal direction.

For a short distance the ground was tolerably clear and open, but as the Troops advanced it became interspersed with large trees, and thick bushes offering considerable impediments to a forward movement, and screening from observation whatever might have been in our front, thus to a very great extent disordering and breaking the line, and in various places reducing the companies to sections in front, while the remaining portions became unavoidably crowded and confused to the rear. I beg here to observe that this state of things applies particularly to the Right or 5th Brigade, for the left was more favorably situated, though by no means free from obstructions, presenting much less difficulty to its advance.

After moving forward a few hundred yards, a fire of round shot was opened from the direction towards which the 5th

Brigade was advancing, and when within range of the Enemy's guns, apparently in number about 20 pieces, the shower of grape fell upon H.M.'s 24th the centre Regmt. was incessant, and the more formidable because the batteries from which it came, were completely screened from view.

While proceeding steadily under these continued discharges, the gallant and lamented Brigadier Pennywick, his Major of Brigade, and the two Majors of the 24th were struck down, together with a vast number of officers and men: My Assistant Adjutant General Major Ponsonby was here struck by a grape shot which knocked him off his horse, but I am happy to add without his sustaining any more serious injury than a contusion. The onward movement of this gallant corps was not in the slightest degree checked by these losses, or by the still increasing fire of the Enemy's line.

On emerging from the jungle, the Enemy's guns for the first time became visible, they were placed on a mound, which commanded a view of the approach of our troops, while the batteries were concealed from their observation. In front of them was a swampy piece of ground, and behind them a gradual rising slope, covered by the Seikh Infantry, who were not discovered until the batteries were carried, without a shot being fired by the Regiment, or a musquet taken from the shoulder. Several of the guns were spiked by Men and Officers, and the Grenadiers especially distinguished themselves, but the fire from the Seikh Infantry on the rising ground above the batteries rendered the keeping possession of the guns utterly impracticable. It was here between the guns Lt.-Col. Brooks with several of his Officers and Men were struck down by the fire of the Seikh Infantry, formed in rear, and on both flanks of the batteries. Under these circumstances having their Lt.-Colonel and thirteen of their Officers killed, and nine severely wounded, in all twenty-two, who fell in the advance and in the batteries, this gallant Regiment was at length compelled to relinquish the advantage it had gained, with such valour, and at such a tremendous sacrifice of life, no less than 231 men having actually fallen, whilst 266 were wounded, all within a few minutes.

The 25th and 45th Regiments of Native Infantry led on by Lt.-Col. Corbett and Major Williams, the two other Corps of the Brigade, the latter Regmt. having been placed temporarily for this particular service under Brigad. Pennywick's command, advanced steadily and well. They also suffered loss but nothing to the extent sustained by the 24th Regmt. They were likewise compelled to retire.

Although the jungle through which the 7th Brigade passed was close and thick, causing frequent breaks to be made in the line, yet by regulating the pace so as to make allowance for these obstructions, the Left Brigade after an advance of half a mile reached a comparatively open tract of country in a tolerably connected Line. On this open tract we found formed in our front a large body of Cavalry and regular Seikh Infantry with four guns, which had played upon us during our advance. H.M.'s 61st Regmt. charged this Cavalry, and put it to an immediate and disorderly flight, while the 36th N.I. on the right made an attack upon the Infantry which however was not successful, and in consequence they came down accompanied by two guns, upon the 36th Regmt. obliging it to retreat in rear of H.M.'s 61st.

The two right companies of the 61st were instantly made to change front to the right, and while the remainder of the Regmnt. was ordered to form rapidly in the same direction, the two right companies charged the two guns and captured them. The fire of these two companies upon the Enemy who were in pursuit of the 36th compelled them to desist and retreat.

While the remainder of H.M.'s 61st was forming on these two companies, the Enemy brought forward two more guns and fresh Infantry, upon which those who had desisted from pursuit of the 36th again formed and the whole opened a heavy fire, this force was likewise charged by H.M.'s 61st Regmnt., put to the rout and the guns captured. At the same time the 46th N.I. in its movement to form on the left of H.M.'s 61st was attacked by a large body of the Enemy's Cavalry, which it gallantly repulsed.

The formation of the Brigade on the flank of the Enemy's line being now completed, it moved forward driving every-

thing before it, capturing in all 13 guns, until it met with Brigadier Mountain's Brigade advancing from the opposite direction. The Enemy retreated upon their guns, which were in position along their line in two's and three's which they defended to the last moment in succession, and were only obtained possession of by us after a sharp contest, such as I have described in the capture of the first two guns, and they were all charged and taken by H.M.'s 61st Regmnt. During these operations we were on two or three occasions threatened by the Enemy's Cavalry on our flanks and rear and obliged to face about and drive them off. The guns were all spiked but having no means with the force to remove them, and it being too small to admit of any portion being withdrawn for their protection, they were with the exception of the three last taken unavoidably left upon the field.

Three guns of No. 16 Light field Battery under the command of Lieut. A. Robertson were placed on the extreme left of the line, No. 5 Light field Battery commanded by Lieut. E. W. E. Walker was disposed between the two Brigades of Infantry, the whole commanded by Major J. S. Mowatt of the Artillery.

These guns moved with the division and opened fire during the first advance, but the Infantry of the left Brigade moving more rapidly through the jungle, and changing position to the right, speedily covered the guns so that they could only open their fire occasionally from the flanks of the Brigade, and at the close of the day joined and assisted in repelling one of the attacks made upon the rear of our line.

Major Mowatt speaks in high terms of the Officers and Men under his command, and I am much indebted to him and to them for their valuable services.

I am much indebted to Brigadier Hoggan who set to his Brigade an example of the greatest bravery during the day, and I beg to testify from my own observation to the able assistance, zeal, and exertions of that brave and excellent Officer Captain D. Keiller his Brigade Major.

I find it difficult to express in words my sense of the gallantry and steadiness of H.M.'s 61st Regmnt. No Regi-

ment upon an ordinary field day could have performed its evolutions with more cool precision, or steadier regularity, and the delivery of its fire told with marked effect upon the ranks of the Enemy.

The 36th Regmnt. Native Infantry though at first thrown into confusion joined and accompanied H.M.'s 61st, and the Commanding Officer Major Fleming and the other Officers of the Regiment behaved with the most intrepid and distinguished gallantry, of which I am happy to say I was an eye witness.

The 46th Regmnt. Native Infantry behaved throughout with the utmost steadiness and coolness and marched in the same line with H.M.'s 61st, following the brave example of their Commanding Officer Major Tudor and the other Officers of the Corps.

To Major Tucker Assist. Adjt. General of the Army, to Captain Goldie and Lt. Irwin of the Engineers, all of whom were sent by his Lordship to accompany me in the field, I am under the greatest obligations for the assistance they rendered me.

I beg also to recommend for his Lordship's notice Major Ponsonby, Asst. Adjt. General, for the cordial and able assistance I have always experienced from this Officer from the time I first had the honor to have him in the Division to which he is attached under my command.

I would also mention Ensign H. Garden Deputy Asst. Quart. Mast. Genl., whom I beg to recommend to his Lordship as a brave, intelligent, willing, and most promising young Officer. Likewise my A.D.C., Captain E. Haythorne of H.M.'s 98th Regmt., a cool and intrepid soldier and an admirable Staff Officer.

Having found it requisite to employ an orderly Officer from each Brigade, their respective Brigadiers sent for the duty Lt. Grant of H.M.'s 24th Regmnt. and Lieut. Powys of H.M.'s 61st Regmnt., the latter of whom had his horse shot under him, and I have to acknowledge my obligations for their prompt and cheerful alacrity in carrying out my instructions to various parts of the field.

I trust I may be here permitted to mention that Lt. and Adjutant L. Shadwell of H.M.'s 98th Regmnt. who happened to be on a visit to me, left a sick bed to accompany me to the field, where he acted as my A.D.C. affording me much assistance, and behaving with great coolness and bravery on every occasion.

I have to apologise for the great length to which this Despatch has extended, but justice to the meritorious and gallant Officers and Men whom I have had the honor to command has rendered it imperative on my part to enter into this lengthened detail.

Enclosed I beg leave to forward returns of killed, wounded, and missing.

I have the honor to be,
Sir,
Your most Obedient Servant,
C. CAMPBELL,
Brigadier General commanding,
3rd Division.

Lt.-Col. GRANT, C.B.,
Adjutant General of the Army,
Head Quarters.

CHILLIANWALLA: GENERAL THACKWELL'S REPORT

CAMP, CHILIANWALLAH,

16th Janry., 1849.

SIR,

1st Brigade. Brigadier White, C.B.
H.M. 3rd Lgt. Drgns. Maj. Yerbury.
5th Lt. Cavalry. Capt. Wheatley.
8th Lt. Cavalry. Maj. Mackenzie.
2nd Brigade. Brigadier Pope, C.B.
H.M. 9th Lancers. Maj. Grant, C.B.
H.M. 14th Lt. Drgns. Lt.-Col. King.
1st Light Cavalry. Lt.-Col. Bradford.
6th Light Cavalry. Maj. Coventry.

I have the honor to report for the information of His Excellency, the Right Honble. The Commander in Chief that the Cavalry under my command advanced on the Flanks of the Army on the morning of the 13th inst. from Dinghie, detailed as in the margin. The Right Brigade in columns of squadrons, left in front. The Left Brigade in column of the same front, right in front, both Brigades covered by advanced Guards and strong flanking parties, those on the right to patrol to the foot of the hills. A Squadron of the 8th Light Cavalry under Captain Moore I ordered to form the Advance Guard of the left column of Artillery, and this Squadron remained then employed during the operations of the day. I had intended to join the right column of Cavalry but on the Enemy's line being discovered in quite a different position to what it was imagined they occupied the previous evening, I thought it likely they had as large a body of Cavalry on their right flank as on their left and particularly as Officers sent out to reconnoitre reported that they were making a movement towards our left rear, I remained therefore with the Cavalry of this wing, though I did not believe the report. On the Infantry deploying into line and advancing, the Cavalry did the same on the Left of Lieut.-Col. Brind's Battery, the Left Regiment being refused, the movement of the Infantry greatly to the left, caused Lieut.-Col.

Brind's guns and the Cavalry to make a similar movement, which soon brought the line under the fire of a strong battery on the Enemy's right flank, upon which Lieut.-Col. Brind's guns soon opened with great effect, and after a cannonade of nearly three quarters of an hour judging that many of the Enemy's guns were disabled I ordered the 5th Light Cavalry and a Squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons to charge a body of Cavalry which threatened our left, to drive them back and take the Enemy's guns in flank, whilst a part of the remaining Cavalry was to charge them in front. This intention was abandoned in consequence of the 5th Light Cavalry being driven back. From the gallant charge of the Squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons under Captain Unett who dispersed the Troops opposed to him and the good countenance of the remainder of the Cavalry, this Cavalry did not dare to advance in pursuit of the 5th Light Cavalry, neither did their Cavalry and Infantry near their guns dare to make any offensive movement. At this time I directed Lt.-Col. Brind to make a movement to his right to support the 3rd Division of Infantry which had suddenly moved to the same flank. The Enemy then directed their fire more rigorously from about six guns which had not been silenced and the Cavalry sustained some casualties in making their flank movement to the right and eventually to the left rear of Chilianwalla.

I greatly regret to learn of the misconduct of the Cavalry of the right wing but as their movement did not come under my observation I have the honor to transmit the reports of Brigadier Pope, Lt.-Col. Bradford, Lt.-Col. King and Major Grant, and it would appear that many faults were committed, such as having no reserve in the rear to support and prevent the right flank being turned. Secondly that care had not been taken not to get before the Artillery on the left, the denseness of the jungle being no excuse for such a false step, and thirdly that Commanding Officers although they might have heard the word 'Three's about' did not take upon themselves to charge any of the Enemy's Cavalry which were pressing upon the line. "Could I have anticipated such an

untoward circumstance as occurred I should have been on the spot to have given the benefit of my experience to an Officer deemed fully competent to have command of a Brigade of Cavalry, and I feel assured from what I have heard of Brigadier Pope and the conduct of the Cavalry of the right that their retrograde movement originated more from mistake than a fear of encountering an insignificant Enemy and I have every confidence on the next occasion the 9th Lancers and the Light Dragoons will remove the stigma now cast upon them and earn similar laurels to those their predecessors gained in the Peninsula. I only regret for myself that I have not the gift of ubiquity. In furtherance of my desire to give every information to His Excellency I have the honor to forward the reports named in the margin, by which, although I cannot advance much in favour of the 2nd Brigade of Cavalry, I have much to say in praise of the First Brigade, two regiments of which did their duty entirely to my satisfaction, and although the 5th Light Cavalry met with a check, but soon rallied, the gallant conduct of the Squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons under Captain Unett, who was severely wounded, has contributed more to establish the invincibility of the British Cavalry than the accidental mishaps occasioning the loss of a few lives can have aided in lessening a faith in it. Having thus detailed the operations of the Cavalry Division from observation and report I have now a pleasing duty to perform in bringing to the notice of the Right Honble. the Commander in Chief that Brigadier White conducted his Brigade much to my satisfaction, as did also Major Yerbury, Major Mackenzie and Captain Wheatley their Regiments, and I must particularize the gallant charge made by the Squadron under Captain Unett and the steady support given by the Squadron of the 8th Light Cavalry under Captain Moore to the guns of Lt.-Col. Brind's Battery and to Captain Warner's guns when acting with the 3rd Division of Infantry to the last moment. I am also well

Brigr. Pope.
Lt.-Col. King.
Lt.-Col. Bradford[1].
Major Grant.

[1] Not yet received.

satisfied with the conduct of the Officers of this Brigade and of the Men with few exceptions. I also beg to bring to His Lordship's notice the zeal and activity of my Deputy Asst. Adjutant General Captain Pratt and my Depty. Asst. Qr. Master General Lieut. Tucker and I have derived great assistance from both on all occasions. I also beg to notice the zeal and activity of my Aide de Camp Lieut. Thackwell and the Sub Asst. Commissary General of the Cavalry Division Lieut. Simpson, also the zeal and activity of Captain Cautley Major of Brigade 1st Cavalry Brigade, Lt.-Col. Brind, Major Fordyse. Captains Warner and Duncan attached to this Brigade of Cavalry conducted their operations greatly to my satisfaction and they and the Officers and Men are deserving of all praise. I beg leave to transmit a return of killed, wounded, and missing.

I have the honor to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
W. S. THACKWELL,
Major General,
Commanding Cavalry Division
Army of the Punjab.

Lieut.-Col. Grant, C.B.
Adjt. Genl. of the Army
Head-Quarters.

APPENDIX C

GENERAL ORDERS

BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HONORABLE

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,

HEAD QUARTERS CAMP, SHAHDERA, NEAR LAHORE,

31st March, 1849.

The Commander in Chief in India announces his farewell and adieu to the Army of the Punjaub.

The troops which, since October have been in arms under his command, are dispersed to their respective cantonments, and on this, the last occasion of addressing them, Lord Gough desires to place on record his sense of the great services and exertions through which the sway of British India has been now extended over the broad plains and classic rivers and cities of this kingdom.

The tide of conquest which heretofore rolled on the Punjaub from the west, has at length reached and overcome it from the east; and that which Alexander attempted, the British Indian Army has accomplished. It is with no common pride that the Commander in Chief applauds the conduct and the valor which have led to so glorious a result.

The favor and approbation of the country and Government will, without doubt, mark enduringly the estimate entertained of its desert; and no time will efface from the memory of this army, and every true soldier in the field, the high sense of triumph and of the glory with which this campaign has terminated. Undismayed by stern opposition, untired by the procrastinations and delays which circumstances forcibly imposed, or by the great labors and exposure which have been borne so manfully, the army has emerged with a fame and

a brightness, only the more marked by the trying nature of its previous toils and endurances.

The mere battle day, when every glowing feeling of the soldier and the Gentleman is called into action, will ever be encountered nobly where British armies are engaged; but it is in the privations, the difficulties, and endless toils of war, that the trial of an army consists; and it is these which denote its metal, and show of what material it is formed.

Since the day when at Ramnuggur the too hasty ardour and enthusiasm of the troops first gave signal of the determined character of the war, and of the fierceness with which a mistaken but brave enemy were bent to oppose the progress of our arms, till now, that a crushing and overwhelming victory has prostrated at the feet of our Ruler and his Government, an independent, a proud and a warlike people; Lord Gough, relying upon British courage and endurance, has never for one moment entertained a doubt of the result; nor yielded even to adverse chances and circumstances a lurking fear of the successful issue, which true constancy and firmness never fail to attain.

The rule which, despite the signal clemency and considerate mercy of the Government, it has nevertheless been found at length necessary to impose upon the Seikhs and their country, has not been thrust upon a defenceless or unresisting people; their valor, their numbers, their means and preparation, and the desperate energy with which, in error and deceived, the Khalsa and Seikh nation mustered and rallied for the struggle, have been conspicuously apparent; and the army which, in virtue of a most persistive constancy, has reduced such a race and such troops to submission and obedience, merits well the highest eulogium which Lord Gough can bestow.

The Commander in Chief lingers upon the severance of those ties which have bound him to that army: the last which in the field it was his duty and his pride to command. Long practice and experience of war, and its trying vicissitudes, have enabled him to form a just estimate of the conduct and merit of the troops now being dispersed; and

the ardour, the vigilance, the endurance, the closing and triumphant bravery and discipline which have marked their path in the Punjaub, will often recur to him in that retirement he is about to seek; and in which the cares, the earnest exertions, and grave anxieties inseparable from the duties of high military command, will be richly recompensed and rewarded, by the sense of duty performed, and the consciousness of unwearied and uncompromising devotion to that Sovereign and country, which in common with the British Indian army, it will ever be his boast and his pride to have so successfully served.

To every General, to every individual Officer and soldier, European and Native, of the Army of the Punjaub, Lord Gough finally repeats his cordial and affectionate farewell. Their persons and services are engraved in his heart and affections, and to those among them who may hereafter, within the brief span of life yet before him, revisit their Native country, he tenders the unaffected renewal of that intercourse and friendship which mutual esteem and regard and mutual dangers and exertions have produced and established.

By order of His Excellency the Right Honorable the Commander in Chief.

PAT. GRANT, *Lieut. Colonel,*
Adjutant General of the Army.

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